The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani

Introduction: The Importance of The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani in Modern Iranian History

The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani constitutes one of the main pillars of intellectual and political transformation during Iran’s Constitutional era—an era shaped by the confrontation between despotism and legality, traditional jurisprudence and modern concepts, and extensive debates between intellectuals and religious forces. Unlike many of his contemporary jurists who viewed changes in governmental structures with caution or suspicion, Akhund Khorasani, drawing on the intellectual heritage of the Najaf seminary, his principled rationalism, and his deep understanding of the transformations of his time, played a crucial role in legitimizing the Constitutional movement and in theoretically and practically supporting the Constitution.

For this reason, studying his theoretical foundations is essential not only for understanding the history of the Constitutional Revolution but also for analyzing the evolution of Shi‘i political jurisprudence. Moreover, his views on civil liberties, oversight of political power, limiting monarchical authority, and the necessity of legal institutions continue to be referenced in discussions on religious governance and the relationship between religion and politics. Additionally, his fundamental disagreements with the Mashrū‘a-advocates (the movement opposing the Constitutionalists) further highlight his significance among religious reformist thinkers.

In other words, only by understanding the intellectual system of Akhund Khorasani can one comprehend how a leading marja‘ and a traditional jurist became one of the political architects of legalism in Iran during an era of transformation. This article seeks, by relying on credible sources and presenting a clear structure and deep analysis, to offer a comprehensive picture of his political thought and to provide a basis for its critical evaluation.

1. The Life and Intellectual Background of Akhund Khorasani

1.1. Early Years and Scholarly Path

Mohammad-Kāzem Khorasani, known as Akhund Khorasani, was born in 1255 AH in Mashhad—a city that was then one of the major centers of religious scholarship and a meeting point for the jurisprudential and theological traditions of Khorasan. His early upbringing in such an environment nurtured in him a rational yet deeply tradition-rooted approach, a combination that later became evident in his political theorizing.

In his youth, he migrated to Najaf to continue his studies and quickly advanced within its scholarly milieu. In the second half of the 13th century AH, Najaf was not only the heart of Shi‘i jurisprudence but also a forum for intellectual exchange among Usulis, Akhbaris, philosophers, and other currents. His presence in such an environment helped shape his scholarly character and enabled him to adopt an ijtihād-centered, coherent, and realistic approach to social and political matters.

1.2. His Position in the Najaf Seminary

After years of teaching and research, Akhund Khorasani became one of the most prominent jurists of his time—especially after the death of Mirza Shirazi, when the general marja‘iyyah gravitated increasingly toward him and Shaykh Abdullah Mazandarani. His scholarly works—particularly Kifāyat al-Usūl—are not only taught as core texts in the seminaries but also demonstrate the depth of his Usuli reasoning and his precise methodological approach. This method—grounded in rational analysis and the formulation of general principles—created the intellectual foundation that later enabled him to enter political debate.

Thus, his marja‘iyyah was not merely a position of jurisprudential authority; it allowed him to play a decisive role in the broader issues of the Islamic world, especially the crises in Iran. His extensive network of representatives, his wide connections with various layers of Iranian society, and his deep knowledge of the country’s political conditions made him, from Najaf, one of the principal political actors of the Constitutional Movement.

1.3. The Historical and Social Context of His Era

Understanding The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani requires situating it within its historical context. The late Naseri period and the early reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah were marked by financial crises, colonial concessions, structural corruption, and widespread despotism—conditions that fomented public discontent. At the same time, the introduction of new European ideas—legalism, separation of powers, and civil rights—transformed the thinking of many Iranian intellectuals.

In such circumstances, Iranian society sought a framework that could meet two demands simultaneously:

• preserving religious identity, and
• establishing a political order based on law.

Drawing on principles of jurisprudence and his particular understanding of the duties of jurists during the Occultation, Akhund Khorasani offered a theory in which the Constitutional government was presented as compatible with Islamic norms.

1.4. The Link Between His Scholarly Character and Political Concerns

One of Akhund Khorasani’s most significant qualities was his ability to connect intellectual scholarship with political concern. Unlike some jurists who believed politics was separate from religious authority, he argued that the jurist—especially during the Occultation—has a religious duty to oppose tyranny and cannot remain indifferent to societal destiny. Nevertheless, he never advocated a religious government defined by the direct rule of the clergy; instead, he supported a supervisory and guiding role for jurists. This distinction marks the beginning of his divergence from the Mashrū‘a movement in Iran.

2. The Core Principles of The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani

The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani is grounded in jurisprudence and Usuli methodology, yet it is infused with a rationality and an awareness of historical context that set it apart from other political theories formulated by Shi‘i jurists. Living during a critical period marked by conflict among despotism, colonialism, and modernity, he articulated a political foundation in which the preservation of Islamic law, the realization of social justice, and the protection of public freedoms were all harmonized. This section examines the main principles of his political system.

2.1. The Union of Shari‘a and Reason: The Ijtihād-Based Foundation of His Theory

Unlike the Akhbari currents or certain traditionalist tendencies that approached reason and modern concepts with caution, Akhund Khorasani believed that Shari‘a and reason were not only non-contradictory but that reason was one of the essential tools for deriving legal rulings and identifying the public good. This Usuli approach led him to regard the adaptation of new political structures—from constitutional law to a representative assembly—not as something impossible, but as something necessary.

Thus, when he defended the rule of law, he saw it not as imitation of the West but as the establishment of a rational and religiously grounded order in the face of lawlessness and tyranny. Such a perspective enabled the jurisprudential system to engage with new political issues and created the possibility of interaction between tradition and modernity through rational principles.

2.2. The Primacy of Law and the Necessity of Oversight Institutions

One of the central themes of his political thought is the sovereignty of law—law that emerges from the will of the people and remains within the framework of Shari‘a. From his perspective, the primary conflict of the Constitutional era was not between religion and irreligion but between legalism and despotism. Therefore, institutions such as the parliament, the court of justice, and supervisory bodies not only did not contradict religion but constituted essential political obligations for preventing tyranny.

Nevertheless, he did not consider law merely a collection of secular regulations. He emphasized that the constitution and parliamentary legislation must be compatible with Shari‘a, a compatibility ensured through the presence of a supervisory jurist or a council of qualified scholars. Even so, he did not see such supervision as a replacement for the people’s sovereignty; rather, he regarded it as a guarantor of the political system’s conformity to Shari‘a.

2.3. Religious Responsibility in Confronting Tyranny and Despotism

Akhund Khorasani believed that a jurist in the era of occultation cannot remain neutral in the face of oppression and systemic corruption. Contrary to interpretations that viewed political engagement as outside the direct duties of jurists, he advocated a form of social obligation (taklīf-garā’ī-ye ejtemā‘ī). According to this view, whenever a government becomes corrupt or violates the rights of the people, silence is impermissible and is itself a form of participation in injustice.

This principle formed the foundation of his support for the Constitutional movement and his struggle against despotism. In effect, he presented the defense of freedom and legal order as a religious duty, thereby establishing a theoretical bridge between religious circles and intellectuals.

2.4. The Role of the People in Managing Public Affairs

Although Akhund Khorasani did not present a theory of “religious government” in the sense of direct rule by jurists, he emphasized active public participation in running society. He believed that during the occultation, the people not only have the right but also the obligation to supervise governmental mechanisms and participate in determining their political destiny. This belief motivated his support for elections, parliamentary representation, and broader political participation.

In his formulation, constitutional government is not an irreligious system but an arrangement of public affairs based on collective reason and religious oversight. Over time, this perspective contributed to the emergence of views in which “the people” were not merely recipients of religious rulings but key elements in the formation of political legitimacy.

2.5. Preventing Despotism Through Separating the Jurists’ Role From Executive Power

In contrast to some religious movements that considered political power inherently desirable for the clergy, Akhund Khorasani argued that jurists must remain distant from direct governmental authority in order to preserve their supervisory role. He saw direct involvement of jurists in executive affairs as dangerous, since it could lead to religious despotism—something he considered more harmful than monarchical tyranny.

Nevertheless, his theory does not imply the complete withdrawal of jurists. Rather, it emphasizes a balance between religious oversight and administrative authority. This pursuit of balance is one of the defining features of his political thought and the main point of divergence between him and the Mashrū‘a-advocates.

3. His View of Government and Political Legitimacy

Akhund Khorasani lived during a time in which the question of political legitimacy was one of the most pressing intellectual and political issues in Iran. The decline of the monarchy’s traditional authority, the influence of colonial concessions, and the emergence of new ideas all underscored the need to redefine legitimacy on new grounds. The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani represents an attempt to answer the fundamental question of how a government in the era of occultation can be both legitimate and effective.

3.1. Government in the Era of Occultation: The Necessity of Practical, Non-Divine Administration

One of the major principles of his political theory is the distinction between the “government of the infallible Imam” and the “non-divine (or customary) government.” In traditional thought, perfect justice and legitimacy are attainable only under the rule of an infallible Imam. However, given the conditions of the occultation, society cannot be left without a governing structure. Therefore, Akhund Khorasani held that establishing a practical, non-divine government—based on reason and public consultation—is both a rational and religious necessity.

From his viewpoint, such a government, if grounded in law, justice, and religious oversight, is not only legitimate but also the best safeguard against the rise of tyrants and autocrats. In this framework, constitutional monarchy represents an example of this necessary “customary administration” that is religiously acceptable.

3.2. The Legitimacy of Government: From the Will of the People to Compatibility With Shari‘a

Unlike traditional theories that reduced political legitimacy to divine appointment or the general guardianship of jurists, Akhund Khorasani linked the legitimacy of constitutional government to public consent and adherence to Shari‘a. In his view, the people play an active role in forming and monitoring government, and a government without public approval lacks full legitimacy.

Though grounded in Usuli jurisprudence, his theory aligns in certain ways with modern political concepts. In other words, he regarded public acceptance as both a rational and religious condition for the healthy administration of society, and on this basis he emphasized that the National Consultative Assembly represents the public will and must form the center of policymaking.

3.3. Limiting the Power of the Monarchy

Akhund Khorasani’s role in limiting monarchical power is one of the most striking dimensions of his political thought. At a time when Qajar kings claimed absolute authority and the monarchy was structurally inclined toward corruption and tyranny, he declared unequivocally that the shah held no divine right to govern and could be considered legitimate only if he operated under the constitution and under the supervision of the people’s representatives.

His support for the Constitutional movement was not motivated by a desire for superficial reform but by a deep commitment to “limiting political power,” since he believed despotism—whether religious or royal—was the chief cause of moral decay and political misery in Muslim societies. This belief made him a central figure in reducing royal authority and establishing supervisory institutions.

3.4. The Position of Jurists Within the Political Structure

One of the most debated aspects of his theory is the role of jurists. Unlike some jurists who advocated forming a religious government based on the general guardianship of the clergy, Akhund Khorasani insisted that the main duty of the jurist during the occultation is supervision, not direct governance. This supervisory role serves two key functions:

1. Ensuring that legislation conforms to Shari‘a
2. Preventing the government from deviating from justice and moral principles

He believed that direct involvement of jurists in executive authority was dangerous because excessive clerical participation in politics exposed religion to corruption and exploitation. This view was not merely political but a continuation of his rational and Usuli methodology applied to the political sphere.

3.5. The Relationship Between Law and Shari‘a in Constitutional Government

In his view, as long as the constitution and customary laws do not conflict with the fundamental principles of Shari‘a, they can serve as the primary instruments for regulating social relations. Contrary to certain traditionalist currents that regarded any non-religious law as illegitimate innovation, he emphasized cooperation between Shari‘a and customary law.

He believed that many matters of public administration fall within the domain of mubāhāt or manṭeqat al-farāgh—areas left to human discretion—and can thus be regulated by representatives of the people based on contemporary needs. This is one of the strengths of his intellectual system, enabling the reconciliation of religion with modern political structures.

4. Akhund Khorasani’s Relationship with Modern Concepts

Alongside its political and social crises, the Constitutional Revolution created a space for the introduction of new concepts into Iran’s intellectual world—concepts such as civil liberties, social justice, separation of powers, the constitution, and the rights of the nation. Although these ideas had emerged from European intellectual developments, in Iran of that era they needed religious justification and harmonization with Islamic tradition in order to survive. The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani becomes particularly significant at this point, because he was able, by relying on jurisprudential and rational principles, to formulate a framework that both addressed the needs of a religious society and facilitated the acceptance of modern concepts.

4.1. Liberty: A Natural Right or a Religious Duty?

In Akhund Khorasani’s view, liberty was not merely a social demand or an imported concept from the West; it was a moral and religious necessity for preserving human dignity. He believed that freedom of thought and freedom from oppression were the two main pillars of a healthy society. For him, liberty meant emancipation from despotism and the ability to participate freely in shaping public affairs.

Akhund clearly emphasized that restricting people’s legitimate freedoms was not a sign of governmental strength but a sign of its deviation. Therefore, his defense of liberty was not a short-term political stance but stemmed from his particular understanding of duty and social responsibility.

4.2. Justice: The Axis of Organizing Power

Justice in The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani was not merely a moral virtue; it was the foundational principle of politics. He considered a political system legitimate only if it could establish justice in society through proper legislation, a trustworthy judiciary, and continuous oversight.

Akhund associated justice with legal equality, adherence to the rule of law, and the prevention of power concentration. Thus, he opposed both royal despotism and religious despotism, viewing both as violations of justice and threats to people’s liberty. Justice, in his political system, became the criterion for assessing the health or corruption of political power.

4.3. Separation of Powers: Preventing the Concentration of Power

One of the most important aspects of Akhund Khorasani’s acceptance of modern concepts was his view of the separation of powers. Although this idea originated in Western philosophical thought, Akhund found it acceptable based on jurisprudential and rational analysis. In his view:

• If law becomes concentrated in the hands of the monarch, despotism emerges.
• If the judiciary is subordinate to the monarch’s will, justice disappears.
• If oversight of political power is removed, political corruption becomes permanent.

Thus, for him, separation of powers was not an imitation of Western politics but a religiously and rationally justified mechanism for restraining power. This approach gave his support for the parliament and oversight institutions a theoretical and intrinsic dimension rather than a merely political one.

4.4. The Constitution: Connecting Modern Order with Religious Principles

For Akhund Khorasani, the constitution was a document for regulating relations of power and guaranteeing public rights—but it had to be designed in a way that did not violate the general principles of the Sharia. He was one of those who read the constitution carefully, commented on several of its articles, and challenged the sections he considered problematic—such as certain overly broad powers granted to the monarch.

In his view, the constitution had several key functions:

1. Limiting monarchical power
2. Guaranteeing public participation
3. Creating legal stability
4. Providing social order in accordance with Sharia

Thus, he saw not only the existence of a constitution as necessary but also the reform of it as part of the political evolution of society.

4.5. Active Engagement with Modernity—Neither Rejection nor Submission

A significant feature of The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani is that, unlike some intellectuals of his era, he did not view modernity as the only path to saving Iran, nor—like some religious traditionalists—did he see it as a threat to the faith of society. Between these two extremes, he paved a rational and principled way:

• Whatever aspects of modernity that enhance justice, social order, and liberty are acceptable.
• Whatever leads to despotism or moral laxity must be rejected.

This approach is precisely what allows modern concepts to become compatible with Islamic jurisprudence in the Iranian context.

5. Akhund Khorasani’s Intellectual Differences with Other Currents

The ideological and political disputes of the Constitutional era were not merely conflicts between intellectuals and the state; serious debates also emerged within the religious tradition. Among these, the conflict between The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani and the views of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri and other proponents of Mashru‘eh (theocratic constitutionalism) was one of the most significant and decisive intellectual confrontations in modern Iranian history. These disagreements not only influenced the trajectory of the Constitutional Movement but also revealed divergent visions of the relationship between religion and political power.

5.1. Roots of the Dispute: Two Different Understandings of “Sharia” and “Customary Law”

At the theoretical level, the core disagreement between Akhund and the Mashru‘eh advocates concerned what could constitute the foundation of political order in the era of occultation. Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri believed that governance must be entirely based on Sharia and that customary law had no independent standing; hence his theory of Mashru‘eh.

In contrast, Akhund Khorasani argued:

• Sharia defines the general principles;
• But political administration and public affairs are entrusted to custom, reason, and public consultation.

In other words, the Mashru‘eh advocates proposed, from within the tradition, a model of religious governance with a prominent role for the clergy. Akhund, however, advocated religious oversight, not direct clerical rule.

5.2. Their Relationship to the Constitution and Modern Institutions

For the Constitutional project, the constitution was the cornerstone of the new political order. The difference of opinion was stark:

• The Mashru‘eh advocates found the constitution legitimate only if every article was explicitly grounded in religious texts.
• Akhund Khorasani regarded the constitution as an instrument for preventing despotism and organizing power, and acceptable so long as it did not contradict the general principles of Sharia.

In Akhund’s view, customary (non-religious) law is formed within the sphere of manṭaqat al-farāgh—the domain left open by Sharia—and may be legislated by representatives of the people. This understanding enabled jurisprudence to engage constructively with political modernity.

5.3. Disagreement over the Role of Clerics in Power

This was perhaps the most fundamental disagreement between the two camps.

Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri’s view:
Clerics must play a guiding and corrective role directly within governance, and the legislative body cannot function without constant religious supervision.

Akhund Khorasani’s view:
Clerics should supervise, not rule. Their direct involvement in politics—especially in executive positions—could lead to religious despotism, which he saw as more dangerous than political despotism.

Thus, Akhund drew a clear distinction among three roles:

1. The role of the people in electing and supervising rulers
2. The role of representatives in legislation
3. The role of clerics in religious oversight and preventing deviation

This balance distinguished his theory from that of the Mashru‘eh advocates.

5.4. Divergent Views on “Modernity” and “Political Reform”

Mashru‘eh advocates largely approached new concepts with suspicion, fearing that their acceptance would weaken the Sharia. But Akhund Khorasani had a different perspective:

• Political modernity is acceptable if it leads to justice and liberty.
• Absolute rejection of modern institutions leaves society vulnerable to despotism.

This difference was not superficial—it arose from two distinct interpretations of public interest (maṣlaḥa), reason (‘aql), and religious duty.

5.5. Political Consequences of the Dispute: Two Paths for Iran’s Future

The conflict between the two currents was not merely theoretical; it had direct consequences for the political fate of the Constitutional Movement:

• The Constitutionalists emphasized parliament, the constitution, and public liberties.
• The Mashru‘eh advocates proposed a religiously infused model of government with a strong clerical role.

These two paths laid the groundwork for two distinct interpretations of the relationship between religion and politics in Iran. The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani, with all its complexity, offered a balanced and rational interpretation that sought, while remaining faithful to Sharia, to enable political modernization and to restrain power.

6. Comparing The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani with Constitutional-Era Intellectuals

6.1. His Relationship with Malkam Khan: Shared Commitment to Legalism, Divergence in Foundations

Malkam Khan was one of the earliest modern theorists of legalism in Iran. He regarded law as the fundamental principle of political order and believed that Iran could escape despotism only by institutionalizing a modern legal system. A noteworthy aspect of his thought is that, despite his intellectual leanings and distance from traditional jurisprudence, he assigned the clergy a supervisory role in public affairs—a role grounded not in wilayah (authoritative guardianship) but in their social and moral credibility.

This creates a significant point of convergence with The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani. Akhund also viewed law as the main tool for preventing oppression and believed that jurists should supervise and safeguard political justice, not hold executive power. However, the main difference lies in their foundations:

• Malkam viewed law as a product of human reason and the experience of modern states,
• whereas Akhund understood law within the framework of Sharia and deemed constitutionalism legitimate because it did not conflict with the overarching principles of Sharia.

In essence, while Malkam reached the ideal of restraining despotism through the secular path of a legal order, Akhund reached a similar result via principled Shi‘i jurisprudence and the religious duties of the age of occultation.

6.2. Comparison with Talibov: Human-Centered vs. Duty-Centered Approaches

Talibov Tabrizi, one of the most influential Muslim intellectuals of the Constitutional period, emphasized awareness, civic education, individual liberty, and the priority of the human being over political structures. He believed social reform was attainable through education and the development of civic rationality, and he saw religion primarily as a provider of moral meaning rather than as a regulator of governance structures.

In contrast, while Akhund Khorasani valued reason and liberty, his political analysis was duty-centered: the jurist has the duty to resist despotism, the believer has the duty to defend justice, and society has the duty to prevent oppression. The difference lies in their starting points:

• Talibov approached politics from the standpoint of human rights,
• whereas Akhund approached it from religious duty and the preservation of religion and justice.

This distinction gives Talibov’s constitutionalism a cultural–social character, whereas Akhund’s constitutionalism acquires a political–jurisprudential character.

6.3. His Distinction from Secular Westernizing Intellectuals

The radical Westernizing current—for example, certain writers of Habl al-Matin or groups connected to clandestine societies—considered the religious structure of politics inherently ineffective and called for direct emulation of European states. In their view, complete separation of religion from government was a prerequisite for development.

Akhund Khorasani distanced himself from such an approach. He believed:

• justice cannot endure without a strong moral foundation,
• Religion is an inseparable moral and identity-giving element of Iranian society,
• Yet direct clerical involvement in executive power is dangerous and leads to religious despotism.

Thus, his position stands between two poles:

No strict secularism, and no religious government;
rather, a constitutional government with non-interventionist religious oversight.

6.4. His Difference from Na’ini and Fazlollah Nuri in Comparative View

A brief comparative note clarifies the picture:

• With Na’ini: Although they worked together, Na’ini formulated constitutionalism with greater theological–philosophical precision. His thought is more systematic and theoretical, whereas Akhund was more influential in political action and more decisive in his stances.
• With the Mashru‘eh advocates: They believed government must implement Sharia directly and that jurists should rule over lawmaking. Akhund, by contrast, considered government a customary (non-sacred) matter whose legitimacy required only the avoidance of injustice and non-contradiction with Sharia.

These distinctions show that Akhund Khorasani belongs neither to the camp of modernist intellectuals nor to the camp of theocratic traditionalists; he articulates a mediating theory that is unique in its own way.

6.5. Comparison with Sayyid Jamal al-Din and Muhammad Abduh: Religious Reform and the Role of Rationality

6.5.1. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: Political Reformer and Anti-Despot

Sayyid Jamal al-Din, one of the leading activists and theorists of religious reform in the Islamic world, emphasized the necessity of resisting despotism and colonialism. Like Akhund Khorasani, he believed in the role of the people and social awareness in achieving political change; yet the differences are notable:

• Sayyid Jamal focused more on social mobilization and the unity of the Islamic world, while Akhund Khorasani focused on domestic laws and Iran’s constitutional system.
• Akhund’s approach was grounded in political philosophy and jurisprudence, whereas Sayyid Jamal’s method was pragmatic and agitational, emphasizing political action and the unity of the ummah.

Nevertheless, both shared a commitment to resisting despotism and corruption and to the necessity of political reform based on reason and morality.

6.5.2. Muhammad Abduh: Religious Rationality and Reconstructing Jurisprudence

Muhammad Abduh, one of Egypt’s most important religious reformers, sought to rationally reinterpret jurisprudence and adapt Sharia to the needs of the time, aiming to reconcile Islam with modernity. Compared to Akhund Khorasani:

• Abduh pursued religious reform and jurisprudential reconstruction across the Arab world and Islamic teachings more broadly,
• while Akhund Khorasani operated primarily within Shi‘i jurisprudence and Iranian conditions—yet both shared the principle of adapting Sharia to contemporary needs.

Both believed in oversight of power, but Abduh understood this role mainly in educational and moral terms, whereas Akhund defined it in practical, institutional terms through juristic supervision.

6.5.3. Comparative Summary

Through comparison with Malkom Khan, Talibov, secular intellectuals, Na’ini, Fazlollah Nuri, Sayyid Jamal al-Din, and Muhammad Abduh, it becomes clear:

• Akhund Khorasani played a moderate, rational role among these diverse currents, respecting juristic oversight while affirming the necessity of popular participation and the constitution.
• He represents a point of convergence among religious reform, constitutionalism, and political rationality—without leaning toward full secularism or extreme clerical rule.
• This position makes his thought a unique model of interest for both historical study and analysis of religious politics in contemporary Iran.

7. The Achievements and Enduring Legacy of The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani

Beyond its direct influence on the victory of the Constitutional Movement and the emergence of legal governance in Iran, The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani left a multilayered legacy for political jurisprudence, law, and theories of government in the Islamic world. His achievements can be examined under several key themes:

7.1. Establishing the Role of Jurisprudence in Modern Politics

Akhund Khorasani demonstrated that Shi‘i jurisprudence is not merely a theoretical system for worship and personal matters but can serve as a tool for regulating social relations and controlling political power. By proposing a model in which jurists supervise executive power without directly exercising it, he created a balance between religion and politics that later became a reference point in modern political jurisprudence. This approach both provided religious legitimacy for the constitutional government and prevented religious despotism.

7.2. Strengthening Constitutionalism and Legal Order

One of his major contributions was his decisive and systematic support for the constitution and the new institutions of constitutionalism. Using jurisprudential principles, Akhund Khorasani showed that law and legal order are not in conflict with Sharia and that a law-governed state can be religiously legitimate. This helped consolidate the parliament, the court of justice, and oversight institutions, and paved the way for Iran’s progress toward a rule-of-law state.

7.3. Protecting Liberty and Social Justice

Akhund Khorasani not only recognized civil liberties as the rights of the people but also regarded social justice as the core of politics and the measure of governmental legitimacy. By limiting monarchy and preventing religious despotism, he created a framework that guaranteed people’s rights, political transparency, and relative justice. This perspective became a model for later generations seeking to combine freedom, justice, and religion in political life.

7.4. Influence on Intellectual Currents and Religious Reform

Akhund Khorasani’s thought influenced Muslim intellectuals, modern jurists, and Constitutional-era writers. He demonstrated that jurisprudential reflection can be linked to political reform, social justice, and civil liberties. Later intellectual currents—from critics of the Mashru‘eh movement to secular thinkers and religious reformers like Sayyid Jamal and Abduh—drew part of their inspiration from his teachings.

7.5. A Mediating Model Between Tradition and Modernity

Perhaps Akhund Khorasani’s most important legacy is his ability to articulate a mediating model between tradition and modernity:

• preservation of Sharia principles and respect for jurisprudence
• acceptance of legalism, separation of powers, and civil liberties
• rational and principled engagement with modern institutions
• juristic oversight without direct executive intervention

This synthesis makes his thought unique—neither excessively traditionalist nor Westernizing secular—and constitutes an example of harmonizing religion and politics in the age of modernity, relevant to Iran and even the broader Islamic world.

Conclusion and Critique of The Political Thought of Akhund Khorasani

By combining jurisprudential principles, rationality, and the necessities of the time, Akhund Khorasani offered a unique model of politics during the Constitutional era. He showed that Shi‘i jurisprudence can become a practical framework for limiting despotism, supporting law, and ensuring social justice—without diminishing the independence or legitimate freedoms of the people. His thought influenced constitutionalism and laid the foundations for contemporary discussions on political jurisprudence and the relationship between religion and government.

Strengths of His Thought

1. Balance between religion and politics:
   Akhund Khorasani avoided both extreme secularism and direct clerical dominance, making non-interventionist religious oversight the axis of politics.
2. Commitment to legalism:
   He considered the constitution and constitutional institutions legitimate and essential tools for restraining despotism.
3. Emphasis on justice and liberty:
   Both civil liberties and social justice stood at the center of his political thought.
4. Flexibility toward modernity:
   He was able to harmonize modern concepts with Sharia and pursued rational engagement with reformist movements.

Critiques and Limitations

Despite its strengths, several criticisms and limitations may be noted:

1. Lack of a clear executive model:
   While theoretically valuable, juristic supervision without executive involvement can create ambiguity in responsibilities and conflict between institutions.
2. Specificity to Shi‘i jurisprudence:
   His thought was grounded in Shi‘i jurisprudence and Iranian conditions, making it difficult to generalize to other Islamic or non-Shi‘i societies.
3. Dual foundations of legitimacy:
   Although the combination of popular legitimacy and jurisprudential legitimacy is balanced, it may lead to conflicts in political decision-making—especially during crises when immediate interests may appear to conflict with religious oversight.

Final Remarks

Akhund Khorasani represents an exceptional model of a rational political jurist who successfully harmonized the jurisprudential tradition with the demands of modernity. By preserving Sharia, guaranteeing liberty and justice, and creating supervisory mechanisms, his thought charted a new path for the interaction of religion and politics in Iran and the Islamic world. Although it has limitations, his legacy continues to inspire scholars, policymakers, and religious thinkers seeking to integrate reason, justice, and faith in governance.