Repression in the Middle East

Introduction

At first glance, Repression in the Middle East is often explained through the actions of authoritarian rulers, powerful security establishments, or the political crises that have defined the region over the past several decades. From military-backed governments in Egypt and Syria to sophisticated systems of political control in Iraq, Jordan, and Algeria, conventional analyses typically attribute repression to the strategic choices of post-independence regimes. Yet such explanations leave an important question unanswered: are contemporary coercive institutions merely products of modern authoritarian governments, or are they rooted in institutional structures established during the colonial era?

Over the past two decades, a growing body of comparative politics scholarship has challenged state-centric and leader-centric explanations of authoritarianism by emphasizing the enduring influence of colonial institutions. Among the scholars advancing this perspective, Elizabeth R. Nugent argues that authoritarian governance in the Middle East cannot be fully understood without examining the institutional legacies of European colonialism. Rather than emerging from institutional vacuums after independence, postcolonial states inherited administrative systems, security bureaucracies, emergency laws, and mechanisms of political surveillance originally designed by colonial authorities. Consequently, many of the coercive capacities employed by contemporary governments represent historical continuities rather than entirely new political creations.

This argument draws heavily upon the tradition of historical institutionalism, particularly the concept of path dependence. According to this perspective, institutions created during critical historical junctures continue shaping political outcomes long after the original conditions have disappeared. Independence, therefore, did not necessarily represent a complete institutional rupture. Instead, newly sovereign governments frequently preserved—and often expanded—the administrative and security apparatus inherited from colonial rule because these institutions proved effective instruments for consolidating political authority.

The Middle East provides a particularly compelling context for examining this proposition because colonial experiences across the region were far from uniform. The French and British empires governed their territories according to fundamentally different philosophies of imperial rule. French colonial administration pursued a highly centralized model that sought to transform colonial societies through direct bureaucratic intervention, whereas Britain generally relied upon indirect rule, governing through local elites, tribal leaders, and existing political hierarchies. If these contrasting colonial projects produced distinct institutional legacies, one would expect contemporary patterns of repression to differ accordingly.

This article examines precisely that proposition. Building upon Elizabeth R. Nugent’s theoretical framework, it asks a central question: To what extent can differences in repression across Middle Eastern states be explained by the contrasting institutional legacies of French and British colonial rule? To answer this question, the article first introduces the historical institutionalist approach and the concept of path dependence before examining Nugent’s argument concerning colonial state formation. It then compares several Middle Eastern cases—including Syria, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan—to explore how colonial administrative structures shaped post-independence security institutions and state-society relations. Finally, it evaluates both the strengths and limitations of Nugent’s framework by considering alternative explanations, including military institutions, rentier economies, regional wars, and political leadership.

Rather than presenting colonialism as a deterministic explanation for authoritarianism, this article argues that colonial institutions established the political foundations upon which later authoritarian regimes were constructed. Understanding repression in the Middle East, therefore, requires looking beyond contemporary governments toward the historical processes through which modern states themselves were originally built.

Why Should the Origins of Repression Be Sought in Colonialism? Elizabeth R. Nugent’s Historical Institutionalist Framework

One of the central questions in the study of authoritarianism is why Middle Eastern states—despite their diverse political histories, economic structures, sectarian compositions, and social landscapes—have developed remarkably durable systems of political control. Conventional explanations point to military dominance, oil wealth, geopolitical rivalry, or the personal ambitions of authoritarian rulers. While each of these factors undoubtedly contributes to the persistence of authoritarian rule, they do not adequately explain why coercive institutions themselves became so deeply entrenched in the first place. Elizabeth R. Nugent argues that the answer lies much earlier in history: in the institutional architecture constructed during the colonial era.

Nugent’s argument is grounded in historical institutionalism, an approach that views political institutions not as temporary administrative arrangements but as enduring structures that shape political behavior across generations. Central to this perspective is the concept of path dependence, which suggests that institutional choices made during critical historical junctures constrain the range of political options available in subsequent periods. Once institutions become embedded within the state, they develop their own organizational routines, bureaucratic interests, and political constituencies, making fundamental institutional change both difficult and costly.

From this perspective, the end of colonial rule did not represent a complete institutional rupture. Although sovereignty passed from European empires to newly independent governments, the administrative machinery of the state remained largely intact. Bureaucracies, legal systems, intelligence agencies, police organizations, and emergency regulations originally designed to govern colonial territories frequently survived independence and were subsequently adapted to serve postcolonial regimes. Independence changed political authority, but it did not necessarily transform the institutions through which authority was exercised.

This insight constitutes one of Nugent’s most significant contributions to the literature on authoritarianism. Rather than asking simply whether colonialism mattered, she asks a more precise question: what kind of colonialism mattered? In her view, the critical variable is not colonial rule per se, but the distinct political objectives pursued by different imperial powers. Colonial institutions reflected the strategic purposes of the empires that created them, and these divergent objectives produced different models of state formation whose effects remain visible long after formal colonialism ended.

According to Nugent, French colonialism was fundamentally driven by a civilizing project. French imperial authorities regarded themselves not merely as rulers of overseas territories but as agents of political, legal, and cultural transformation. Inspired by the republican ideal of the mission civilisatrice, colonial administrators sought to remake colonial societies through centralized administration, legal standardization, educational reform, linguistic assimilation, and direct bureaucratic penetration into everyday social life. Governing the colony therefore required an extensive administrative apparatus capable of observing, classifying, regulating, and, when necessary, coercing the population.

The implications for state coercion were profound. Under the French model, repression was not simply an emergency response to rebellion or political dissent. It became an integral component of governance itself. Surveillance, intelligence gathering, bureaucratic registration, centralized policing, and continuous monitoring of civil society formed part of a broader strategy of social transformation. The objective was not only to suppress resistance but also to reshape society according to the political and cultural vision of the colonial state.

British imperial governance rested upon a markedly different logic. The British Empire was principally concerned with maintaining political stability, protecting strategic trade routes, securing access to critical resources, and minimizing the financial costs of imperial administration. Rather than attempting to reconstruct colonial societies, British officials generally preferred to govern through existing local institutions. Kings, tribal leaders, religious authorities, and established elites were incorporated into colonial administration so long as they guaranteed political order and safeguarded imperial interests.

This strategy of indirect rule generated a different institutional legacy. Because governance relied heavily upon local intermediaries, Britain had less incentive to construct the kind of comprehensive bureaucratic and surveillance apparatus characteristic of French colonial administration. Coercion remained an essential instrument of imperial rule, but it was typically deployed selectively—to suppress major uprisings, protect strategic interests, or preserve political stability—rather than as a permanent mechanism for reorganizing society.

Here lies the central theoretical innovation of Nugent’s framework. She argues that the distinction between French and British colonialism should not be understood simply as a difference in administrative style, but as a difference in the purpose of state power itself. French colonial institutions were designed to transform society through direct state intervention, whereas British institutions sought to preserve order by managing alliances with local elites. Consequently, the security institutions inherited by postcolonial states reflected these different governing philosophies.

The significance of this distinction became increasingly evident after independence. Governments that inherited French administrative structures often expanded highly centralized bureaucracies, intelligence services, and systems of social surveillance because these institutions were readily available instruments for consolidating domestic authority. By contrast, many states shaped by British colonial rule continued to rely more heavily upon political coalitions, patronage networks, traditional elites, and selective coercion. In both cases repression persisted, but the institutional logic through which it operated differed substantially.

Importantly, Nugent does not argue that French colonialism was inherently more violent than British colonialism, or vice versa. Both empires relied upon coercion whenever their authority was challenged. The crucial distinction lies elsewhere: violence served different political projects. French coercion was embedded within an ambitious project of state-led societal transformation, while British coercion primarily functioned to safeguard imperial stability and economic interests. The institutions created to achieve these distinct objectives continued shaping postcolonial governance long after colonial administrations themselves had disappeared.

Seen in this light, the study of repression in the Middle East requires moving beyond contemporary political crises or individual authoritarian leaders. Instead, it demands an examination of the historical processes through which coercive institutions were originally established, institutionalized, and ultimately inherited by postcolonial states. This historical perspective forms the analytical foundation upon which Nugent builds her broader explanation of authoritarian resilience across the region.

Two Colonial Models, Two Logics of Repression: Comparing the French and British Legacies in the Middle East

If Elizabeth R. Nugent is correct in arguing that the objectives of colonialism shaped the institutions of repression, then understanding contemporary authoritarianism in the Middle East requires distinguishing between two fundamentally different imperial projects. France and Britain both relied on coercion, surveillance, and political domination to preserve their colonial rule. Yet these instruments served different purposes. It was these divergent objectives—not merely differences in administrative style—that produced two distinct traditions of state formation whose institutional legacies continue to shape patterns of repression in the Middle East today.

The French Colonial Project: The State as an Instrument of Social Transformation

French colonialism was driven by an ambitious political vision that extended far beyond territorial conquest or economic extraction. Influenced by the republican ideal of the mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission), French policymakers believed that France possessed a universal political and cultural model that could—and should—be transplanted into colonial societies. Colonial rule was therefore conceived not simply as administration, but as a project of transformation.

This civilizing mission required a powerful and highly centralized state. Transforming society demanded more than military occupation; it required detailed knowledge of the population and the capacity to regulate everyday life. Colonial authorities invested heavily in bureaucratic institutions capable of registering populations, collecting information, supervising education, regulating religious organizations, standardizing legal systems, and extending state authority into local communities. Surveillance became an essential feature of governance because effective transformation depended upon continuous observation and administrative penetration.

Within this framework, repression assumed a preventive rather than merely reactive function. Security institutions were designed not only to suppress rebellion after it emerged but to identify, monitor, and neutralize potential opposition before it could threaten colonial authority. Police organizations, intelligence services, and administrative bureaucracies worked together as components of an integrated governing apparatus whose purpose extended well beyond maintaining public order.

Perhaps the most enduring legacy of French colonialism was therefore not military occupation itself, but the creation of a centralized administrative state possessing extraordinary capacity to intervene directly in society. Following independence, many postcolonial governments retained these institutions because they provided highly effective mechanisms for consolidating domestic political authority.

The British Colonial Project: Governing Through Stability and Local Alliances

British imperial governance followed a markedly different trajectory. Unlike France, Britain generally viewed empire through a strategic and economic lens. The principal objectives of British rule were to safeguard maritime routes, secure commercial interests, maintain regional stability, and protect access to valuable resources. Social transformation was rarely considered an end in itself.

Consequently, Britain preferred governing through indirect rule whenever circumstances allowed. Rather than replacing indigenous political structures with an expansive colonial bureaucracy, British administrators frequently incorporated existing monarchies, tribal leaders, religious authorities, and local elites into the machinery of imperial governance. These intermediaries maintained social order while reducing both the financial and administrative costs of direct colonial administration.

Because governance relied upon local partners, Britain had less incentive to construct comprehensive systems of bureaucratic surveillance comparable to those developed by France. Coercion remained indispensable, but it was typically employed selectively—to suppress major uprisings, secure strategic assets, or restore political stability when necessary. Everyday governance depended less upon continuous state intervention than upon negotiated relationships with local power holders.

This approach produced a very different institutional inheritance. After independence, many states shaped by British colonialism continued relying on political coalitions, patronage networks, tribal alliances, and established elites as central mechanisms of governance. Security institutions certainly existed, but political stability depended as much upon maintaining elite bargains as upon expanding direct state surveillance over society.

Comparing Two Institutional Legacies

The contrast between the French and British colonial models may be summarized through several key institutional dimensions.

This comparison should not be interpreted as an absolute dichotomy. French colonial authorities frequently relied upon local collaborators, while Britain occasionally exercised direct and extraordinarily violent forms of rule. Both empires employed repression whenever their authority was challenged. The essential distinction lies elsewhere: the institutional purpose of coercion differed fundamentally between the two imperial projects.

For France, coercion was embedded within a broader strategy of reshaping society through centralized state intervention. For Britain, coercion functioned primarily as a means of preserving political order while allowing existing social hierarchies to remain largely intact. Consequently, the institutions inherited by postcolonial governments reflected these contrasting philosophies of governance.

This insight represents one of Nugent’s most important theoretical contributions. Rather than explaining authoritarianism primarily through the personalities of rulers, military coups, or immediate security threats, she directs attention to the historical construction of state institutions themselves. Contemporary authoritarian governments inherited different institutional repertoires because they inherited different colonial states. The capacity of governments to monitor, discipline, and repress society was therefore shaped long before independence.

The explanatory power of Nugent’s argument, however, ultimately depends upon empirical evidence. Do former French territories actually exhibit different patterns of repression than former British ones? Can variations between countries such as Syria and Jordan, or Algeria and Iraq, be understood through their contrasting colonial legacies? These questions require moving beyond theory to examine concrete historical experiences—a task undertaken in the following section through a comparative analysis of several Middle Eastern case studies.

Colonial Legacies in Practice: Testing Elizabeth R. Nugent’s Theory Through Middle Eastern Case Studies

The explanatory strength of any theory ultimately depends on its ability to account for real-world political outcomes. Elizabeth R. Nugent’s argument is no exception. If differences in colonial state-building produced distinct institutional traditions, those differences should remain visible in the organization of postcolonial states and in the ways governments exercise coercive power. The Middle East offers an ideal setting for examining this proposition because countries with comparable social and geopolitical conditions often experienced markedly different colonial administrations.

Importantly, Nugent does not argue that every former French colony developed an identical authoritarian system, nor that every former British territory followed the same political trajectory. Rather, she identifies institutional tendencies—persistent patterns of state organization that continue to influence political choices decades after independence. Historical legacies create constraints and opportunities, but they do not eliminate political agency.

Syria: The Persistence of the Centralized Security State

Syria represents perhaps the strongest illustration of Nugent’s argument regarding the French colonial legacy. During the French Mandate (1920–1946), colonial authorities invested heavily in constructing a centralized administrative apparatus capable of extending state authority throughout society. Bureaucratic institutions, intelligence networks, centralized policing, and extensive systems of population registration formed essential components of French governance.

Following independence, successive Syrian governments inherited these institutions rather than dismantling them. The rise of the Ba’ath Party after 1963 and the consolidation of power under Hafez al-Assad significantly expanded the existing security infrastructure. Multiple intelligence agencies, extensive surveillance of political organizations, centralized control over the media, and the penetration of security institutions into nearly every sphere of public life became defining characteristics of the Syrian state.

From Nugent’s perspective, this evolution reflects institutional continuity rather than institutional innovation. The Ba’athist regime did not create a centralized state from scratch; instead, it strengthened and repurposed institutional capacities that had already been established during the colonial period. Repression consequently became preventive as well as punitive. The objective was not merely to eliminate opposition once it emerged but to monitor society continuously in order to discourage organized dissent before it could develop.

Algeria: Independence Without Institutional Rupture

Algeria presents a more complex case because it achieved independence only after one of the twentieth century’s most violent anti-colonial struggles. One might expect such a revolutionary rupture to produce an equally radical transformation of state institutions. Yet the post-independence trajectory suggests a remarkable degree of institutional continuity.

Following independence in 1962, the National Liberation Front (FLN) inherited a highly centralized administrative system created during more than a century of French colonial rule. Although the ideological foundations of the new state differed fundamentally from those of the colonial regime, many administrative practices, legal frameworks, and bureaucratic structures remained intact. Centralized authority, strong executive institutions, and an expansive security apparatus continued to characterize Algerian governance.

This continuity illustrates one of the central insights of historical institutionalism: institutions frequently outlive the political regimes that created them. Once established, administrative organizations develop routines, expertise, and organizational capacities that successive governments often find useful regardless of ideological orientation. In Algeria, the colonial state disappeared, but many of its governing mechanisms survived.

Jordan: Coalition Building Instead of Comprehensive Surveillance

Jordan offers a contrasting example shaped primarily by British imperial governance. Under the British Mandate, political authority depended less upon direct bureaucratic penetration than upon cooperation with the Hashemite monarchy, tribal leaders, and local elites. Rather than replacing existing social structures, British administrators sought to stabilize them in ways that served imperial interests.

Following independence, the Hashemite monarchy largely preserved this governing logic. Although Jordan developed capable security institutions, political stability depended equally upon maintaining broad coalitions among tribal communities, military elites, business interests, and regional allies. State authority has therefore rested not only on coercive capacity but also on the continuous management of political alliances.

Consequently, repression in Jordan has often been more selective than comprehensive. Security measures have typically intensified during periods of political crisis or perceived threats to regime stability, while routine governance has relied heavily on negotiated relationships between the monarchy and influential social actors. This pattern closely corresponds to Nugent’s characterization of the British institutional legacy.

Iraq: A Challenge to the Theory

Among Nugent’s case studies, Iraq presents perhaps the greatest theoretical challenge. Initially administered under British influence, the Iraqi state emerged through a combination of indirect rule, monarchical governance, and cooperation with local elites. Yet the political transformations that followed—including the 1958 revolution, Ba’athist rule, prolonged regional wars, international sanctions, and the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein—fundamentally altered the structure of the Iraqi state.

By the late twentieth century, Iraq possessed one of the region’s most extensive security apparatuses, displaying characteristics often associated with highly centralized authoritarian systems. At first glance, this appears inconsistent with Nugent’s expectations regarding the British colonial legacy.

Historical institutionalism, however, does not claim that colonial institutions permanently determine political outcomes. Instead, it recognizes that critical junctures—such as revolutions, wars, foreign occupations, or state collapse—can redirect institutional development onto new trajectories. Iraq demonstrates that path dependence is not historical determinism. Colonial legacies remain influential, but they may be substantially modified by subsequent political upheavals.

Egypt: Where Multiple Historical Legacies Converge

Egypt occupies an equally distinctive position. Although British influence shaped much of Egypt’s modern political development, the country possessed a long tradition of centralized state administration dating back to the nineteenth-century reforms of Muhammad Ali. Later, the Free Officers’ Revolution of 1952 further strengthened bureaucratic and military institutions.

As a result, Egypt combines characteristics associated with both colonial models. Its political system has long relied upon elite coalitions and the central role of the military—features broadly consistent with Britain’s indirect governing tradition. At the same time, Egypt developed an expansive bureaucracy and powerful security institutions capable of extensive state intervention, characteristics more commonly associated with centralized administrative states.

Egypt therefore illustrates an important qualification to Nugent’s argument: colonial institutions interact with pre-existing state traditions and subsequent historical developments. Colonialism matters, but it rarely operates in isolation.

Assessing the Comparative Evidence

Taken together, these case studies suggest that Nugent’s theory possesses considerable explanatory value, particularly when interpreted as a framework for identifying long-term institutional tendencies rather than rigid historical laws. The experiences of Syria and Algeria strongly support her claim that French colonialism left behind centralized administrative and security institutions that facilitated the emergence of powerful authoritarian states. Jordan similarly reflects the institutional legacy of British indirect rule, where political stability has depended more heavily on elite coalitions than on pervasive bureaucratic surveillance.

At the same time, Iraq and Egypt demonstrate the limitations of monocausal explanations. Military intervention, revolutionary transformations, regional conflicts, rentier political economies, and domestic political leadership all interact with colonial legacies in shaping the evolution of authoritarian institutions.

This balanced interpretation may ultimately represent the greatest strength of Nugent’s scholarship. Rather than reducing authoritarianism to the decisions of contemporary rulers or the immediate pressures of regional politics, she encourages scholars to examine the historical foundations upon which modern states were constructed. The institutions of coercion that define repression in the Middle East are therefore best understood not as sudden creations of post-independence governments, but as products of long historical processes whose origins frequently extend back to the colonial era.

Beyond Colonial Legacies: The Strengths and Limits of Elizabeth R. Nugent’s Theory of Repression

No theory of authoritarianism can fully explain the political diversity of the Middle East through a single variable. While Elizabeth R. Nugent offers a compelling historical explanation for the institutional origins of repression, her framework inevitably raises a broader analytical question: How much of contemporary authoritarianism can colonial legacies actually explain? Put differently, if colonial institutions shaped the foundations of postcolonial states, what explains the significant differences that have emerged among countries sharing similar colonial experiences?

The value of Nugent’s work lies precisely in the fact that she does not present colonialism as a deterministic force. Instead, she treats colonial institutions as historical starting points that structure—but do not dictate—the political choices available to later governments. This distinction is crucial. Historical institutionalism emphasizes continuity, but it also recognizes the possibility of institutional adaptation, reform, and even rupture. Colonial legacies matter because they influence the range of available options, not because they eliminate political agency.

Avoiding the Trap of Historical Determinism

Perhaps the most common criticism of institutional explanations concerns the risk of historical determinism. If authoritarian institutions are inherited from colonial rule, does this imply that postcolonial societies were destined to become authoritarian?

Nugent’s answer is clearly no.

Historical institutionalists distinguish between constraint and determination. Institutions shape incentives, distribute power unevenly, and make certain political choices easier than others, but they never make alternative outcomes impossible. Political leaders continue to exercise agency, social movements can reshape institutional arrangements, and major crises may redirect political development in unexpected ways.

The democratic transitions experienced in parts of Latin America and Southern Europe, despite long histories of authoritarian rule, demonstrate that institutional legacies are neither permanent nor irreversible. Likewise, political trajectories within the Middle East have differed considerably despite shared colonial experiences, suggesting that history creates probabilities rather than destinies.

The Military as an Autonomous Political Institution

One important complement to Nugent’s theory comes from the work of political scientist Eva Bellin, whose influential research emphasizes the role of the military and coercive apparatus in sustaining authoritarian regimes.

Bellin argues that the survival of authoritarian governments depends less on their historical origins than on the cohesion, institutional interests, and political loyalty of their security forces. Even where colonial institutions created strong bureaucratic states, authoritarian rule cannot endure without military organizations willing to defend the regime during periods of political crisis.

The experiences of Egypt, Syria, and Algeria illustrate this point clearly. In each case, military institutions evolved far beyond their colonial origins, becoming powerful political and economic actors in their own right. Their influence reflects decades of post-independence state-building, regional conflict, and domestic political competition—developments that cannot be attributed solely to colonial institutional design.

Rentier States and the Political Economy of Repression

Another important critique comes from the literature on rentier state theory.

Scholars of political economy have long argued that governments deriving substantial revenues from oil and natural gas exports enjoy a fundamentally different relationship with society than states dependent upon taxation. Because resource-rich governments rely less on citizens for revenue, they face weaker incentives to negotiate political representation or institutional accountability.

This economic autonomy enables regimes to combine two complementary strategies. On the one hand, resource revenues finance generous systems of patronage, public employment, and social benefits that reduce political opposition. On the other hand, they provide the financial capacity to maintain sophisticated security institutions capable of suppressing dissent when necessary.

The Gulf monarchies illustrate this dynamic particularly well. Although their colonial experiences varied considerably, many have maintained stable authoritarian systems through combinations of distributive politics and selective coercion. Their political trajectories therefore demonstrate that economic structures can substantially modify the institutional legacies inherited from colonial rule.

War, Conflict, and Institutional Transformation

Armed conflict represents another major factor capable of reshaping state institutions.

Charles Tilly’s famous observation that “war made the state, and the state made war” remains highly relevant to understanding Middle Eastern political development. Wars expand executive authority, strengthen security institutions, increase military spending, and often normalize extraordinary legal measures that persist long after hostilities have ended.

The Iran-Iraq War, the Algerian Civil War, the Syrian conflict, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the prolonged instability of Lebanon all dramatically altered state institutions in ways that colonial legacies alone cannot explain. Emergency legislation, intelligence agencies, and military organizations frequently acquired new powers during these crises, fundamentally reshaping the balance between state authority and civil liberties.

These examples demonstrate that institutional development remains an ongoing historical process. Colonialism established important foundations, but subsequent conflicts repeatedly transformed those foundations in response to new political realities.

Political Leadership Still Matters

Institutional explanations are sometimes criticized for paying insufficient attention to political leadership. While Nugent’s framework rightly shifts analytical attention away from individual rulers toward state institutions, leaders continue to play a critical role in determining how inherited institutions are used.

Institutions provide governments with political capacities, but leaders decide how extensively those capacities will be employed. The same security apparatus can produce markedly different political outcomes depending upon leadership strategies, ideological commitments, and perceived threats.

Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser differed significantly from Egypt under Anwar Sadat, despite substantial institutional continuity. Likewise, the Syrian security state evolved differently under Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, even though both operated within broadly similar institutional structures. Such examples remind us that institutions establish opportunities and constraints, but political choices remain consequential.

Nugent’s Lasting Contribution

These criticisms do not diminish the significance of Nugent’s scholarship. On the contrary, they help clarify its proper place within the broader literature on authoritarianism.

Her central contribution is not the claim that colonialism explains everything. Rather, it is the demonstration that authoritarian institutions possess deep historical roots extending well beyond the lifetimes of contemporary political leaders. By directing attention toward the historical construction of bureaucracies, police organizations, intelligence services, and administrative structures, Nugent fundamentally changes the way scholars approach authoritarian resilience.

Instead of asking why individual rulers become repressive, she asks why states possess certain coercive capacities in the first place. That shift in perspective represents a major theoretical contribution because it relocates the origins of authoritarianism from short-term political events to long-term processes of state formation.

Viewed in this way, repression in the Middle East cannot be understood through any single explanatory framework. Colonial legacies, military institutions, rentier economies, interstate wars, ideological struggles, political leadership, and international intervention all interact in shaping contemporary authoritarian governance. Nugent’s theory does not eliminate these alternative explanations; rather, it provides the historical foundation upon which they can be integrated into a more comprehensive understanding of state power.

In this sense, colonialism should be understood neither as the complete explanation nor as a historical footnote. It is the institutional point of departure from which subsequent political developments unfolded. Appreciating that historical starting point allows scholars to better understand why authoritarian institutions have proven remarkably resilient—even as the political environments surrounding them have changed dramatically.