Introduction
The political thought of Soroush is one of the most important and, at the same time, most controversial intellectual efforts in contemporary Iran to rethink the relationship between religion and politics. This line of thought emerged within a broader project known as “religious intellectualism,” a project that claims it is possible, through a new, ethical, and rational reading of Islam, to reconcile it with the values and institutions of the modern world—from democracy and human rights to freedom and pluralism. At first glance, this endeavor appears to be a response to the profound crises faced by religious societies in the modern age. However, the central question of this article begins precisely at this point: is any form of religious reading that seeks to intervene in the political sphere— even when driven by reformist and anti-fundamentalist intentions—inevitably burdened with the risk of reproducing the past and reviving forms of Salafism?
Abdolkarim Soroush, as the most prominent figure of this current, has played a central role in theorizing this possibility. Theories such as the “theoretical contraction and expansion of the Sharia,” the precedence of ethics over jurisprudence, the critique of religious government, and the defense of democracy, ostensibly present an image of a soft, historical religion compatible with modern reason. Nevertheless, this article seeks to show that the political thought of Soroush, despite its clear distancing from juridical fundamentalism and religious authoritarianism, at a deeper level remains confined within a religious logic of return to origins, authentic ethics, and privileged truth.
Accordingly, one must first ask whether it is possible to introduce religion into politics without contaminating politics with the sacred and the unquestionable. Moreover, does the emphasis on “religious ethics” truly open a path toward the future, or does it, on the contrary, reproduce a hidden regression to an idealized and ahistorical past? In other words, does the project of religious intellectualism, despite its claim of rupture with tradition, ultimately slide into a softer and more ethical form of Salafism?
On this basis, the present article adopts a critical and philosophical approach and seeks to analyze the internal logic of the political thought of Soroush without resorting to personal judgments or speculation about intentions. The central hypothesis of this essay is that the main problem lies not in a particular interpretation of Islam, but in the very entry of religious thinking into the realm of politics—an entry that potentially paves the way for fundamentalism, the exclusion of secular ethics, and the weakening of universal human values. In what follows, it will be shown step by step why every attempt to “reconcile” religion with modernity ultimately looks backward rather than toward the future.
The Project of Religious Intellectualism and the Problem of Modernity
The project of religious intellectualism in Iran is an intellectual response to the crisis arising from the encounter between religious tradition and the modern world—a crisis intertwined with concepts such as modern rationality, empirical science, the nation-state, human rights, and autonomous individuality. Within this framework, religious intellectuals have attempted to demonstrate that religion, and Islam in particular, is not inherently incompatible with modernity and that, through a new interpretation, it can be aligned with the requirements of the contemporary age. The political thought of Soroush must be understood at the heart of this theoretical effort—an effort that seeks to remain faithful to religious belief while not relinquishing the achievements of the modern world.
However, the fundamental question is whether this project itself does not begin with a problematic presupposition: the assumption that religion must—and can—continue to serve as a reference for meaning, ethics, and the orientation of collective life. Religious intellectualism, unlike radical secularism, does not take the withdrawal of religion from the political sphere as a given; rather, it seeks to offer a “more correct,” “more ethical,” or “more rational” form of religion’s presence in politics. It is precisely at this point that the unresolved tension between religion and modernity becomes apparent.
Modernity is not merely a set of institutions or values that can be selectively reconciled with religion; it is a historical paradigm grounded in the autonomy of human reason, the rejection of sacred authority in politics, and the precedence of the worldly over the metaphysical. From this perspective, the main issue is not whether a modern interpretation of religion can be offered, but whether a religion grounded in revelation and transhistorical truth can, in principle, inhabit a world that derives political and moral legitimacy from human beings and their lived experience.
In this context, the distinction between the “reform of religion” and the “reconstruction of religion” acquires particular importance. Reforming religion means purifying certain rulings, readings, or historical traditions without undermining the privileged status of religion as the ultimate source of truth. Reconstructing religion, by contrast, requires accepting the full historicity of religion, ethics, and meaning—an acceptance that, in practice, fundamentally destabilizes the political and moral authority of religion. The main argument of this article is that the project of religious intellectualism—including in Soroush’s formulation—effectively remains at the level of reform and never advances to the costly thresholds of reconstruction.
As a result, religious intellectualism becomes trapped in a dual condition: on the one hand, it seeks to draw boundaries against fundamentalism and violent readings of religion; on the other hand, it cannot relinquish the idea of religion as a privileged source of ethics and meaning. This theoretical suspension lays the groundwork for a kind of soft return to the past—a return that is reproduced not in the form of rigid jurisprudence, but in the guise of religious ethics, compassionate Islam, and so-called authentic values. In the following sections, it will be shown how this logic, within the political thought of Soroush, gradually paves the way for new forms of ethical Salafism.
The Theory of Contraction and Expansion: Epistemic Openness or the Reproduction of Religious Authority?
The theory of the “theoretical contraction and expansion of the Sharia” can be regarded as Abdolkarim Soroush’s most important and influential intellectual achievement; a theory that also forms the epistemological foundation of the political thought of Soroush. According to this theory, a distinction must be drawn between “religion” as a divine and fixed matter, and “religious knowledge” as a human, historical, and changeable phenomenon. Human understanding of religion is always shaped by contemporary forms of knowledge, epistemic presuppositions, and social conditions; therefore, no reading of religion can be considered final, absolute, or immune to criticism. At first glance, this formulation appears to open a liberating horizon and to block the path to religious authoritarianism and jurisprudential fundamentalism.
However, the essential problem lies precisely in this “first glance.” Although the theory of contraction and expansion presents religious understanding as historical and mutable, “religion” itself remains, behind these transformations, as a transhistorical, sacred, and untouched truth. In other words, relativity and changeability are confined solely to the level of interpretations, not to the status of religion as the ultimate source of meaning and ethics. From this perspective, the theory of contraction and expansion preserves religious authority at a deeper level rather than leading to the secularization of politics and ethics.
Moreover, although Soroush defends the plurality of religious readings, this plurality is always defined within a shared horizon: fidelity to the sacred text and religious faith. In other words, differences are permitted, but stepping outside the circle of religion is still regarded as impossible or illegitimate. This hidden limitation blocks the possibility of a radical critique of religion as a source of authority and, as a result, continues to expose politics to a form of sacred authority—even if soft and non-coercive.
Within this framework, the political thought of Soroush seeks to contain the danger of religious despotism by historicizing the understanding of religion. Yet the question is whether political power can truly be restrained by such epistemological tools. Historical experience shows that power does not require rigid interpretations to legitimize itself and can easily draw upon ethical, compassionate, and even critical readings of religion. Thus, contraction and expansion not only fail to prevent the politicization of religion but also enable more complex and flexible forms of it.
On the other hand, the emphasis on the dynamism of religious knowledge unintentionally keeps alive a kind of nostalgia for “pure religion” or “authentic meaning”—a meaning presumed to exist beyond history, power, and human interests, and to which one must draw closer through more correct interpretations. This constant search for authentic truth provides a theoretical ground for a return to the sources; a return that, although clothed in the language of philosophy and epistemology, ultimately resonates with the logic of Salafism—that is, the precedence of a sacred past over the historical present.
Consequently, it can be said that the theory of contraction and expansion, despite its apparent openness, remains fundamentally incapable of fully transcending religious authority. This incapacity has direct political consequences: as long as religion—even within a critical and historical horizon—remains the ultimate reference for meaning and ethics, politics will never become fully secular, criticizable, and human. In the next section, it will be shown how this logic, in Soroush’s emphasis on “religious ethics” and the search for an ethical Islam, more explicitly leads to the reproduction of the past.
Religious Ethics and the Problem of Returning to “Authentic Islam”
One of the central points in the political thought of Soroush is his repeated emphasis on the precedence of “ethics” over “jurisprudence”—an emphasis that, at first glance, appears to be an important step away from Sharia-centeredness and religious fundamentalism. By foregrounding ethics, Soroush seeks to present a more humane, flexible, and less violent reading of Islam and thereby to open a path for the presence of religion in the modern world. However, the fundamental question is what exact relationship this ethics has with religion and on what basis it is grounded.
The ethics envisioned by Soroush, although liberated from the constraints of detailed juridical rulings, nevertheless remains within the horizon of “religious ethics”—an ethics that derives its ultimate legitimacy not from human suffering, social consensus, or autonomous reason, but from its relationship to revelation and religious tradition. In other words, jurisprudence is set aside, but religion still remains the final arbiter of good and evil. This shift from jurisprudence to ethics, without a rupture from sacred authority, constitutes the most problematic point of this approach.
Moreover, the concept of “authentic religious ethics” implicitly carries a historical judgment: the assumption that in a particular past—usually the early period of Islam or the initial religious experience—there existed a purer, cleaner, and more humane form of ethics that must now be recovered. Such an image, though articulated in a soft ethical language, is in its logic nothing but a return to the past. The problem is that the past was not a repository of pure moral truths, but a historical arena marked by absolute power relations and its own specific forms of violence.
From this perspective, the emphasis on religious ethics unintentionally leads to a kind of “ethical Salafism”—a Salafism that, instead of focusing on outward rulings, relies on intentions, virtues, and values attributed to the pious ancestors. The danger of this approach lies in blurring the boundary between ethics and ideology and weakening the possibility of moral judgment independent of religion. Within such a framework, what is deemed ethical is assessed not on the basis of human and social consequences, but according to proximity to or distance from an idealized religious model.
By contrast, modern secular ethics is grounded in the historicity of values, critical dialogue, and the lived experience of human beings. This ethics is committed not to a sacred source, but to the reduction of suffering, the expansion of freedom, and the recognition of equal human dignity. The fundamental difference between these two approaches lies precisely here: religious ethics, even in its softest and most compassionate form, is always susceptible to becoming an instrument of exclusion and repression, because it inevitably draws distinctions between believer and non-believer, moral and immoral, insider and outsider.
As a result, Soroush’s emphasis on ethics, although intended as an effort to escape religious violence, remains structurally trapped in the logic of returning to authentic Islam. This logic, rather than opening new horizons for the future, turns the past into the criterion of moral judgment and thereby paves the way for the reproduction of soft but effective forms of fundamentalism. In the next section, this discussion will be pursued in relation to the question of power and politics.
Religion, Politics, and the Illusion of Containing Power
In his critique of the connection between religion and political power, Abdolkarim Soroush has adopted one of the most explicit and, at the same time, most complex positions among contemporary religious intellectuals. He repeatedly emphasizes that power inherently tends toward monopoly, exclusion, and self-justification, and that whenever it is linked to religion, this tendency is not restrained but intensified under an ethical and sacred guise. From this perspective, Soroush seeks, by establishing a theoretical distance between religion and government, to prevent the repetition of authoritarian experiences and to protect religion from contamination by power.
Within this framework, his well-known distinction between “religion in power” and “the religious in power” takes shape. By this, Soroush means that government should not speak directly in the name of religion or regard itself as the executor of divine will; at the same time, however, rulers may be religious individuals with ethical motivations. At first glance, this distinction appears to be a moderate and even intelligent solution—as if one could both avoid the sacralization of politics and prevent its moral emptiness.
However, the fundamental critique here is that politics, contrary to moralistic assumptions, is not the realm of individual intentions, but the field of institutions, binding laws, collective decisions, and the exercise of legitimate coercion. In such a field, the beliefs and values of political actors are inevitably translated into the language of public policy, law, and power structures. Consequently, the presence of religious individuals in power is, in practice, not easily separable from the presence of religion in power; for religion, even when it enters politics informally and as inspiration, gradually becomes a source of legitimacy for decisions.
Moreover, referring—even indirectly—to religion as a moral source in politics creates a form of authority beyond human critique. When a political decision is justified in the language of religious values, the possibility of criticizing it is defined only within the framework of those same values. Politics thus shifts from the arena of free and rational contestation to an ethical–sacred field in which political opposition can quickly be interpreted as moral opposition or even hostility to faith. This mechanism constitutes one of the most subtle yet dangerous grounds for the growth of soft fundamentalism.
Another important point in this context is the issue of personal credibility based on religiosity. Within such a logic, certain individuals are regarded as more trustworthy by virtue of their adherence to Islamic ethics, and their decisions are seen as more oriented toward the common good. By contrast, secular individuals or those whose conduct is not necessarily tied to religious authority acquire less credibility in the arena of power, and their decisions enjoy less public legitimacy. This mechanism not only weakens intellectual diversity and non-religious decision-making, but also creates an unfair competition and reproduces ethical–religious power in a way that can endanger the foundations of democracy and public participation.
From a historical perspective as well, political power does not necessarily require harsh or jurisprudence-centered readings of religion to consolidate and expand itself. On the contrary, ethical, compassionate, and humanitarian interpretations of religion may be far more effective, because they make it possible to impose restrictions on freedoms and rights without generating widespread social resistance. Under such conditions, ethical religion becomes not an obstacle to power, but a symbolic asset for it—an asset that cloaks political decisions in an aura of benevolence and moral responsibility.
Ultimately, it can be said that the political thought of Soroush, despite its deep awareness of the dangers of power, remains optimistic about the possibility of containing it from within religion. This optimism overlooks the fact that power is inherently expansionary and gradually puts every sacred source—even one that is initially critical and ethical—at the service of its own reproduction. For this reason, the distinction between “religion in power” and “the religious in power” is less a sustainable solution than a kind of theoretical suspension that, in practice, leads to the gradual sacralization of politics.
This theoretical impasse gives rise to an even deeper contradiction, one that emerges clearly and irresolvably in the idea of “religious democracy”—a contradiction that will be addressed in the next section.
Religious Democracy: An Internally Incompatible Concept
One of the central axes of the political thought of Soroush is his effort to reconcile religious faith with a democratic system. He views democracy as a rational method for governing society and believes that the presence of religion in the public sphere need not conflict with democratic principles. On the surface, this idea appears appealing and suggests an attempt to redefine politics in a modern religious framework.
However, the fundamental critique is that democracy is essentially grounded in the radical equality of human beings, mutual accountability, and legitimacy derived from the collective will. Religion, by contrast, as an ultimate source of truth and ethics, inevitably regards certain propositions and actions as superior and sacred. This fundamental difference generates an internal contradiction within “religious democracy”: on the one hand, all citizens must be equal and possess equal voting rights; on the other hand, certain actors and decisions, due to their proximity to religious values, acquire greater legitimacy, and their decisions are prioritized over others.
This contradiction has clear practical and political consequences. First, the possibility of mutual criticism and accountability in politics is reduced, since opposition to the decisions of “the religious in power” can be interpreted as opposition to divine values. Second, secular individuals or those whose criteria for decision-making are purely human and rational lose credibility, and the legitimacy of their decisions is called into question. Third, this logic lays the groundwork for the reproduction of ethical–religious power, even when it appears outwardly democratic and participatory.
In other words, the attempt to establish religious democracy, even with reformist and anti-fundamentalist intentions, ultimately cannot escape the logic of returning to authentic religious values and the domination of sacred authority over political decisions. This condition weakens democracy and, in its soft form, can reproduce a kind of ethical and political fundamentalism.
Consequently, religious democracy, despite Soroush’s claims regarding the compatibility of religion and modernity, is structurally incompatible and fraught with danger. This incompatibility demonstrates, in the continuation of this article, how the project of religious intellectualism, even with its rational and ethical appearance, ultimately leads to the reproduction of past values and patterns and does not reduce the risk of fundamentalism.
From Religious Reformism to Ethical Salafism
Religious reformism, especially in the political thought of Soroush, seeks to harmonize Islam with the modern world by offering new interpretations. On the surface, this project appears to be a reformist endeavor aimed at freeing religion from authoritarianism, violence, and fundamentalism, and at opening a path toward rationality, human ethics, and democracy.
However, structural critique shows that this reformist path ultimately leads to a form of ethical Salafism. The intellectual process of religious reformism typically begins with traditional jurisprudence, moves toward religious ethics, then gives rise to a more compassionate and softer Islam, and finally returns to the past through the search for authentic Islam. This return, even in its ethical form, continues to evaluate values and institutions on the basis of a sacred past and the models of the pious ancestors.
This soft and ethical Salafism can lead to the reproduction of sacred authority in politics and society, because it continues to measure the value and legitimacy of decisions and behaviors against “authentic Islam” and pure religious ethics. Even if direct violence and coercion are absent in this process, restricting the legitimacy and credibility of individuals based on their distance from religious criteria closes the path to rationality, freedom, and social critique.
Historical and contemporary examples show that this logic, whether in the form of soft and compassionate religious intellectualism or in explicit fundamentalism, facilitates a return to the past and the domination of religious values. In other words, religious reform that enters the political sphere, even in its mild and ethical form, is structurally prone to reproducing past values and powers and cannot sustainably belong to the modern and secular world.
In what follows, this article shows how the entry of religion into the public sphere, even with ethical and rational intentions, can lead to the erosion of human values and the restriction of modern freedoms.
The Secular Alternative: Politics Without Religion, Ethics Without Revelation
One of the most important strategies for confronting the limitations and dangers arising from the entry of religion into politics is the acceptance of hard secularism. Hard secularism means that politics is fully independent of religious authority and derives its legitimacy from institutions, law, collective agreement, and the will of citizens, not from revelation, sacred texts, or transhistorical criteria. In such a system, religion is confined to the personal and spiritual sphere and can no longer directly or indirectly serve as a criterion for political decision-making or the legitimation of power.
From a theoretical perspective, hard secularism has multiple advantages. First, the possibility of critique and accountability in politics increases, because no power is immune to questioning and protest on the basis of moral or religious authority. Second, political decisions are evaluated on the basis of the public good, collective interests, and human experience, not on conformity with sacred religious values. This prevents the restriction of rational decision-making and the dominance of ethical–religious authority.
Ethics, within this framework, also becomes independent of revelation and sacred texts. Secular ethics is grounded in human dignity, the reduction of suffering, equality, and equal rights, rather than in transhistorical criteria or the models of the pious ancestors. This form of ethics is flexible and adaptable to historical and social conditions, while at the same time deriving the practical legitimacy of political decisions from human and experiential foundations. In other words, secular ethics and secular politics become intertwined, guaranteeing the public sphere as a space for intellectual diversity, individual freedoms, and collective decision-making.
Secularism also preserves the possibility of individual and cultural spirituality without allowing religion to become an instrument for legitimizing power. Citizens can experience their religious and spiritual beliefs in their personal lives, families, and cultural communities, but these beliefs cannot directly determine political decisions or public institutions. This separation paves the way for the development of modern society, citizenship rights, and the equal participation of all groups.
From a practical standpoint, hard secularism prevents the reproduction of past values and authorities. When political decisions are made on the basis of human and collective criteria, there is no longer room for a return to authentic Islam, sacred ethics, or Salafi values. Thus, society can preserve religious culture and individual spirituality while freeing itself from the political and social dangers of religious thinking.
Consequently, hard secularism is always a preventive and necessary strategy for overcoming the impasse of religious intellectualism. This framework not only strengthens freedom, equality, and human dignity, but also enables collective rationality, social critique, and decision-making grounded in historical experience. Politics and ethics, in this system, become independent, human, and adaptable, preventing the erosion of human values that political religious thought—even in its soft and compassionate form—may produce.
Conclusion
The political thought of Soroush, as one of the most prominent examples of religious intellectualism in contemporary Iran, represents a serious theoretical effort to reconcile Islam with the requirements of modernity and democracy. By emphasizing the theory of contraction and expansion, the precedence of ethics over jurisprudence, and religious democracy, Soroush seeks to demonstrate that religion can enter the political sphere without succumbing to authoritarianism, violence, or religious fundamentalism. At first glance, this reformist, soft, and compassionate approach appears to reflect an attempt to redefine religion and politics in a rational and humanistic form.
However, structural and critical analysis shows that this effort, despite its reformist intentions, encounters fundamental limitations and contradictions at a deeper level. The theory of contraction and expansion, while rendering religious understanding historical and mutable, preserves the authority of religion and its transhistorical truth. The focus on religious ethics and authentic Islam, although nonviolent, facilitates the reproduction of ethical Salafism and a return to the past. Likewise, the distinction between “religion in power” and “the religious in power” proves fragile in practice, privileging the personal credibility and legitimacy of religious individuals’ decisions, while secular and rational individuals become politically and socially marginalized.
Religious democracy, despite its theoretical appeal and promises of compatibility with modernity, is structurally incompatible. The inherent contradiction between human values, equality, and collective accountability, on the one hand, and religious authority and transhistorical values, on the other, is never resolved and ultimately exposes modern society to restrictions on freedom and the erosion of human values. In other words, any entry of religion into politics, even with ethical and reformist intentions, potentially carries the risk of reproducing the past and narrowing the human horizon.
The final solution to overcoming this impasse is the acceptance of hard secularism and the complete separation of religion from the political sphere. Secularism frees politics from transhistorical legitimacy and grounds ethics in human dignity, suffering, and experience. This framework enables social critique, equal participation, and rational, collective decision-making without restricting spirituality or individual beliefs. In this way, politics and human ethics become independent, and society can prevent the erosion of human values resulting from the entry of religion into the public sphere, even in the form of soft and compassionate religious intellectualism.
Ultimately, it can be said that the political thought of Soroush, although reformist in intention, structurally leads to the reproduction of past religious values and authorities and imposes deep limitations on freedom and social rationality. Moving beyond religious politics and embracing secularism is the only path that guarantees freedom, equality, and human ethics in the modern age. This conclusion shows that any attempt to “reconcile” religion with modern politics, without a complete break from sacred authority, is not future-oriented but instead reinforces a return to the past.
