Introduction
Political history shows that there has always been a thin and fragile line between oligarchy and democracy. Crossing this line has meant, for many nations, entry into a new stage of political and social life, while for others, remaining trapped at this boundary has resulted in the domination of narrow elites and the failure of democratic aspirations. The European experience, particularly that of England, stands out as a successful passage across this line; commercialization of agriculture, the growth of industry, and the emergence of the bourgeoisie created a new balance among social classes and paved the way for parliamentary democracy. In contrast, Iran’s experience in recent centuries demonstrates that despite certain elements of capitalist growth and integration into the global economy, political monopoly in the hands of religious institutions and the absence of free competition have produced a religious–economic oligarchy. This oligarchy, although benefiting from global capitalism, has used its accumulated wealth to reinforce its political monopoly. This article examines, in a comparative perspective, the European and Iranian trajectories to demonstrate how the thin line between oligarchy and democracy can lead to divergent historical outcomes.
1. Europe and the Historical Passage from Feudalism to Democracy
Feudalism and Hereditary Power Structures
Medieval Europe was largely based on feudalism. Political authority resided with kings and feudal lords, while the majority of the population, especially peasants, lived within the framework of lord–serf relations. Land ownership was the primary source of power, and the aristocracy dominated the political and social order. In such a system, broad political participation was impossible, and the oligarchy of landowners effectively monopolized governance.
Commercialization of Agriculture and the Passage to Capitalism
From the 16th century onward, Europe underwent significant economic transformations. The commercialization of agriculture, a shift from subsistence production toward market-oriented commodity production, reshaped social relations. Landowners adopted new methods of cultivation for profit, while peasants were often forced to leave the land or become wage laborers. These transformations undermined the foundations of feudalism and gave rise to new social strata.
Industrial Growth and the Rise of the Bourgeoisie
The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century marked a turning point. A new bourgeoisie—composed of merchants, industrialists, and investors—emerged as a powerful class, controlling an ever-larger share of the economy. Their economic power soon translated into political demands. As a result, conflicts between the rising bourgeoisie and the entrenched aristocracy intensified.
Competition of Guilds and the Limiting of Aristocracy
A distinctive feature of this era was the competition among different classes and guilds: commercial farmers, industrialists, merchants, service providers, and even segments of reformist landowners. This competition prevented political monopoly by any single group and gradually laid the foundation for a more balanced distribution of political power.
The Formation of Parliament and the English Experience
England represents the most prominent example. Initially, Parliament served as an advisory body to the king, but over time it became the primary instrument for curbing the power of the monarchy and the aristocracy. The “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 was the culmination of this process, firmly establishing parliamentary supremacy and limiting royal authority. This transition marked the successful crossing of the thin line between oligarchy and democracy, making Europe a pioneer of parliamentary democracy.
2. Development Theories and Linear Interpretations
Linear Models of Development in the Twentieth Century
In the twentieth century, many social scientists attempted to universalize the European experience into models of development. These theories were largely linear, presenting development as a series of uniform stages applicable to all countries.
Walt Rostow and the Stages of Economic Growth
Rostow, in his famous “Stages of Economic Growth,” argued that all societies pass through five stages: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and age of mass consumption. He saw England’s trajectory as the archetype and assumed that other countries could replicate this path, ultimately reaching both development and democracy.
Simon Kuznets and the Growth–Inequality Nexus
Kuznets focused on the economic dimension, proposing his famous curve that showed inequality rising during the early stages of growth but declining in later phases. Implicit in his view was the assumption that economic growth would eventually generate social and political stability, thus supporting democratic governance.
Daniel Lerner and Cultural Modernization
Lerner emphasized the cultural dimension. He argued that the spread of media, education, and modern communications would foster “empathy” and expand political participation in transitional societies. Like other modernization theorists, he believed modernization would ultimately lead to democracy.
Samuel Huntington and Political Order in Changing Societies
Huntington adopted a more cautious approach. In Political Order in Changing Societies, he argued that economic and social development does not necessarily produce democracy. Instead, without corresponding institutional development, modernization could lead to instability or authoritarianism. Yet even Huntington envisioned a general pattern of modernization applicable to all.
The Eurocentric Assumption and Its Critique
The common feature of these theories was their Eurocentrism: the assumption that Europe’s trajectory could serve as a universal template. However, history shows otherwise. Many countries, despite economic growth and integration into global capitalism, did not reached democracy. Developmental paths are diverse, and no single linear model can capture these variations.
3. Iran and the Contradiction Between Capitalism and Political Monopoly
Historical Background of an Incomplete Passage
Since the nineteenth century, Iran has grappled with the pressures of integration into the global economy. Partial reforms under the Qajar dynasty, the Constitutional Revolution, and attempts to establish modern institutions were part of this trajectory. Yet each time, traditional forces and concentrated power structures obstructed full transition.
Commercialization and Capital Growth in the Contemporary Period
Particularly after the 1960s land reforms, the commercialization of agriculture and the growth of industrial and service sectors accelerated. Oil revenues became the engine of dependent capitalism. Yet unlike Europe, these economic changes were not matched by balanced political transformations.
The Role of Clergy in Political Monopoly
Following the 1979 Revolution, the clergy emerged as the dominant political actor. Whereas in Europe competition among classes redistributed political power, in Iran the clergy monopolized it, redefining modern institutions within a religious framework. This monopoly suppressed free competition and marginalized other social classes.
The Emergence of a Religious–Economic Oligarchy
Over subsequent decades, the fusion of political authority with economic interests—particularly those tied to oil and foreign trade—produced a new oligarchy. This religious–economic elite benefited from global capitalism but redirected accumulated wealth toward preserving political monopoly. The result was neither democracy nor classic competitive capitalism but a form of rentier, religious capitalism.
Structural Corruption and Dependency on Global Capitalism
This oligarchy’s reliance on oil rents and selective engagement with global markets fostered deep structural corruption. Wealth accumulation by a narrow elite, absent transparency and political competition, has entrenched one of the region’s most corrupt governance systems.
4. Why Democracy Did Not Take Root in Iran
Absence of Free Political Competition
The primary condition for democracy is free competition among groups and classes. In Iran, the clerical monopoly eliminated such competition. Even in the economic sphere, markets are dominated by institutions tied to political authority, suppressing genuine rivalry.
The Link Between Religious Monopoly and Economic Interests
Unlike Europe, where aristocracy gradually yielded to a competitive bourgeoisie, in Iran the clergy fused political monopoly with economic dominance. This nexus stifled democratic transition.
Divergence from the European Experience of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
Europe succeeded in curbing aristocratic oligarchy through class competition, ultimately establishing democracy. In Iran, concentration of power in a single religious–political institution prevented such a balance. As a result, the thin line between oligarchy and democracy was never crossed, leaving the society trapped in an incomplete passage.
Outcome of the Incomplete Passage: Entrenched Oligarchy
The consequence was the entrenchment of a religious–economic oligarchy, reproducing monopoly and obstructing both political and sustainable economic development.
5. The Thin Line Between Oligarchy and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis
The Fundamental Condition of Democracy: Competition and Distribution of Power
The comparative lesson is clear: without competition, democracy cannot emerge. Europe succeeded by distributing power among diverse classes, crossing the thin line between oligarchy and democracy. Iran, however, remained stuck in the absence of competition.
Oligarchy as Monopoly of Resources and Restriction of Competition
Oligarchy entails concentration of power in the hands of a narrow elite, often through control of economic and political resources. Contemporary Iran exemplifies this model in the form of a religious–economic oligarchy.
Europe: Successful Passage Across the Line
Through successive transitions—from feudalism to capitalism, from absolute monarchy to parliamentarism—Europe eventually institutionalized open competition. The line was crossed despite conflicts and crises.
Iran: Trapped at the Boundary and Reproducing Monopoly
Iran, however, failed to cross. Dependent capitalism and clerical monopoly halted the transition, producing an oligarchy that exploits capitalist mechanisms while blocking political development.
Conclusion
The comparative study of Europe and Iran demonstrates that the thin line between oligarchy and democracy is both delicate and decisive. Europe crossed this line and laid the foundation for parliamentary democracy, while Iran remained trapped due to religious–political monopoly. Linear development theories that universalized the European path failed to explain Iran’s divergent outcome. Iran’s history shows that neither economic growth nor integration into global capitalism suffices for democracy; the fundamental prerequisite is breaking monopoly and fostering real competition among groups and social classes.
In the case of Iran, it can be stated with clarity and firmness that the first condition for crossing this boundary is overcoming religious rule—a system that has entrenched monopoly for the clergy and its affiliates. Without transcending this fundamental obstacle, no economic or institutional reform will open the way to democracy, and the society will remain stuck at the thin line between oligarchy and democracy.
Key Takeaways
- The European experience shows that competition among classes and groups was the key condition for crossing the thin line between oligarchy and democracy.
- Linear development theories, such as those of Rostow and others, fail to account for Iran’s divergent trajectory.
- In Iran, clerical political monopoly has blocked free competition and entrenched a rentier religious–economic oligarchy.
- The first condition for overcoming this state is overcoming religious rule, which has institutionalized a monopoly for the clergy and its allies.
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Without dismantling this monopoly, no reform can enable Iran to cross the thin line between oligarchy and democracy.
