Introduction
The complex and rapidly evolving developments in the Middle East in recent decades—particularly in Iraq and Syria—have created the conditions for the emergence of actors capable of continuously adapting to environmental changes and shifting power dynamics. Ahmad al-Sharaa, known as Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, is one of the prominent figures in this context. His trajectory—from jihadist activities in Iraq and Syria to leading the quasi-state entity of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and eventually engaging with regional and international actors as president of Syria—constitutes a clear example of political pragmatism.
Here, the Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa is not an abstract philosophical theory, but a practical model for analyzing political and tactical behavior in which expediency, survival, and the preservation of power take precedence over ideological principles.
This article seeks to examine the evolution of al-Sharaa’s positions and strategies through a historical and analytical lens. His approach demonstrates that in tense environments, the concepts of enemy and ally are not fixed or eternal; rather, shifting battlefield realities, regional pressures, and the need for legitimacy determine the shape of relationships and decision-making. In other words, analyzing al-Sharaa’s behavior through the lens of pragmatism enables us to understand the mechanisms of decision-making under instability and crisis, showing that politics in war-torn environments is governed less by ideology and more by the logic of practical survival and tactical calculations.
One significant dimension of this study is attention to situational shifts and the reconfiguration of alliances. From Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fath al-Sham, then Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and eventually the Syrian presidency, al-Sharaa repeatedly redefined his path. Each structural transformation and each rebranding was not merely symbolic but a tactical and pragmatic move aimed at ensuring survival, enhancing legitimacy, and expanding power within Syria’s volatile context.
Beyond internal and structural changes, his relations with external actors—including Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and potentially Iran in the future—offer clear examples of the Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa. He has been able to recalibrate his policies based on opportunities and constraints, challenging any form of ideological rigidity or permanent hostility in favor of tactical advantage and power consolidation. These characteristics make him a noteworthy case for analyzing pragmatic politics in unstable and crisis-driven environments.
The primary objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive and well-documented analysis of the Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa, with emphasis on historical examples and operational shifts.
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Presence in Iraq and Transnational Jihad
The first decade of the 21st century saw Iraq undergo profound and tumultuous transformations. The power vacuum created after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime enabled the rise and expansion of transnational militant networks and jihadist groups. It was within this complex and volatile context that Ahmad al-Sharaa entered the realm of armed activity and established connections with anti-American and jihadist networks. Despite his relatively brief presence in Iraq, this phase played a decisive role in shaping his pragmatic style and revealed the earliest signs of situational pragmatism in his political and military behavior.
The primary condition for survival in Iraq at the time was the ability to coordinate with various groups and forces, selecting targets that served group interests. At this stage, al-Sharaa clearly understood that hostility toward the United States and international forces was an operational necessity—not necessarily an absolute ideological commitment. By capitalizing on battlefield opportunities and local networks, he managed to secure a position for himself and allied groups, making him an influential actor in Iraq’s guerrilla warfare.
At the same time, this period provided al-Sharaa with the opportunity to expand his international connections. He was able to establish ties with leaders of other jihadist groups, acquire field and tactical information, and benefit from their operational experiences.
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The Establishment of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Merger of Groups
With the relative consolidation of Jabhat Fath al-Sham’s influence in northwestern Syria, a new phase began in al-Sharaa’s management of power and organization of armed groups. In January 2017, he merged several armed factions and created a new structure under the name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This move was more than a symbolic change; it was a form of structural and operational re-engineering, as it provided HTS with unified command, operational cohesion, and full control over areas under its influence.
One of al-Sharaa’s notable actions during this phase was his management of internal disputes. Some former members of Jabhat Fath al-Sham, who remained loyal to the ideology of global jihad, resisted the group’s shift in direction. A number of smaller factions broke away and joined formations like Hurras al-Din. Al-Sharaa, carefully and decisively, removed or sidelined such elements and retained only those individuals aligned with the group’s new objectives.
At the same time, al-Sharaa succeeded in strengthening the image of the group as a local and negotiable power. The rebranding from Jabhat Fath al-Sham to HTS not only marked a formal separation from al-Qaeda but also conveyed a clear message to both local and external actors: this was no longer merely a branch of an international network; it was a power capable of governing the territories under its control and influencing local affairs. Along this path, he established tactical relationships with local factions, tribal leaders, and even regional actors to ensure HTS’s relative stability as well as its financial and logistical resources.
Another significant measure he undertook during this stage was the reconstruction of the command structure and the division of areas of responsibility. Different regions under HTS control were assigned to operational units, each supervised by commanders whose loyalty to al-Sharaa’s new policies had been secured. This ensured the group’s stability both in terms of security and administration and effectively consolidated the leader’s authority.
Under al-Sharaa’s leadership, HTS gradually engaged in civil governance alongside its control of territory. Management of resources, tax collection, supervision of markets, and the delivery of basic services presented a different image from that of a purely armed group. These actions increased local legitimacy and demonstrated the group’s ability to adapt to the political and social environment under complex conditions.
Ultimately, the establishment of HTS and the merger of the factions illustrated a comprehensive example of how an armed group can transform into a quasi-state power. Every decision—from eliminating internal rivals to resource management and image-building—was part of a deliberate process aimed at consolidating power, creating cohesion, and preparing for future regional and international engagements. The narrative of al-Sharaa’s actions, or the Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa, during this period clearly shows how he used tactical and practical flexibility to turn his group from a branch of a global jihadist network into an independent and influential local power.
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Media Shift and Domestic Politics
With the consolidation of power and the establishment of a cohesive structure within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, it gradually became evident that controlling the battlefield was only one part of the power equation. To secure its position in northwestern Syria and enhance the legitimacy of the group, a new path emerged in the Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa in the realm of media and domestic politics. The changes that occurred during this period reflected, above all, image management and the exploitation of political opportunities.
One of the earliest steps was strengthening the group’s media presence. Al-Sharaa ordered the creation of a dedicated unit for content production and public communication. This unit published field reports, official statements, and coverage of the group’s social and economic activities. As a result, the image of HTS shifted from that of a purely armed group to one capable of administering the areas under its control. This action not only attracted local audiences but also sent a clear message to external actors: the group was now an effective and negotiable local power.
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Interaction with Regional and Global Powers
After achieving relative consolidation of control over northwestern Syria and Idlib, Ahmad al-Sharaa encountered a new reality: maintaining power was not limited to battlefield skills and internal organization but required engagement with major regional and international actors. At this stage, his decisions and actions were clearly influenced by the ties developed with foreign powers, financial resources, and strategic training. This demonstrates that his success was rooted more in the ability to utilize opportunities and supportive networks than in any exceptional innate talent.
One of the most significant examples of such interaction was his relations with Turkey and Qatar. These countries held influence over various parts of northwestern Syria and could provide financial resources, equipment, and political support. By establishing communication channels with these actors, al-Sharaa secured the capacity to meet the group’s immediate needs and reinforce control over areas under his influence. These interactions were not based on ideological loyalty but shaped by practical necessity and available opportunities. In other words, any shift in al-Sharaa’s policies or positions may have stemmed from pressures or incentives transmitted through these relationships. His relations with Saudi Arabia further illustrate the complexities of regional dynamics.
His dealings with the United States and other Western actors followed a similar path. The overt hostility of his years in Iraq and the early stages of the Syrian conflict gradually gave way to media engagement and unofficial dialogue aimed at gaining legitimacy and reducing international pressure. These changes were not the result of extraordinary cleverness but rather of his ability to make use of diplomatic tools and training acquired through foreign networks.
Overall, al-Sharaa’s relations and interactions with regional and global powers indicate that his decisions and achievements were not solely the product of personal skill or extraordinary intelligence but were also shaped by a convergence of battlefield experience, training, and external support.
It can thus be understood that throughout his political and military activity in Syria, al-Sharaa engaged with regional powers such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. It is reasonable to infer that these relationships—through financial support, military and strategic training, and political coordination—shaped his decision-making structure and operational priorities.
Likewise, from an international perspective, certain Western and American sources appear to have indirectly influenced the strategic behavior of the group, especially in areas such as reducing tensions with external actors and improving its media image. These interactions enabled al-Sharaa to present an image of himself suited to evolving political and military conditions.
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Al-Sharaa’s Presidency — Power Building, International Relations, and Strategic Orientation
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024—after forces led by al-Sharaa and HTS captured Damascus and former centers of power—Ahmad al-Sharaa was selected as the leader of the “transitional government” and was formally declared the “Interim President of Syria” on January 29, 2025. This transfer of power reflected a profound structural shift in Syria’s political landscape: the dissolution of the previous military, security, and party institutions (including the security corps, the army, and the Ba’ath Party) and the establishment of a new government under his leadership and that of his close associates. One should not hesitate for a moment: this structural transformation was the result of the Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa.
Al-Sharaa’s first step after assuming power was signing a “Provisional Constitutional Declaration,” which marked the beginning of a five-year transitional period and promised transitional justice, freedom of expression and the press, and the separation of powers. All of these themes were influenced by modern Western rationality and bore no relation to Islamist governance models.
In March 2025, a new cabinet was formed, including representatives of minorities and various ethnic and religious groups; for the first time in decades, ministries were assigned to members of minority communities and to women. Were it not for the Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa, such developments would seem unbelievable.
Another major transformation during al-Sharaa’s presidency was the reconfiguration of Syria’s international relations. In early 2025, after Assad’s removal and the formation of the transitional government, a significant number of Arab and international states began to restore ambassadors or reestablish diplomatic contact with Damascus. Likewise, the sanctions imposed on Syria since 2011 gradually came under review. The new government promised to rebuild the country and accept international assistance to revive the economy and infrastructure—an incentive likely to encourage support from Western states and Gulf countries. This was the same al-Sharaa who had once taken up arms to fight the global system led by the United States, battling international forces in Iraq. But the height of The Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa was revealed when, in November 2025, he was formally invited to the White House—the first visit by a Syrian leader to Washington after years of hostility. A man who once appeared on the U.S. international terrorism list was now, through his pragmatic approach, an official guest of the White House.
Reportedly, the U.S. government now seeks cooperation with Syria within the framework of the international coalition against ISIS and other terrorist groups, and it appears that all sanctions against the country have been lifted.
This step represents a 180-degree shift in Washington’s stance—from open hostility to dialogue and engagement—a change unimaginable without The Pragmatic Approach of Ahmad al-Sharaa.
Conclusion
An analysis of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s political and military trajectory—from Iraq to the presidency of Syria—shows that his behavior has been shaped by battlefield opportunities, regional and international relations, and the supportive networks of regional and global powers. Within this pragmatic framework, no enemy remains an enemy forever, and no friendship is permanently stable. The selection of allies and adversaries, the merging of groups, shifts in domestic and foreign policy, and interactions with global powers all depended on the balance of opportunity and constraint in constantly changing political and geopolitical conditions.
He is influenced by an international environment guided by Donald Trump—someone whose actions on the global stage are shaped by nothing but tangible economic outcomes.
Given this trajectory, it is plausible to expect that in the near future, many former enemies—including the Islamic Republic of Iran—may join the ranks of al-Sharaa’s allies and partners due to geopolitical and regional interests. At the same time, some current friends and allies may reduce their role or distance themselves from his government due to evolving interests or new circumstances. This pattern illustrates the central lesson of political pragmatism: in regional politics, stability and loyalty are always relative and conditioned by circumstance.
