Introduction
Qatar is a small country on the shores of the Persian Gulf that, with its limited territory, a population of less than three million (mostly migrant workers), and fragile geography, should traditionally be considered a marginal player in international politics. Yet, in the past three decades, it has managed to become one of the most controversial and influential actors in the Middle East. By using its vast natural gas wealth and massive investments in media, diplomacy, and even sports, Qatar has sought to fill its geopolitical voids and gain a position in global affairs far beyond its natural size. An examination of Qatar’s foreign policy and support for Islamist groups shows how the country has relied on tools such as the Al Jazeera network, hosting Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and providing financial and political backing to the Taliban and Hamas, to consolidate its regional and international influence.
1. The Arrival of Islamist Forces in Qatar: The Muslim Brotherhood
The entry of Islamist movements into Qatar dates back to the mid-20th century. After Arab governments, particularly Nasser’s Egypt, cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, many of its members migrated to the Persian Gulf states. Qatar, which at the time faced a severe shortage of skilled labor, welcomed these forces. The Brotherhood cadres worked in schools, universities, and government institutions, gradually gaining influence within Qatar’s educational and cultural structures.
This presence was not merely a matter of economic or technical need. The Brotherhood also brought with it an ideology and transnational networks that later became one of the pillars of Qatar’s foreign policy. Unlike its Gulf neighbors, which moved toward confrontation with the Brotherhood, Qatar distinguished itself by embracing them as part of its political capital.
2. Al Jazeera: A Platform for Transnational Influence
In 1996, Qatar founded Al Jazeera, which quickly became an unprecedented phenomenon in the Arab world. With its critical approach to Arab governments, extensive coverage of regional crises, and open invitation to Islamist figures, the network created a space previously absent in Arab official media.
Al Jazeera not only amplified Islamist voices but also became their de facto platform. Many Islamist leaders, silenced in their own countries, found in Al Jazeera a direct line to millions of viewers. During the post-2011 uprisings (the so-called Arab Spring), Al Jazeera played a pivotal role in amplifying Islamist movements.
Thus, Al Jazeera was not merely a media project but a soft power instrument that turned Qatar from a marginal state into a loud and visible actor in Middle Eastern politics.
3. Financial and Political Support for Islamist Groups
Over the past two decades, Qatar has become the main supporter of several Islamist groups. The Taliban in Afghanistan, Hamas in Palestine, and various Muslim Brotherhood branches in Arab countries are prominent examples.
- The Taliban: The Taliban’s political office is based in Doha, and many of their negotiations with the U.S. and other powers were held in Qatar. This not only facilitated the Taliban’s survival but also positioned Qatar as an “indispensable mediator.”Qatar’s support for the Taliban organization had ensured that the group remains a potential alternative to the newly established republican government in Afghanistan.
- Hamas: Qatar has provided massive financial aid to Hamas and repeatedly acted to sustain the group’s presence in Gaza. These actions came at a time when many Arab states, especially after normalizing relations with Israel, distanced themselves from Hamas.
- The Muslim Brotherhood: Qatar has consistently hosted exiled Brotherhood leaders and provided them with financial and media resources.
This policy has made Qatar one of the few countries capable of organizing and supporting Islamist forces on a regional scale.
4. The Nature of This Support: Distance from Local Culture, Proximity to Terrorist Organization
It is important to note that these policies do not stem from Qatar’s local culture. Like other small Persian Gulf societies, Qatari society has neither a history of organized Islamism nor the capacity for such projects. These supports are the result of a calculated political strategy: using Islamist groups to fill geopolitical voids and expand regional influence.
From this perspective, Qatar’s foreign policy and support for Islamist groups is less about reflecting Qatari society’s beliefs and more about leveraging Islamism as a tool for transnational influence and the survival of the monarchy. Yet, such a strategy carries heavy risks, since many of these groups are internationally designated as terrorist organizations.
5. Why Do Major Powers Tolerate or Even Welcome This Policy?
Despite the clear costs of Qatar’s policies, major powers like the United States have tolerated them. The main reason is Qatar’s geopolitical and military importance. The Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East and plays a crucial role in Washington’s regional operations.
In addition, Qatar serves a unique function for Western powers: it can maintain ties with Islamist groups that other U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf either cannot or will not engage with. In effect, Qatar becomes a “necessary intermediary” — bearing the political and security risks while the great powers reap the benefits.
6. The Israeli Attack on Qatar in 2025: The Contradiction of Sovereignty
In 2025, Israel launched a military strike on Qatari territory, claiming to target facilities supporting terrorist groups. Qatar immediately described this as a violation of its sovereignty and appealed for international backing.
Yet, the glaring contradiction was that Qatar itself had long facilitated the organization of Islamist groups that directly threatened the sovereignty of other nations. This crisis exposed the duality of Qatar’s position: portraying itself as a victim of sovereignty violations while simultaneously enabling threats to others’ sovereignty.
7. Why Does Qatar Only Offer Space to Islamists?
A crucial question arises: why does Qatar exclusively empower Islamist forces, while denying the same opportunity to non-Islamist movements such as leftists, liberals, or secular republicans?
The answer lies in the logic of the Persian Gulf monarchies. Above all, these regimes fear social movements aimed at republicanism and democracy. Islamism, in contrast, can both reproduce the traditional legitimacy of monarchies and restrain social transformations. Republican and secular movements, however, directly challenge monarchical rule.
Thus, Qatar’s support for Islamism is not evidence of openness but a deliberate choice to block republican alternatives.
8. Islamism: A Shield for Monarchy and a Barrier to Social Rationality
For Qatar, Islamism is less an ideological project and more a survival tool. Persian Gulf monarchies, including Qatar, exploit Islamism to:
- Reproduce their legitimacy against domestic and foreign pressures.
- Prevent the emergence of republican social movements.
- Block the intellectual transformation of regional societies toward rational and humanist values.
In this sense, Islamism functions as a form of “social-political engineering” designed to divert change in directions favorable to monarchies.
9. The Consequences of Qatar’s foreign policy and support for Islamist groups
Qatar’s foreign policy and support for Islamist groups has not only fueled regional crises but has also produced significant international consequences. The preservation and support of the Taliban in Afghanistan created conditions that ultimately led to the collapse of the republican government and the return of a fundamentalist regime — a development with profound implications not only for the Afghan people but also for regional and global security. In Egypt, the survival of the Muslim Brotherhood was prolonged through Qatari political and media backing, and had the military not staged a coup against Mohamed Morsi’s government, it remained uncertain where the Brotherhood might have steered the country and what destabilizing effects this would have had on the Middle East. In Palestine, according to officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Qatar’s continued support for Hamas has been one of the major obstacles to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, as it has entrenched internal divisions and dual leadership among Palestinians.
Thus, Qatar’s foreign policy has extended its influence far beyond its borders, not merely affecting domestic dynamics in individual states but also reshaping international political trajectories by sustaining radical groups and obstructing the formation of stable political structures.
10. Conclusion
Qatar represents a small but ambitious state that has sought to fill its geopolitical voids through Islamism, media, and mediation diplomacy. This strategy has brought Qatar from the margins to the center of regional politics, amplifying its weight far beyond its natural size.
Yet, the strategy carries major contradictions and threats. Supporting Islamist groups may strengthen Qatar’s short-term influence but risks exposing it to international pressure, external attacks, and even domestic instability in the long term. Furthermore, by promoting Islamism while excluding secular and liberal alternatives, Qatar has delayed the movement of regional societies toward rationality and democracy.
Therefore, Qatar’s foreign policy and support for Islamist groups may boost its status in the short run, but in the long run, it threatens to undermine the very legitimacy and security that Qatar seeks to protect, leaving it more vulnerable than it might appear today.
