Power in Middle Eastern Politics

1. Introduction: Why Does Power in the Middle East Have a Different Meaning?

   In no other region of the world is the concept of Power in Middle Eastern Politics as complex, multilayered, and tense as it is here. Power, in this context, is not merely the ability to exercise force or control state institutions; it is a network of tribal, religious, class-based, and external relations that simultaneously operate within and beyond the state. Every government — from Cairo to Tehran, and from Riyadh to Ankara — is engaged in a constant struggle between legitimacy, survival, and authority; a struggle that is both a product of history and a consequence of new geopolitical balances.

Understanding Middle Eastern politics is nearly impossible without grasping the mechanisms of power that define it. Power in this region is not simply the result of elections or modern institutions, but a delicate combination of “the legacy of monarchy and caliphate,” “personal authority,” “religion and narrative,” and “oil and security rents.” In other words, Power in Middle Eastern Politics is more of a network than a structure — a network nourished by history, identity, and geopolitics.

In the twenty-first century, the Middle East has become, more than ever before, a living laboratory for studying the production, reproduction, and collapse of power. On one hand, authoritarian states continue to operate according to classical models of domination and social control; on the other, popular movements, transnational groups, media, and religious ideologies are redefining the boundaries of power. In such a landscape, power is not merely an instrument of governance — it is the primary arena of competition for survival, legitimacy, and meaning.

2. Power as Survival: The Inner Logic of Middle Eastern Politics

   In the West, power is typically understood as a tool for governance or achieving collective goals. But in Power in Middle Eastern Politics, power is first and foremost an instrument of survival — both for the state and for non-state actors. Survival in this region is not a natural condition but an ongoing project that requires the continuous reproduction of power resources.

In many Middle Eastern countries, the state is not built upon a social contract but upon a model of “security as privilege” — the state provides security, and the people obey. This relationship, rooted in premodern structures, has caused power to become not a means of serving society but a mechanism for controlling it.

Power in this sense is more personal than institutional; it is tied to a leader, a family, or a small elite who view themselves as the embodiment of the state. From Nasser’s Egypt and Saddam’s Iraq to Saudi Arabia and Assad’s Syria, a recurring pattern emerges: power as inheritance, not responsibility. This personalized form of rule derives its legitimacy from a blend of charismatic authority, religion, and rent distribution.

However, survival in the Middle East is not purely domestic. States must also endure within a network of regional rivalries and international pressures. As a result, internal power is constantly redefined in relation to foreign policy. Power in the Middle East is less about military or economic might and more about maintaining balance among conflicting forces — between tradition and modernity, religion and state, nation and ummah, East and West.

3. Historical Roots of Power: From Caliphate to the Modern State

   To understand the current structure of Power in Middle Eastern Politics, one must revisit its historical roots. The Islamic Caliphate system — which for centuries served as the model of political legitimacy in the Islamic world — defined power not as a social contract but as a divine trust (amanah). The caliphate was, in essence, the political continuation of the Prophet’s authority and derived its legitimacy from religion. However, after the collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate and the fragmentation of the Islamic realm, power gradually passed into the hands of local dynasties, monarchies, and tribal emirates.

As a result, power in the Middle East divided into two poles:

• Religious (shar‘i) power, held by scholars and religious institutions, and
• Political (sultanic) power, concentrated in the hands of kings, sultans, and later, military presidents.

Throughout history, these two sources of power were either in conflict (as in the tension between scholars and the Umayyad or Abbasid caliphates) or intertwined (as in the Safavid and Ottoman empires, which used religion as an instrument of political authority). In both cases, the outcome was the same: concentration of power in the ruler’s hands and the weakening of intermediary social institutions.

The arrival of colonialism and the formation of modern Middle Eastern states after World War I did not fundamentally transform the structure of power; instead, it reproduced it within a new framework. Artificial borders, dependent governments, and politicized militaries created a pattern of “state without nation” in which power continued to flow from the top down. In such a system, loyalty replaced participation, and security was prioritized over freedom.

4. Modern Theories of Power and the Middle East: From Domination to Discipline

One of the greatest challenges in analyzing Power in Middle Eastern Politics lies in reconciling modern theories of power with the region’s historical and social realities. Western theories, though providing robust analytical frameworks, are mostly built upon the experience of modern, institutionalized, and law-based nation-states. In contrast, states in the Middle East are often personalistic, tribal, or ideological, and the boundary between state and society is frequently blurred.

Nevertheless, revisiting three major intellectual traditions — those of Machiavelli, Weber, and Foucault — allows us to understand the patterns of power in the Middle East within the broader history of political thought.

4.1 Machiavelli and Power as the Control of Reality

Niccolò Machiavelli was the first thinker to separate power from morality and to treat it as a naked reality. In The Prince, he demonstrated that the preservation of power is more important than justice or even legitimacy — because without power, no value can endure. In Power in Middle Eastern Politics, many states have followed this same logic: power for survival, not power for service.

From Nasser’s Egypt to Saddam’s Iraq, the logic of political survival — based on controlling resources, securing military loyalty, and eliminating opponents — reflects a Machiavellian worldview. Yet in this region, power has never been a purely political instrument; it has always been intertwined with symbols and narratives. In fact, if Machiavelli spoke of control, in the Middle East control is infused with meaning — meanings nourished by religion, history, and collective identity.

4.2 Weber and the Triad of Legitimacy: Tradition, Law, and Charisma

The German sociologist Max Weber defined power not only as the ability to impose one’s will but also as the capacity to persuade and to be accepted. He distinguished among three types of legitimacy: traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic. This framework is particularly illuminating for understanding Power in Middle Eastern Politics, since nearly all regimes in the region combine these three sources of legitimacy:

• In Arab monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, power rests upon traditional and religious legitimacy.
• In military republics such as Egypt and Syria, the charismatic legitimacy of nationalist leaders has played a central role.
• In the Islamic Republic of Iran, a distinctive synthesis of religious and revolutionary-legal legitimacy has emerged.

Weber emphasized that no regime can endure by coercion alone; there must exist a collective belief in the “right to command.” This insight is crucial in the Middle East: to maintain power, states must possess not only force but also a legitimizing narrative — whether that narrative is religious, nationalist, or resistance-oriented.

4.3 Foucault and Power as a Network

Michel Foucault revolutionized the understanding of power. For him, power does not reside solely within the state but flows throughout the entire network of social relations — in education, religion, gender, language, and even the body. Power is not simply transmitted from the top down; it is produced and reproduced everywhere.

In the Middle East, this Foucauldian insight is strikingly evident. Religious networks, satellite and digital media, charitable and security institutions — all are part of the machinery of power. In Power in Middle Eastern Politics today, power is no longer concentrated in a single institution or individual; it is distributed among the state, non-state actors, regional players, and even public opinion.

In Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon, one can clearly see how religious or party-based networks exert real influence over society without formally holding state power. This is what Foucault called disciplinary power — a form of power that regulates people’s behavior through institutions, discourses, and beliefs rather than through open coercion.

4.4 Theoretical Synthesis: The Middle East Between Machiavelli, Weber, and Foucault

If Machiavelli spoke of power as survival, Weber of power as legitimacy, and Foucault of power as a network, then the Middle East embodies all three. States draw upon Machiavellian logic for survival, rely on Weberian legitimacy for justification, and employ Foucauldian networks for effective governance.

In this synthesis, power becomes a multidimensional phenomenon — neither purely political nor purely cultural, but rather a lifeworld of power, in which everything — from media to religious rituals — constitutes part of the field of power itself.

5. The Rentier State and the Reproduction of Economic Power

No variable has shaped the pattern of Power in Middle Eastern Politics more than oil. From the 1950s to the present, the political economy of oil has created a unique relationship between state and society, one that differs sharply from Western models of democracy and taxation. In this system, the state is financed not by taxing its citizens but by selling natural resources; therefore, it is not accountable to the people, but rather acts as a distributor of rents.

According to the Rentier State Theory, first introduced by Hossein Mahdavy and later developed by Beblawi, political power derives directly from the control of natural resources. Under such conditions, the state can maintain stability through wealth distribution, the purchase of loyalty, and the soft suppression of dissent — even in the absence of democratic institutions.

In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, oil rent has produced a kind of “implicit social contract”: prosperity in exchange for obedience. In Iran and Iraq, although the political structures differ, the same rentier logic operates in another form: the state reproduces social loyalty through subsidies, public-sector employment, and welfare policies.

This rentier model, while seemingly efficient and stable, is deeply fragile at its core. Its legitimacy does not rest on public participation but on the distribution of privileges; thus, in times of economic crisis or falling oil revenues, the entire structure of power becomes vulnerable to erosion. This fragility was laid bare during the Arab Spring, particularly in countries with more limited resources, where it manifested as social upheaval and revolt.

6. Power and Ideology: From Nasserism to Political Islam

In the Middle East, power has never been purely economic or military; it has always required an ideological foundation to acquire meaning. From the 1950s onward, three major ideologies have shaped the landscape of Power in Middle Eastern Politics: Arab nationalism, state socialism, and political Islam.

6.1 Arab Nationalism and the Charisma of the State

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt, embodied the archetype of charismatic power in the Arab world. Through the ideology of Arab unity, he constructed an anti-Western and justice-oriented discourse that extended the legitimacy of the state from the national to the supranational level. Yet this ideology collapsed after the military defeat of 1967 and the subsequent economic crises, giving way to a more bureaucratic form of authoritarianism.

6.2 State Socialism and the Paternal State

In many countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, power gained legitimacy under the banner of social equality and anti-imperialism, but in practice it led to the concentration of authority within the ruling party. In this model, the state acted as the “father of society” — the distributor of resources and caretaker of the people — yet one that remained unaccountable.

6.3 Political Islam and the Redefinition of Power

From the 1970s onward, with the decline of Arab nationalism and the failure of state socialism, political Islam emerged as a new center of legitimacy and power. The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Turkey’s Islamist movements each sought to redefine the relationship between power and sharia.

Within this shift, Power in Middle Eastern Politics once again transcended national boundaries. Religious ideology began to create new transnational loyalties, allowing faith-based movements to shape political authority beyond the limits of the nation-state.

7. Networked Power: Weak States, Strong Networks

One of the defining transformations in understanding Power in Middle Eastern Politics in the twenty-first century is the gradual transfer of power from formal state institutions to non-state actors. Whereas in the West, nation-states are characterized by stable institutions and systems of accountability, in the Middle East, the breakdown of formal state structures has enabled the rise of networks that often assume state-like functions.

From Lebanon to Yemen, and from Syria to Iraq, militias, religious organizations, and even charitable and media networks hold a significant share of real authority. Here, power stems not from law but from loyalty, identity, and access to resources. In Foucauldian terms, power “flows throughout the social body,” and it is no longer possible to locate a single center.

Examples of this networked power are numerous:

• In Lebanon, Hezbollah has evolved from a resistance movement into an economic, military, and social network.
• In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) have become a power parallel to the official army.
• In Turkey, neo-Islamist and business networks aligned with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have shaped the state from within.
• And in Iran, supra-governmental and revolutionary institutions, while accepting the legal order, have created parallel structures to exercise social and cultural authority.

In these societies, power is no longer exercised solely from the top down but is embedded within complex social networks. This transformation has fundamentally altered the classical face of the state in the Middle East.

8. Transnational Power and Regional Rivalries

Another defining dimension of Power in Middle Eastern Politics is the transnationalization of power relations. The region, whose borders were drawn by colonial agreements in the twentieth century, is now moving beyond the framework of state-centrism more than ever before.

Within this evolving landscape, four principal poles of power have emerged: Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
Each represents a distinct model of power, and through their competition and interaction, the regional balance of power takes shape.

8.1 Iran: Ideological and Networked Power

Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has pursued a model of power grounded in ideology and strategic depth. This power is not merely military but also cultural and social; networks of aligned groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen constitute Iran’s “power of influence.”

This model exemplifies networked power within Power in Middle Eastern Politics — the fusion of religious authority, anti-Western resistance, and support for non-state movements.

8.2 Saudi Arabia: Financial Power and Religious Legitimacy

Saudi Arabia wields a different form of power, drawing upon its vast oil resources and its religious status as the birthplace of Islam. Its power blends chequebook diplomacy with cultural control — projecting influence across the Islamic world through media, education, and religious organizations.

In recent decades, Saudi foreign policy has shifted from conservatism to assertiveness, especially under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who seeks to redefine the kingdom’s regional role by combining economic strength with soft-power strategies.

8.3 Turkey: Neo-Ottomanism and Soft Power

Turkey represents a third model — soft power framed by a neo-Ottoman ideological vision. The Erdoğan government has sought to expand its cultural, media, and economic influence across Turkic and Arab nations.

Through television series, universities, and business networks, Turkey has constructed an image of power based on attraction and role modeling — a form of influence reminiscent of Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power,” yet colored by Turkey’s own blend of religious and national identity.

8.4 Israel: Technological and Security Power

Israel, by contrast, represents a distinct model: technological-security power. Relying on advanced military, cyber, and intelligence technologies, Israel has maintained a regional balance of power within a small yet highly contested geopolitical space.

The country demonstrates that in the twenty-first century, power is no longer measured by oil or population, but by knowledge, information, and innovation.

9. Media, Public Opinion, and Symbolic Power

No analysis of Power in Middle Eastern Politics is complete without considering the role of the media. In recent decades, media have become the new battleground of power — a space where legitimacy is constructed, undermined, and redefined.

Networks such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and Press TV each serve as soft-power instruments for specific states. The media wars surrounding the crises in Syria, Yemen, and Palestine have shown that today’s conflicts are fought less over territory and more over narrative.

Alongside traditional media, social networks have also transformed the structure of power from within. The Arab Spring marked the first instance of a digital uprising in the Arab world; yet subsequent experiences revealed that the same tools of liberation can also become tools of surveillance and control. Today, Middle Eastern governments no longer merely confront the media — they govern through it.

10. Power, Identity, and the Discourse of Resistance

Power in the Middle East has always been deeply intertwined with the notion of identity. On one side, states seek to foster social cohesion through appeals to national or religious identity; on the other, opposition movements challenge existing regimes by invoking a return to authentic identity or resistance to foreign domination.

The “discourse of resistance” has become one of the most powerful sources of legitimacy in the contemporary Middle East. From Hezbollah to Hamas, from Yemen’s Ansar Allah to Iran’s Quds Force, this discourse is built upon two intertwined elements: victimhood and steadfastness. Within it, power is not viewed as oppressive but as sacred — defined as a force in the service of justice and faith.

Conversely, conservative regimes construct a different form of legitimization around the discourse of “stability and development.” These opposing narratives — resistance versus stability — have effectively split the political landscape of the region in two, and many of its modern crises stem directly from this tension.

11. The Future of Power in Middle Eastern Politics: From State to Network

Considering all these transformations, it is evident that Power in Middle Eastern Politics is undergoing a shift from a vertical model to a horizontal one.

In the past, power flowed from the top down — from sultan, king, or president. Today, it is dispersed across multiple layers of society: economic and religious networks, media ecosystems, and the digital sphere.

While states remain central decision-making bodies, they are no longer the only actors. The boundaries between ruler and ruled, between state and nation, between power and resistance, are becoming increasingly blurred. In this sense, the Middle East serves as a living laboratory for studying new forms of power — a realm of fluid alliances, shifting discourses, and overlapping legitimacies.

12. Final Synthesis: Power, Crisis, and the Possibility of Transformation

Power in Middle Eastern Politics cannot be explained by a single model. It is a fusion of force and meaning, rent and faith, technology and myth.

Its uniqueness lies in combining multiple layers of reality: state, network, ideology, and society. Regional crises — from the war in Gaza to the Iran–Saudi rivalry — reveal that power in the Middle East is being redefined more intensely than ever before. Yet within these crises also lies the possibility of transformation: if power can transcend the logic of exclusion and domination to embrace cooperation and constructive networking, it may open a new path toward political development in the region.

Ultimately, Power in Middle Eastern Politics is no longer merely an instrument — it is an existential reality, a language through which all political actors communicate, even when they speak of freedom, faith, or justice.