Introduction
In a world where grand narratives have collapsed, the question of political legitimacy has once again moved to the center of political thought. In the twentieth century, states derived their legitimacy from ideologies; communism, liberalism, nationalism, and Islamism each promised meaning, justice, and political salvation. Yet in the twenty-first century, states can hardly construct such narratives. The world has entered a stage that can be called the era of Post-ideological legitimacy — an era in which politics is emptied of meaning and power is detached from purpose.
In a previous independent article, the concept of legitimacy and its types were analyzed based on Max Weber’s tripartite classification (traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational). Now, however, the issue goes beyond that: in conditions where neither tradition, nor charisma, nor law alone appears sufficient, what becomes the foundation of legitimacy? If ideologies no longer possess the power to inspire, how is political power justified? This article is an attempt to understand this fundamental transformation; a journey from the ruins of ideology to the search for meaning in a politics that calls itself “realist,” “neutral,” and “pragmatic,” but in reality is trapped in a crisis of meaning.
In this post-ideological world, states emphasize efficiency and order above all else; yet efficiency, although necessary, cannot by itself serve as a source of legitimacy. Political legitimacy, even in the most secular societies, always presupposes some kind of meaning, value, or ultimate purpose. Therefore, the central problem of our age is not only the functional crisis of governments, but the crisis of meaning in politics.
-
The decline of ideology and the void of meaning in politics
The collapse of ideologies can be regarded as one of the most profound transformations of the twentieth century. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, many assumed that the world had entered a “post-historical era”: a time in which liberal democracy would be the final and natural system of governance. Yet this optimism, as Francis Fukuyama later admitted, was less a description of reality than a new ideological faith — a faith in the rationality of markets and parliamentary democracy.
A few decades later, the world showed another face: from the rise of post-communist China to the return of authoritarianism in Russia, from American populism to Arab neo-conservatism, all demonstrated that we are not living in the “end of ideology,” but in the post-ideological age; a period in which ideologies have neither disappeared nor been replaced, but persist in pragmatic, relative, and at times contradictory forms within politics.
This condition can be described, borrowing from Jean-François Lyotard, as the “end of grand narratives.” Politics no longer rests on a moral or philosophical foundation. States no longer speak of the “public good” or the “shared future of humanity”; what has replaced these is a technocratic and managerial language that seeks legitimacy not in meaning, but in performance. In such a world, Post-ideological legitimacy means replacing meaning with functionality: the state is legitimate because it works; because it maintains order, because it controls the economy — not because it carries a universal value or moral mission.
But it is precisely here that the crisis begins. When power feeds solely on its technical success, every failure, even temporary, endangers its legitimacy. The post-ideological state is more defenseless in the face of crises than the ideological state, because it can no longer justify failure through “narrative.” Failure in politics without meaning is simply failure: immediate, unshielded, and unsupported.
Thus, the post-ideological age can be called “the age of fragile legitimacy.” In this age, political order persists, but behind it, there is no longer faith, purpose, or a shared dream. Politics has become crisis management, and leaders have turned into managers whose mission is to prevent collapse, not to create meaning.
-
The state as a management machine
The post-ideological state, in Zygmunt Bauman’s terms, is the “liquid state”: a state that can no longer guide society, but only attempts to control currents and prevent explosions. These states — from Beijing to Washington, from Tehran to Riyadh — are more technocratic than ideological. Their language is the language of data, numbers, efficiency, and stability. Yet in this process, something essential has been lost: meaning.
In the past, political legitimacy came with a “story” about the world — the story of justice in Marxism, freedom in liberalism, salvation in religion. Today, these stories have been replaced by economic charts and performance indicators. On the surface, this transformation seems like a sign of human rational maturity, but in essence, it has created an ontological void within politics.
The post-ideological state finds itself defenseless before fundamental questions: Why does it govern? For whom? And toward what ultimate end? The answers to these questions no longer lie within the text of politics itself. Hence, politics becomes a field of management without purpose — something Machiavelli considered necessary and Fukuyama deemed inevitable, but later philosophers have described as a sign of the decline of meaning.
-
The post-ideological state: from meaning to management
In the modern era, the state has always been understood as more than a mere executive institution. From the revolutions of the eighteenth century to the twentieth, the state carried a message or meaning; it represented the will of the nation, freedom, justice, or collective faith. But in the present age, this image has been transformed. The post-ideological state is no longer the embodiment of an ultimate purpose; it has become an institution whose objective is efficient management and the preservation of social order. This transformation forms the essence of Post-ideological legitimacy: a legitimacy emptied of meaning and reduced to functionality.
In this new structure, the state presents itself not as a prophet of justice but as a manager of equilibrium. Politics is reduced to the science of data, the economy to the metric of stability, and society to a system of crisis management. What was once known as “ideology” or “political philosophy” has been replaced by guidelines, performance indicators, and economic reports.
In other words, in the post-ideological state, efficiency replaces faith. If the state can control inflation, develop infrastructure, or maintain political stability, it is deemed legitimate — even if it lacks any meaning, narrative, or moral horizon.
But while this new model of legitimacy may be effective in the short term, it is fragile in the long run. In the absence of meaning, any economic or political crisis can collapse the very foundation of legitimacy. In post-ideological systems, there are no sacred values to fall back on. The only criterion is practical success; and when that is lost, the state suddenly becomes rootless.
A. China: efficiency instead of communism
One of the clearest examples of this transition is the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese Communist Party once considered itself the heir to a universal ideology, but today its legitimacy comes not from Marxism, but from economic growth and managerial efficiency. Xi Jinping’s China is a perfect example of Post-ideological legitimacy: a regime that promotes faith not in class justice, but in order, stability, and development.
In this framework, the Communist Party does not act as a revolutionary force, but as a “developmental state.” The people of China do not expect meaning from the state; they expect their lives to improve. Legitimacy is fed by statistics and indicators, not by dreams. This is precisely the moment when ideology becomes functionality and meaning gives way to performance.
B. Russia: rebuilding power without belief
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is another example of this transformation, though with a different tone. In Russia, Soviet ideology has disappeared, but to fill the void of meaning, the state makes instrumental use of nationalism, Tsarist heritage, and even Orthodox religion. These are not genuine belief systems, but functional quasi-ideologies: tools for reproducing order and consolidating power.
In fact, Putinism can be seen as a pure example of post-ideological legitimacy with a traditional face: a legitimacy that draws on the past, but uses it to serve a present devoid of meaning. Russia is religious and historical at the symbolic level, yet at the structural level it is thoroughly technocratic and security-driven.
C. The United States: pragmatism and the crisis of meaning
In the United States, although liberal-democratic institutions remain intact, the moral narrative of liberalism has been eroding. The Trump era symbolized this collapse: a moment when ideology gave way to absolute pragmatism. U.S. foreign policy no longer seeks to “spread democracy,” but pursues immediate interests and power balance.
Here too, one can speak of an American form of Post-ideological legitimacy — a legitimacy derived not from the idea of freedom, but from the performance of power. Democracy remains the official language of the system, yet in practice, American politics has become a domain of private interests, lobbying, and technocratic considerations.
D. The Middle East: from faith to security
In the Middle East, this transition unfolds in another way. States that once drew legitimacy from religious or revolutionary ideologies now emphasize “security” and “stability.” In Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, ideological narratives still exist at the level of official discourse, but in reality, post-ideological legitimacy rests on control, order, and development.
Even governments that still speak in the language of faith and mission now rely more than ever on “economic efficiency” and “political stability.” This is where politics becomes a religious-technocratic management system — a fusion of two worlds, both of which have lost meaning.
E. From the state of meaning to the state of survival
Across all these examples, one common pattern emerges: the transition from the state of meaning to the state of survival.
The state of meaning saw itself as the bearer of a historical or moral mission; but the state of survival seeks only to preserve order and maintain functionality. In such a world, politics rests not on ideals, but on numbers and indicators.
This seemingly calm transformation is in fact a philosophical revolution: a shift in the foundation of legitimacy. From now on, legitimacy derives not from the idea of justice or freedom, but from functional and technical criteria. This is the moment when the human being shifts from a citizen committed to political participation to a “customer” of state services.
As a result, the post-ideological state appears stable on the surface, but carries a crisis within: in the absence of meaning, no deep emotional or moral bond remains between authority and society.
This is the very crisis that will be examined in the next section.
-
Political and social consequences of post-ideological legitimacy
When states derive their legitimacy from performance and efficiency rather than meaning and belief, society itself is transformed. The modern human being is no longer a political believer; he is a “user” of the political system, not its citizen. This fundamental shift forms the essence of the crisis of the new era: post-ideological legitimacy empties society from within.
A. Erosion of social bonds
In meaning-oriented states (whether religious, revolutionary, or liberal-democratic), citizens saw themselves as part of a shared narrative. Justice, freedom, or faith were concepts that shaped collective identity. But in post-ideological systems, this narrative has vanished.
The state no longer says anything that can touch the soul of society. “Politics” becomes a technical domain in which experts, not believers, make decisions. Society is emptied of moral solidarity and remains united only by economic interests or fear of instability.
This condition is what Habermas calls a crisis of communicative legitimacy: a time when the shared language between state and people disappears, and politics becomes a silent conversation.
B. The rise of populism as a reaction
In the absence of meaning, people turn to populism in search of voice and belonging. Populism is born from this very void: an emotional response of society to lifeless politics.
Trumpism in the United States, Brexit in the United Kingdom, the new nationalism in Europe, and even revived religious movements in the Middle East are all reactions to Post-ideological legitimacy.
Populists pretend to restore meaning, but in reality they use the same post-ideological logic: managing emotions, not rebuilding belief.
Populism is, in appearance, against technocracy, yet in practice it complements it. Both rely on “functionality”; the difference is only that one speaks in numbers and the other in feelings. Neither speaks of great ideas.
C. The dominance of technocracy and ethics-less knowledge
When ideology recedes, “applied knowledge” takes its place. Technocracy is the rational face of post-ideological legitimacy. Contemporary states use the language of science and expertise to justify policies, without reflecting on the moral foundation behind them.
In this logic, science and data replace values. But science does not say what ought to be done — it only says what works. And this distinction strips politics of its moral dimension.
In Arendt’s terms, this situation represents the return of the “banality of evil”: evil no longer arises from totalitarian ideologies, but from the mindless functioning of efficient systems in which no one feels responsible for meaning or consequences.
D. The crisis of public trust
When the legitimacy of the state depends on performance, every error or failure quickly turns into a crisis of trust.
In the past, governments could endure failures under the shelter of faith or ideology, but in the post-ideological world, even minor inefficiency burns the legitimacy of the entire structure.
This is visible in Western economic crises, in the collapse of populist systems, and in social uprisings in the Middle East. Society no longer accepts failure, because there is no longer any meaning left to justify sacrifice.
E. From citizen to consumer
Ultimately, the post-ideological society reduces the human being to a “consumer of politics.” Voting, protesting, or even civic participation no longer function as a duty or moral commitment — they become a matter of “choosing from a service menu.”
The citizen expects services from the state just as he expects service from a mobile company. If dissatisfied, he simply switches political brands.
But this consumer rationality, while seemingly stable, in fact corrodes the foundations of politics from within. A society that no longer believes collapses as soon as it faces a crisis, because it has no higher reason to remain present in the public sphere.
F. The return of the question of meaning
But can we escape this cycle of meaninglessness?
Amid this crisis, the voices of philosophers are heard again: from Arendt and Rawls to Habermas. Each, in a different way, seeks to reconstruct the meaning of legitimacy — not by returning to absolute ideologies, but by reviving rational and ethical dialogue between state and society.
Habermas, with his concept of communicative action; Rawls, with justice as fairness; and Arendt, with politics as action and appearance — all attempt to open a path toward meaning from within the modern world.
In their view, legitimacy does not arise from technical performance, but from ethical and rational dialogue among citizens.
-
Reconstructing Political Order Without Returning to Ideology
The central question of our era is this:
When ideologies have collapsed and the state survives only on the basis of performance, can we build a political order that depends neither on blind faith nor on soulless technocracy?
This is, in fact, a new formulation of Kant’s essential concern:
“How can freedom coexist peacefully with law?”
Kant was the first to ground political legitimacy not in external authority but in practical reason. For him, a legitimate state is one whose principles can be imagined as universal laws for all human beings. This idea forms the cornerstone of reconstructing political order in the post-ideological era: a return to reason, not to belief.
A. Arendt: Politics as the Emergence of Meaning
Hannah Arendt, witnessing the death of ideologies and the rise of totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century, placed neither faith in the economy nor in institutions. For Arendt, legitimacy can only be rebuilt when politics again becomes a realm of appearance — where human beings freely act and speak, revealing themselves to one another.
Within the framework of post-ideological legitimacy, Arendt’s thought gains new relevance:
If the state is no longer the bearer of meaning, the public sphere must become the space where meaning is created.
For her, freedom becomes real only when people create shared meaning through speech and action.
Thus, legitimacy arises not from the machinery of the state, but from a living network of human dialogue and action.
B. Rawls: Justice as Rational Reconciliation
John Rawls, following the Kantian tradition, sought a theory of legitimacy in a world without shared faith. Recognizing that modern society cannot rest upon a single ideology or religion, he built his argument on justice as fairness.
In this view, legitimacy comes not from absolute truth, but from public reason — the agreement of free and equal citizens on principles consistent with their conscience.
Rawls thus offers a moral alternative to post-ideological legitimacy:
a system that retains meaning, but one rooted in human dialogue rather than in transcendent absolutes.
Here, politics is freed from ideology, yet returns to ethics.
Legitimacy lies not in efficiency or faith, but in the structural fairness of institutions and decisions.
C. Habermas: Communicative Action and the Reconstruction of Meaning
Jürgen Habermas can be called the philosopher of meaning’s reconstruction in the age of technocracy. Unlike Nietzsche and Foucault, who embraced the death of meaning, Habermas argues that human beings can still create shared meaning through dialogue.
In the theory of communicative action, legitimacy exists only when political decisions are accepted through free and rational deliberation.
He distinguishes between two forms of rationality:
- Instrumental rationality — concerned with control and efficiency (the basis of the post-ideological state)
- Communicative rationality — aimed at mutual understanding and meaning-making
His message is clear:
To overcome the crisis of post-ideological legitimacy, we must return the language of politics from command and data to dialogue and understanding.
D. From Technical Reason to Moral Reason
Comparing these thinkers shows that the path out of post-ideological crisis lies in returning to moral rationality — not in reviving totalitarian ideologies, and not in extending technocratic rule.
The task is to balance performance with meaning, administration with dialogue.
This model of legitimacy rests on three pillars:
- Technical efficiency (the need for order and survival)
- Institutional justice (fairness and public reason)
- Communicative dialogue (creation of shared meaning)
In such a paradigm, the state is not merely a manager; it becomes a facilitator of understanding and social cohesion.
E. Rebuilding Legitimacy in the 21st Century
If legitimacy in the twentieth century was born from ideology, and in the twenty-first has been reduced to technocracy, the next step must synthesize both:
an ethical-rational state in which meaning arises not from blind faith, but from free human dialogue.
This model can even form a new foundation for global order — one based not on ideological hegemony or empty pragmatism, but on communicative reason and global justice.
As Kant wrote in Perpetual Peace, enduring peace becomes possible only when the foundation of world order is reason, not fear or interest.
Thus, rebuilding political legitimacy in the post-ideological age is a return to Kant’s rational heritage — expressed through the modern vocabulary developed by Arendt, Rawls, and Habermas.
Final Synthesis
Legitimacy in the post-ideological world can no longer draw upon faith, race, class, or ideology. Yet this does not mark the death of politics.
Rather, it offers the chance to recreate politics on the foundations of dialogue, fairness, and communicative rationality.
In this sense, the era of post-ideological legitimacy, though born of a crisis of meaning, carries within it the possibility of a rebirth — a politics not in service of power, but in service of understanding and humanity.
