Natural Law and Modern Politics

Introduction: The Return of Natural Law in the Unruly World of Modern Politics

In a world where politics is increasingly turning into an arena of power struggles and economic interests, the question of natural law has once again become one of the central concerns of political philosophy.

Should politics be governed by moral and rational principles rooted in human nature itself, or is it merely a system organized by interests, contracts, and the will of power?

This question—whose origins trace back to antiquity—has re-emerged in modern times in a new form: an era in which concepts such as human rights, justice, freedom, and political legitimacy all stand precariously on a fragile boundary between morality and power.

In simple terms, natural law is the belief that within human nature lie principles of justice and goodness that are valid independently of the will of states and rulers. From Socrates and Aristotle to Christian and Islamic philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, al-Fārābī, and Avicenna, thinkers have sought to establish a connection between human law and the natural order of existence.

In this view, politics must embody rationality and inherent justice; for, as Aquinas puts it, if a law is inconsistent with the rational and moral nature of humanity, “it is no longer a law, but a form of coercion.”

However, with the advent of modernity, the meaning of natural law underwent a profound transformation. On one hand, philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant sought to secularize it—turning it into the foundation of natural rights and the social contract. On the other hand, realists such as Hobbes, and later Nietzsche and Machiavelli, regarded politics as the realm of power and dismissed natural morality as philosophical idealism.

Thus, modern politics came to walk a thin line between moral idealism and the reality of power: on one side, declarations of human rights; on the other, colonialism, war, and interventionism.

In the twentieth century, after the catastrophes of two world wars and the experience of totalitarian regimes, the idea of natural law was revived once more. The Nuremberg Trials, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the establishment of institutions such as the United Nations were all founded upon the principle that “human beings possess a dignity and rights which no state has the authority to violate.”

Yet even this notion gradually became an instrument of ideological rivalry in the context of global politics. The great powers—especially during the Cold War—invoked the language of human rights to legitimize their influence over the world; consequently, natural law became hollowed out from within and politicized.

Today, with the rise of movements such as Trumpism, right-wing populism, and economic neoliberalism, natural law has been more marginalized than ever. Global politics is no longer structured around universal principles but around transient interests, temporary agreements, and shifting power balances.

Hence, the question of “natural law and modern politics” is not merely a philosophical inquiry—it is a vital issue for understanding the contemporary crises of the world: from international instability and the crisis of legitimacy to migration, wars, and the collapse of public trust.

This article seeks, through a historical and analytical perspective, to trace the evolution of the concept of natural law from classical philosophy to modern politics and to demonstrate how—despite its many transformations—it remains one of the fundamental pillars of thought on justice and legitimacy in the contemporary world.

In the first section, we examine the philosophical roots of natural law in ancient Greece and Islamic philosophy (particularly in the works of al-Fārābī and Avicenna).
In the second section, we explore how it was reinterpreted in modern thought, from Locke to Kant.
In the third, we analyze the role of natural law in the development of human rights and contemporary global politics.
Finally, by focusing on the politics of Donald Trump, we show how absolute pragmatism and economic reductionism have pushed natural law and global ethics to the margins.

The ultimate aim of this paper is to reconsider a fundamental question:
In a world reduced to bargaining and power, can we still speak of natural law as a measure of justice and legitimacy?

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Part I: The Philosophical Origins of Natural Law

1. The Concept of Natural Law: From Nature to Justice

Natural law was not originally a legal doctrine, but rather a philosophical intuition about the inherent order of the universe. Since antiquity, humankind has sensed that the world rests upon a rational order—one that exists independently of the will of rulers and serves as the true standard of justice and goodness. The idea of natural law thus represents humanity’s effort to harmonize human law with the law of reason and nature.

In contrast to positive law—the law created by human will and political authority—natural law claims that there are moral and universal principles embedded in the very fabric of nature, which should form the foundation of law and politics.
From the beginning, this duality became a central axis of political philosophy:
Should justice be derived from nature—or from the power of the ruler?

2. Ancient Greece: From the Sophists to Aristotle

In ancient Greek thought, the concept of natural law emerged as an alternative to conventional law (Nomos).
The Sophists argued that human laws are social constructs and therefore relative; but philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle contended that the standards of justice and goodness are rooted in the nature of reason itself.

• Plato, in The Republic, defined justice as the harmony between the parts of the soul and the classes of the city—a harmony that mirrors the cosmic order.
• Aristotle made physis (nature) the basis of his teleological worldview and wrote: “Natural law is that which everywhere is the same, for it derives from nature and not from human beings.”
  In Aristotelian politics, the human being is a natural creature who can attain perfection only within society and under the guidance of rational law.

Here, natural law is not merely a moral injunction but the very source of political legitimacy: the ruler must govern according to the rational nature of humankind, not by the mere exercise of power.

3. Natural Law in Stoic Philosophy and the Roman Tradition

The Stoics, especially Cicero, translated the idea of natural law into a more legal and universal language. They held that:

“True law is right reason in agreement with nature—a law that is universal and eternal, binding all human beings by their common reason.”

In Stoicism, natural law becomes a form of moral universalism: all humans, through reason, participate in the divine law.
This conception was later incorporated into Roman law, and subsequently developed in Christian theology, particularly in the works of Thomas Aquinas.

4. The Middle Ages and the Christian Tradition: Thomas Aquinas

During the Middle Ages, Christianity sought to reconcile Greek philosophy with divine theology.
Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), in his Summa Theologica, formulated a comprehensive theory of natural law.

He distinguished four types of law:

• Eternal law (the divine order of God),
• Natural law (the part of that order accessible to human reason),
• Human law (civil legislation), and
• Divine law (revealed through scripture).

According to Aquinas, natural law is a reflection of divine reason inscribed within the human soul; every person, through the use of reason, can discern good from evil. Therefore, just politics must rest upon natural reason, not upon the mere will of kings or the Church.

In this way, Aquinas sought to forge a rational bridge between faith and reason, and between theology and politics—a synthesis that would later pave the way for philosophical secularism and the rise of modern natural rights theory.

5. Islamic Philosophy: Reinterpreting Reason and Natural Law in al-Fārābī and Avicenna

In the Islamic world, although the exact term “natural law” was not employed, similar ideas can be found in the works of philosophers such as al-Fārābī and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā).
They endeavored to establish a rational relationship between reason, revelation, and politics—a relationship whose essence closely parallels the concept of natural law.

1. a) al-Fārābī and Rational Politics

In his al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah (The Virtuous City), al-Fārābī described politics as a civil science whose ultimate goal is the attainment of human happiness.
He viewed the cosmos as an intelligible order that begins with God and extends into human society.

For al-Fārābī, the virtuous ruler must apprehend the Active Intellect and legislate not according to personal interest but according to wisdom and the rational nature of humankind.
In other words, the law must be aligned with the natural telos of humanity—its rational and moral perfection.
This is precisely the essence of the natural law tradition: the subordination of law to reason and intrinsic goodness.

1. b) Avicenna and the Natural Order of the World

In his philosophical and ethical writings, Avicenna conceived the universe as a causal and purposive system in which every being has a natural end.
In politics, he emphasized the harmony between theoretical and practical reason and maintained that divine law (Sharī‘a), when properly understood, corresponds to the law of natural reason.

For Avicenna, true Sharī‘a is not in opposition to nature but a continuation of it, for nature itself is the creation of divine reason.
Thus, just governance must follow reason and nature, not passion and power.

6. Summary of Part I

From Aristotle to Aquinas, and from al-Fārābī to Avicenna, the concept of natural law has always represented an effort to find a rational and universal foundation for justice and political legitimacy.

Across these diverse traditions, a set of shared ideas emerges:

• The rational order of the universe;
• The harmony of law with human goodness and purpose;
• The distinction between legitimate (natural) and imposed (positive) law.

Yet, with the advent of modernity, this harmony between nature and law came under profound challenge.
Modern thought—through humanism, social contract theory, and epistemological relativism—transformed the very meaning of “nature.”

In the next section, we will examine how thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau reinterpreted natural law within the framework of modern politics and the theory of the state.

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Part II: The Passage to Modernity and the Transformation of the Concept of Natural Law

1. A Fundamental Transformation: From Divine Nature to Human Nature

The advent of modernity was marked by a profound epistemological shift:
the human being moved from the center of divine creation to the center of knowledge and lawmaking.

While in classical and medieval philosophy nature was regarded as the manifestation of divine order, in modern philosophy it became a knowable and controllable reality.
This change, though seemingly scientific, had far-reaching political consequences:
Law was no longer seen as a reflection of God’s will or cosmic reason, but as the product of human will, expressed through the state and the social contract.

Within this context, modern thinkers sought to detach the concept of natural law from its metaphysical foundations and reconstruct it upon the basis of human nature—a nature that could serve both as the source of natural rights and as the origin of conflict and the need for political authority.

2. Hobbes: Natural Law in the Service of Authority

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1651), in his seminal work Leviathan, marked the beginning of political modernity.
He viewed the universe not as teleological and rational, but as a material mechanism governed by the laws of motion.
In such a world, human nature is not benevolent but self-interested and driven by the instinct for survival.

The state of nature, for Hobbes, is a condition of perpetual war—a war of all against all—because there exists no common law or authority.
Yet, despite his pessimism, Hobbes still speaks of natural laws—rules that reason discovers as a means of escaping destruction.

According to him, the first natural law is that every person must strive for self-preservation and seek peace whenever possible.
From this principle follows the necessity of establishing an absolute power: the sovereign state.

Thus, in Hobbes’s thought, natural law becomes not the measure of justice but the foundation of political authority.
Through a decisive shift, Hobbes transforms natural law from a moral principle into a political instrument—one that legitimizes absolute power in the name of order and security.

3. Locke: From Individual Survival to Liberty and Property

John Locke (1632–1704) took an opposing path to Hobbes.
He, too, spoke of the state of nature, but in his view, human beings in that condition are rational, moral, and endowed with innate rights—including the rights to life, liberty, and property.

These rights exist prior to any government or legal system; therefore, a legitimate government is one established to protect these natural rights, not to suppress them.

In Locke’s philosophy, natural law regains its true meaning:
a rational and universal law to which all governments must be subordinate.
If a government violates these principles, the people possess the right to revolt against it.

This idea became the cornerstone of liberal political philosophy and inspired foundational documents such as the Declaration of Independence of the United States, which proclaims:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Locke thus detached natural law from its theological roots and reconnected it to the rational morality of humankind—formulating a secular yet ethical basis for political legitimacy.

4. Rousseau: Nature as the Source of Equality and the General Will

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) was the third great figure in the transformation of natural law.
With a romantic and critical perspective on modernity, he conceived the state of nature not as a condition of war, but as an age of innocence and freedom in which human beings were pure and equal.

According to Rousseau, civilization and private property alienated humanity from its true nature and gave rise to inequality.
In The Social Contract, he argued that when humans leave the state of nature, they must create laws that embody the general will (volonté générale)—the collective will oriented toward the common good.

Hence, a legitimate law is one that accords with the moral nature of human beings and realizes their freedom.
In this sense, natural law continues within the general will—a will that transcends individual or class despotism and expresses the moral unity of the community.

5. The Shift from Ethics to Politics: Reason, Contract, and Legitimacy

In sum, modern philosophy brought natural law down from heaven to earth.
Whereas in Aristotle or Aquinas it reflected the cosmic order, in modern thought it became a contract among human beings aimed at securing peace and liberty.

However, this transformation yielded two contradictory consequences:

• On the one hand, human reason became the new source of political legitimacy—ushering in the age of modern democracy and human rights.
• On the other hand, by removing its metaphysical foundation, natural law drifted toward relativism, creating the danger that law might become subject to majority interest or power rather than to universal justice.

This tension—between individual freedom and the common good, between human will and moral principles—continues to define modern politics to this day.

6. Consequences for the Modern Age: From Natural Rights to Human Rights

The modern reinterpretation of natural law, especially in the works of Locke and Rousseau, laid the groundwork for a major transformation in the eighteenth century:
the rise of the concept of natural rights, which would later evolve into the doctrine of human rights.

These rights preserved the ancient belief that justice and freedom spring from human nature itself, not from the decrees of governments.
Over time, however, many legal philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin challenged this view, dismissing natural law as a metaphysical fiction and asserting that the only genuine law is that which is enacted by political institutions.

Thus, the philosophy of law divided into two major schools:

• Natural Law Theory, which upholds universal moral principles;
• Legal Positivism, which grounds legal validity solely in the authority of the sovereign.

This duality remains alive at the heart of modern politics and underlies many of today’s global conflicts—from wars to debates over human rights.

7. Transition to the Next Section

Modernity, therefore, transformed the concept of natural law from its very foundations:

• From a divine order to a human one;
• From universal nature to individual rights;
• From divine reason to the social contract.

Yet in the centuries that followed, natural law returned in a new guise—in the doctrines of human rights, constitutional law, and the emerging global order.

In the next section, we shall examine how the idea of natural law persisted within the structures of modern politics and international institutions, becoming one of the key pillars of global legitimacy.

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Section III: Natural Law in Modern Politics and Global Justice

1. From Philosophy to Law: The Birth of the Modern Natural Law System

   In the eighteenth century, the philosophy of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on reason, liberty, and equality, liberated natural law from theology and transformed it into a set of universal principles governing human relations.
   According to Enlightenment thinkers, human beings, through their rational capacities, are capable of formulating laws consistent with human nature and universal morality.
   This intellectual movement provided the theoretical foundation for many major political transformations, such as:
   • The American Revolution (1776) and the Declaration of Independence
   • The French Revolution (1789) and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen

In both cases, it was explicitly proclaimed that human rights are “innate and inalienable” — an expression rooted in the doctrine of natural law.
However, the crucial difference between this era and earlier ones was that people no longer spoke of the “law of God,” but rather of the “law of human nature” and “universal reason.”
Natural law thus descended from heaven to earth, becoming the foundation of legitimacy for modern states and constitutional systems.

2. Natural Law and Political Liberalism

   Nineteenth-century liberalism can be seen as the political continuation of the natural law tradition.
   Within this framework, the human being is regarded as a free creature endowed with inherent dignity, and the purpose of politics is to protect that natural freedom.
   Individual natural rights — such as freedom of speech, property, conscience, and assembly — were codified as legal rights, with constitutions charged with their protection.

Philosophers like John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty, argued that a just society is one in which the law may only interfere to the extent necessary to prevent harm to others — that is, the law must follow the rational nature of humanity rather than serve as an instrument of majority domination.
Thus, at the heart of liberalism, natural law survived in a secular and individualistic form:
a law whose legitimacy derives from human nature and human dignity, not from political power.

3. Natural Law in International Law and the Global Order

   After the Second World War, the world faced a profound moral crisis: how could one define justice and law beyond the authority of nation-states in response to the crimes of fascism?
   The answer was a return to natural law.

In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Its preamble begins:

“Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”

This language clearly continues the discourse of natural law — the belief in rights and moral principles that transcend the will of governments.
On this very basis, the Nuremberg Tribunal was able to prosecute Nazi crimes by appealing to laws that had never been written into any national legal code but were deemed self-evident to the conscience of humanity.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists such as Lon Fuller (The Morality of Law) and John Finnis (Natural Law and Natural Rights) sought to revitalize the philosophy of natural law.
They argued that any legal system, if it is to be just, must be in harmony with the internal moral principles of law — principles such as rationality, fairness, and the common good.

4. Contradictions within Global Politics: Universalism versus Relativism

   Despite the global influence of the natural law tradition in the form of human rights, the modern world faces a deep contradiction:
   On the one hand, there is the claim to the universality of human rights; on the other, the diversity of cultures and political systems.

Nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East often argue that so-called “Western human rights” reflect a specific cultural perspective rather than a truly universal natural law.
Conversely, Western powers have sometimes used natural law as a moral justification for political or military intervention in other countries.

In other words, the very concept that was meant to ground peace and justice has, at times, become a tool of domination.
Thinkers such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor have emphasized that the great error of modern liberalism was to assume that it could define “human nature” in a universal and ahistorical way, while in reality, every society possesses its own understanding of justice and the good.

5. Natural Law versus Neoliberalism and Political Realism

   In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with the rise of neoliberalism and power politics, the idea of natural law once again came under challenge.
   Political realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger regarded global ethics and moral law as utopian illusions, arguing instead that international relations are governed by national interests and the balance of power, not by universal moral principles.

Within this context, phenomena such as Trumpism can be seen as a sharp return to an unrestrained pragmatism, where law and morality give way to deal-making, commercial interest, and economic power.
However, a deeper analysis of this tendency — its roots, implications, and challenges to global legitimacy and natural law — will be reserved for the next chapter (Section IV).

6. Summary of Section III

   In modern politics, natural law has experienced three major revivals:

7. In the eighteenth century, as natural rights and individual freedoms;
8. In the nineteenth century, as liberalism and constitutional law;
9. In the twentieth century, as universal human rights.

Yet in each case, it risked being reduced to a political instrument.
Today, the greatest challenge to global politics is this:
Can natural law still serve as a universal standard of justice and legitimacy in a world where power, media, and markets have displaced reason and morality?

Section IV: The Crisis of Natural Law in the Age of Absolute Pragmatism — A Critique of Trump’s Politics

1. The Return to Naked Power: Politics as Transaction

With the rise of Donald Trump in 2016, global politics witnessed a blunt resurgence of unrestrained pragmatism.
Unlike previous U.S. presidents, Trump did not speak of freedom, democracy, or human rights; he openly defined politics as a “deal.”
In his view, international relations resembled a marketplace where great powers bargain over their economic and security interests.

He repeatedly asserted that “America will no longer be the world’s policeman” and that “we value our money.”
This outlook may appear to be political realism, yet at its core it represents a rejection of the philosophy of natural law, because natural law rests upon moral principles and the common good — not upon profit and loss.

2. Trump and the Collapse of Global Morality

In Trump’s foreign policy, human rights and liberal values ceased to serve as the foundation of diplomacy; instead, they became tools for economic bargaining.
He withdrew the United States from major international agreements such as the Paris Climate Accord, the Iran Nuclear Deal, and even the U.N. Human Rights Council, claiming that these institutions were disadvantageous to America.

In other words, global ethics and natural law had no place in Trump’s logic; what mattered was the economic balance sheet.

Examples include:

• In relations with Saudi Arabia, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi did not hinder multi-billion-dollar arms sales.
• With North Korea, nuclear threats became instruments for transactional diplomacy.
• In immigration and minority policies, human dignity was replaced by criteria of security and ethnicity.

Under such a policy, the human being is no longer viewed as a creature endowed with inherent worth, but as an economic unit or a means to national interest.
In short, natural rights collapsed before the logic of the market and national security.

3. From Natural Rights to Contractual Rights

One of the most fundamental shifts introduced by Trumpism was the transition from “natural rights” to “contractual rights.”
In Trump’s worldview, nothing is innate or universal; every relationship is contingent upon momentary agreements.
Even long-standing allies such as the European Union, Canada, and Japan were seen not as partners in shared values, but as economic competitors.

This mindset recalls Thomas Hobbes’s warning in Leviathan: when human beings abandon natural law and moral reason, they fall into a state of “war of all against all.”
Trumpism, in this sense, represents a return to a state of nature without natural law — a world full of competition but devoid of order and justice.

4. The Crisis of Legitimacy in the Global Order

Since the end of World War II, the global order has rested on two pillars:

1. The balance of power among states; and
2. The universal moral values of freedom, human rights, and justice.

Trump discarded the second pillar and declared openly that “America comes first.”
Yet removing morality from politics did not enhance U.S. power; it undermined the West’s moral legitimacy.

The consequences were immediate:

• China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia grew more confident in defending models of development without freedom.
• Europe became fragmented, and liberal values lost credibility among its citizens.
• Even within the United States, racial, ethnic, and class divisions deepened, as politics no longer operated on the basis of natural justice or shared moral ground.

5. The Return of Philosophy: The Need to Revive Natural Law

The post-Trump world faces a profound question:
If politics is nothing but a realm of interests, how can justice, freedom, and human dignity survive?

Here, the philosophy of natural law regains its importance.
Contemporary thinkers such as Martha Nussbaum, Alasdair MacIntyre, and John Finnis argue that modern politics cannot endure without a shared moral foundation.
When law merely reflects the will of power, societies inevitably slide into distrust, inequality, and violence.

Hence, a return to concepts like the common good, natural justice, and inherent human rights is not a nostalgic retreat to the past, but a necessary path toward the future of human politics.
The critique of Trump’s politics, therefore, is not merely a critique of a single individual or administration, but of a global tendency that sacrifices ethics for profit and severs law from its natural roots.

6. Final Reflection: Natural Law as the Last Bastion of Humanity in Politics

In political philosophy, natural law has always stood as a reminder that power without morality is self-destructive.
From Aristotle and Farabi to Rousseau and Rawls, thinkers have sought to ground politics in the rational and moral nature of the human being.
Yet in today’s world — especially in the age of Trumpism — that foundation is once again under threat.

If politics is reduced merely to “deal-making,” then justice, freedom, and even law itself lose their meaning.
By contrast, natural law reminds us that the true basis of political order is not power but human dignity.

As Thomas Aquinas wrote:

“A law that is not in harmony with reason and justice is not law at all, but a form of violence.”

Therefore, the future of global politics depends on whether humanity can once again return to principles that transcend interest and power — principles rooted in human nature itself, forming the enduring foundation of justice, freedom, and peace.