Hassan al-Hudaybi and the Deadlock of Political Islamism

1. Introduction: From Moderation to Deadlock — Hassan al-Hudaybi’s Place in the Critique of Political Islamism

For a critique of political Islamism, we are facing one of the most challenging intellectual and political movements in the contemporary world. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, groups advocating a return to the original Islam and the full implementation of Sharia have attempted to present a model of religious governance that, in their view, responds to the crises of identity and Western domination. However, historical experience has shown that Islamism in all its forms—whether radical or moderate—is trapped within a paradigm of return to the past; a paradigm that, from within, stands in conflict with modernity, critical rationality, and the values of the contemporary world.

In this context, the name Hassan al-Hudaybi, the second General Guide of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, emerges as a prominent figure of so-called “moderate Islamism.” Many scholars have tried to portray al-Hudaybi as a symbol of rational or anti-violent Islamism, as if he had taken a path distinct from Salafism or jihadism. Nevertheless, the purpose of this article is the critique of political Islamism through an analysis of al-Hudaybi’s thought. We aim to demonstrate that even a figure like him, who seemingly distances himself from extremism and takfir, remains theoretically caught in the restorationist logic of Islamism and does not transcend the intellectual framework whose ultimate goal is to reconstruct an idealized past in the form of a religious state.

From this perspective, Hassan al-Hudaybi is not an alternative to Salafism but rather part of the continuum of the same restorationist thinking—an ideology that outwardly takes on a moral and invitational tone yet, in essence, bears no substantive difference from more radical tendencies. Although he rejects violence, his intellectual structure remains grounded in the dichotomy between the modern world and Islamic truth, and in the necessity of reviving “authentic Islam.” Thus, understanding al-Hudaybi is impossible without recognizing his connection to the broader discourse of Islamism.

In other words, the critique of political Islamism in this article is not understood as a critique of violent behavior or the political misuse of religion, but rather as a logical and epistemological critique of a project that seeks to build politics, the state, and society on the reconstruction of a sacred past. Such a vision—even in its moderate and reformist versions, from al-Hudaybi to al-Qaradawi—cannot escape its historical impasse, since the fundamental modern question—the relation between religion, history, and rationality—remains absent within it.

Historically, al-Hudaybi’s thought took shape in the 1950s and 1960s, a period of profound transformation in the Arab world: the decline of direct colonialism, the rise of nation-states, and the intensifying conflict between secularism and religion. During this time, the Muslim Brotherhood, following the execution of Hasan al-Banna, faced a dual crisis: on the one hand, the repressive policies of Nasser’s government that sought to politically eliminate them; and on the other, the radicalization of some members, later embodied in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. In this context, Hassan al-Hudaybi attempted to prevent the spread of violence and, through his famous book Du‘āt lā Quḍāt (“Preachers, Not Judges”), presented a supposedly “moderate” image of the Brotherhood. Yet, as we shall see, this moderation was only a moderation of method, not of intellectual foundations.

To better understand al-Hudaybi’s position, we must first distinguish between three spheres:

1. Traditional Islam, which operates within the juristic-theological framework and the authority of the ulama;
2. Reformist Islam, which, in the nineteenth century through figures such as Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, sought reconciliation between faith and modern reason;
3. And finally, political Islamism, which emerged with Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s, aiming not at reforming religion but at a total reconstruction of politics and society on a religious foundation.

Despite his milder tone, al-Hudaybi clearly belongs to the third category. He offers neither a theory for the separation of religion and state nor an acceptance of the historical possibility of modernity. In fact, he seeks to “purify” political Islam of extremism, not to challenge its essence.

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the discourse of Islamism has always been based on a fundamental dichotomy: “the West” versus “Islam.” This dichotomy, originating in anti-colonial discourse, gradually became the mental foundation of all Islamist tendencies. Even when figures like al-Hudaybi speak of dialogue and ethics, such dialogue remains meaningful only within that same dichotomy. In other words, the rationality he advocates is an inward, closed, religious rationality—not a historical or universal one.

Thus, the central issue in Hassan al-Hudaybi’s thought is his inability to transcend the logic of return. By rejecting takfir, he does not detach himself from the revivalist ideology of Islamism. Consequently, his critique of extremism remains confined to methodological reform rather than epistemological transformation. As will be shown later, a close analysis of Du‘āt lā Quḍāt reveals that, despite its moderate appearance, the book remains rooted in the ideas of the Islamic state, the sovereignty of Sharia, and the rejection of modernity.

Therefore, to critique political Islamism, one cannot limit the analysis to its radical manifestations. It must be shown that even a “moderate” like Hassan al-Hudaybi operates within the same mental framework that ultimately reproduces symbolic and intellectual violence. From this perspective, al-Hudaybi is not a point of rupture from Salafism but the continuation of the same restorationist idea—an idea that remains persistently present across all forms of political Islamism.

2. Islamism as a Discourse of Return

To analyze Hassan al-Hudaybi’s thought within its real context, we must first theoretically examine the phenomenon of political Islamism. For al-Hudaybi, contrary to the assumptions of some researchers, was not a thinker detached from Islamism but rather a direct product of its internal logic. In other words, if Islamism is understood as a discourse aimed at reconstructing society around the axes of Sharia and tradition, then even its moderate versions—regardless of the moral or political intentions of their leaders—operate within the same intellectual orbit.

2.1. The Historical Origins of Islamism

In its precise sense, Islamism is a modern phenomenon that emerged in reaction to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the expansion of European colonial influence in the Islamic world. Unlike traditional Islam, which was primarily concerned with preserving faith and Sharia, this movement sought to reconstruct the umma in the form of a state. Political Islamism, in the words of Olivier Roy, is an attempt to translate the religious sphere into the language of the modern state—yet without accepting the spirit of modernity. Thus, at its core, it is a revivalist project: the revival of a sacred past that Islamists imagine as the golden age of Islam, that is, the earliest period of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs.

However, it should be noted that the “return to the past” in Islamism is not merely historical nostalgia but its very existential logic. More precisely, Islamism does not simply draw inspiration from the past; it reconstructs it as the ultimate model of society. Any historical change or transformation is, from the perspective of this discourse, perceived as a deviation from authentic truth. It is from this point that Islamism—even in its seemingly reformist forms—embodies a fundamentally anti-historical mindset.

2.2. The Distinction between Islamism, Traditionalism, and Religious Reformism

One of the common analytical errors in political studies is the conflation of Islamism with traditionalism or Islamic reformism. Traditional Islam, in past centuries, was grounded in the institutions of jurisprudence (fiqh), the consensus of scholars, and the continuity of tradition, and rarely engaged directly in political activism. In contrast, nineteenth-century Islamic reformism, represented by figures such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, sought to reconcile modern reason with Islamic faith. Political Islamism, however—born from the crisis of modernity within Muslim societies—emerged with the slogan “Islam is the solution,” seeking to replace the entire modern order with a religious one.

In reality, Islamism distanced itself from the reformism of Abduh and his contemporaries because it no longer concerned itself with the epistemological reform of religion; rather, it sought to return religion to the center of political power. This shift was foundational: from religious modernity to religious sovereignty. Along this path, thinkers such as Hassan al-Hudaybi played a crucial role, as they attempted to offer a moderate and legalistic face to this same aspiration for religious power.

2.3. The Logic of Return in Islamism

From a theoretical standpoint, Islamism can be said to rest on three fundamental components:

1. The Revivalist Discourse: the effort to return society to its “origins,” understood as the era of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs.
2. The Discourse of Decline: a historical narrative that interprets the current condition as the result of “departing from authentic Islam.”
3. The Discourse of the Denial of Modernity: which identifies the West and secularism as the sources of corruption, moral crisis, and alienation.

The combination of these three components produces a discourse that, in essence, does not live in the present. Islamism seeks not to engage with history but to reverse it—as if salvation lies not in progress but in the reconstruction of the past. It is for this reason that Talal Asad and Gilles Kepel refer to it as a “discourse of return,” one that, although it speaks in modern vocabulary—state, nation, law—remains premodern in its essence.

2.4. The Critique of Intra-Religious Rationality in Islamism

Within the framework of the critique of political Islamism, one must note a fundamental point: Islamists claim to be rational, yet their rationality is textual—reason in the service of Sharia, not in critique of it. Consequently, Islamism, whether in its radical or moderate forms, is devoid of critical rationality. Hassan al-Hudaybi is no exception to this rule. He was a jurist concerned with order, justice, and morality, yet he regarded reason merely as an instrument for interpreting the text, not as a means of assessing the text itself.

In other words, al-Hudaybi’s rationality is conservative: it employs reason to reinforce tradition rather than to critique it. Therefore, although he outwardly rejects violence, he offers no theoretical foundation that would allow transcendence beyond the sanctity of the past. He seeks to correct the path of Islamism, not to abandon it. In fact, al-Hudaybi represents what may be called an “instrumental rationality in the service of tradition.”

2.5. From the Discourse of Return to the Crisis of Modernity

Political Islamism—from Hasan al-Banna to al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb—constitutes a response to the crisis of modernity in Muslim societies, but a response from within tradition. Instead of critically engaging with modern questions of reason, freedom, individuality, and the state, Islamism replaces them with traditional concepts. “Freedom,” within the Islamist discourse, becomes obedience to God; “justice” becomes the implementation of Sharia; and “reason” becomes the understanding of divine texts. Thus, while this discourse speaks in modern terms, it remains, at its core, restorative and closed.

As a result, Islamism cannot be a historical project, for it perceives itself as existing outside of history. Its goal is to reconstruct a past that never truly existed but is continuously reproduced within ideological imagination. From this perspective, the critique of political Islamism is a critique of its inherent past-oriented nature—of the assumption that salvation lies in returning to the past.

2.6. Al-Hudaybi’s Position within This Discourse

Within this logic of return, Hassan al-Hudaybi occupies a special place: he represents a stage in the evolution of Islamism that distances itself from jihadism yet remains confined within the geography of return. He sought to present a legalistic image of political Islam, yet he left concepts such as the “Islamic state” and “the sovereignty of Sharia” beyond philosophical critique. Thus, rather than breaking the framework of Islamism, al-Hudaybi ultimately reinforced it.

3. The Historical and Intellectual Context of Hassan al-Hudaybi

Understanding the position of Hassan al-Hudaybi is impossible without recognizing the historical and social context of mid-twentieth-century Egypt. His thought did not emerge in a vacuum but in the midst of deep political and cultural crises—crises that led to the rise and persistence of Political Islamism. Egypt in the 1940s to 1960s was the scene of a clash between three conflicting discourses: secular nationalism, Arab socialism, and Islamism. Among them, the Muslim Brotherhood, relying on its extensive religious and social networks, presented itself as the religious alternative to the modern order.

3.1. From Hassan al-Banna to Hassan al-Hudaybi: The Transition from Preaching to Politics

The establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna was a response to the crisis of identity and backwardness following the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate. Al-Banna viewed Islam as a comprehensive system for politics, economics, and society—a system that must stand against Western civilization. He emphasized that “Islam is not a religion for the mosque but a program for life.” With this slogan, the traditional boundaries between religion and politics were broken, and “Islam as a state” entered public discourse. This was the birth of Political Islamism.

However, al-Banna’s death in 1949 and the Brotherhood’s suppression by King Farouk’s regime plunged the movement into a severe crisis. In such a situation, the election of Hassan al-Hudaybi as the second Supreme Guide in 1951 symbolized an effort to restore the Brotherhood’s legal and moral image. Unlike its founder, he was neither a preacher nor a cleric but a legally trained judge. This apparent difference in demeanor and tone later led some scholars to consider al-Hudaybi as a symbol of “moderate Islamism.” Yet, in reality, his selection was less a sign of intellectual transformation and more a political tactic to save the movement from internal and external pressures.

3.2. The Crisis of Legitimacy and the Redefinition of Religious Leadership

During al-Hudaybi’s leadership, the Brotherhood was caught in a constant struggle between two tendencies: first, the pragmatic political current that sought negotiation and legal activity; and second, the ideological current, influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s thought, which inclined toward jihad and takfir (excommunication). Through his well-known work Du‘at la Qudat (“Preachers, Not Judges”), al-Hudaybi sought to balance these two currents. His goal was to limit violence and takfir and to present a missionary, rather than militant, face of political Islam.

Yet the crucial point is that al-Hudaybi never distanced himself from the core of Islamism. He did not seek to separate religion from politics but rather to rescue religious politics from disorder. In fact, by delegitimizing takfir, al-Hudaybi attempted to restore the Brotherhood’s central authority, as takfir, used as an intra-movement weapon, threatened organizational cohesion. Therefore, Du‘at la Qudat should not be seen as a manifesto defending religious rationality, but as an effort to restore the Supreme Guide’s authority as the ultimate arbiter of the Sharia. This demonstrates that al-Hudaybi’s reformism was more managerial than intellectual.

3.3. Al-Hudaybi’s Relationship with the Nasserist State: The Conflict between Islam and Modernity

The rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the 1952 Egyptian Revolution marked a turning point in the relationship between the modern state and Islamism. Nasser, with slogans of social justice and Arab nationalism, sought to build a powerful secular state. However, the Brotherhood, deriving its legitimacy from Islam, viewed this project as a threat to faith and the community’s identity. In 1954, after an assassination attempt on Nasser, the government executed dozens of Brotherhood members and imprisoned hundreds. Al-Hudaybi himself spent some time in prison. This experience pushed Islamism even further from the formal political arena into the ideological and cultural sphere.

From then on, al-Hudaybi emphasized two central points in his writings and statements: first, that Islam constitutes a comprehensive system for governance; and second, that any society not founded upon the Sharia strays from divine guidance. Although he refrained from explicit takfir, in practice he considered the secular state religiously illegitimate. Thus, a fundamental duality emerged in his discourse: a call for morality and nonviolence on one hand, and the rejection of modern order’s legitimacy on the other. This duality shows that the Critique of Political Islamism must go beyond the behavioral level to the level of logic, because al-Hudaybi remained within the logic of Islamism, even when he distanced himself from its overt violence.

3.4. Judicial Rationality and the Centrality of Sharia in al-Hudaybi’s Thought

Al-Hudaybi’s judicial background made him more concerned than other Islamists with order, justice, and law. However, in his view, law was always equivalent to the Sharia. He neither believed in civil law nor in the separation between the religious and the civil spheres. For him, justice was possible only through the implementation of divine ordinances, and human reason had no capacity to legislate independently. Therefore, any modern legal system appeared to him as a Western imitation, rootless in faith. This juridical–religious interpretation, though moderate in tone, is in fact the theoretical foundation of the same Political Islamism: the absolute sovereignty of Sharia in place of popular will.

Hence, al-Hudaybi’s rationality is instrumental rather than critical. He thought of order, but not human order—divine order, in which man is merely the executor. From this perspective, even in his moderate discourse, there was no space for modernity, the autonomy of reason, or human rights. This is why his thought, despite its calm appearance, remained fundamentally incompatible with modernity.

3.5. Al-Hudaybi’s Connection with the Intellectual Tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood

To understand al-Hudaybi’s position more deeply, one must consider the intellectual continuity of the Brotherhood. From Hassan al-Banna to Sayyid Qutb, the central theme of Brotherhood thought has been the emphasis on divine sovereignty and Islam’s comprehensiveness over all aspects of life. Al-Hudaybi, on the surface, sought to present this comprehensiveness as moral and educational, yet in practice he preserved the same political totality. In other words, instead of changing the content, he merely changed the tone. Thus, al-Hudaybi represents a phase in which Islamism sought to present a civil façade without abandoning its ideology.

Therefore, al-Hudaybi aimed to strike a balance between “preaching” and “governance,” but in practice, he understood both within the framework of Sharia. He never asked whether religious politics is inherently incompatible with freedom and pluralism. This very avoidance reveals the intrinsic limitation of Islamism as a discourse: a discourse that, even in its most moderate figures, remains incapable of self-critique.

3.6. Conclusion: Al-Hudaybi as a Figure of Moderation within an Impasse

If one were to summarize al-Hudaybi’s place in the history of Political Islamism, it could be said that he represented an attempt at “crisis management” rather than “ideological critique.” He sought to save Islamism from violence, but not from its backward-looking orientation. His project was the reconstruction of Islamism, not its transcendence. For this reason, al-Hudaybi’s thought should be seen not as a rupture, but as the continuation of Islamism in a softer form. Instead of speaking of a “state of jihad,” he spoke of a “state of preaching,” yet both ultimately led to the sovereignty of Sharia and the negation of modernity.

4. Analysis of Hassan al-Hudaybi’s Thought in Du‘at la Qudat

4.1. The Context and Purpose of the Book

The book Du‘at la Qudat (“Preachers, Not Judges”), published in the 1960s, was al-Hudaybi’s response to the wave of takfiri tendencies within the Muslim Brotherhood. After years of imprisonment and the widespread torture of Brotherhood members during Nasser’s rule, many of the younger members turned toward a rigid interpretation of Islam. They described the state and society as jahili (ignorant, pre-Islamic) and spoke of the necessity of “jihad to establish an Islamic government.” This current, influenced particularly by Sayyid Qutb’s ideas in Ma‘alim fi al-Tariq (Signposts on the Road), spread widely.

In this atmosphere, al-Hudaybi sought, on one hand, to restrain violence and takfir, and on the other, to restore the Brotherhood’s leadership legitimacy. In Du‘at la Qudat, he emphasized that Muslims are called to preach, not to judge—that is, they have no right to pronounce others believers or unbelievers. Yet behind this call for tolerance, the same fundamental assumption of Islamism remains: that the ideal Islamic society is the ultimate criterion of judgment, and that any order not founded upon Sharia is incomplete and deviant. Thus, his book does not mark a departure from Islamism but rather an attempt to manage the internal crisis of Political Islamism.

4.2. The Structure and Logic of Du‘at la Qudat

In this work, al-Hudaybi’s argument revolves around three main points:

1. Takfir is not beneficial to the community: He asserts that judgment about the faith of others belongs to God, not to humans; therefore, Muslims should engage in preaching, not judging.
2. The Islamic community still exists, though imperfectly: In contrast to Qutb’s view that society is jahili, al-Hudaybi insists that Muslims, in any case, remain part of the umma and should not be abandoned.
3. Social reform is achievable through education and morality, not through violence: He advocates for a gradual and moral return to Islam rather than a revolutionary or coercive one.

These three points outwardly present a moderate and ethical image of Islamism. Yet upon closer examination, it becomes evident that al-Hudaybi continues to uphold Islamism’s fundamental premise: the necessity of reconstructing society around Sharia. He opposes violent methods, but not their ultimate goal. Consequently, his rationality is conservative—reform within the same framework, not a critique of it.

4.3. The Apparent Contrast with Sayyid Qutb and the Inner Continuity of a Single Logic

Al-Hudaybi is often portrayed as a moderate figure in contrast to Sayyid Qutb. Qutb described modern society as jahili and believed that only through jihad could an Islamic society be established. Al-Hudaybi, by contrast, emphasized that the present society is Muslim and in need of reform, not destruction. At first glance, this distinction appears to indicate a fundamental difference, yet from the perspective of the Critique of Political Islamism, it does not produce a difference in logic.

Both, despite their methodological differences, share the same underlying premise: that Islam constitutes a comprehensive political and social system that must be made sovereign. Thus, even al-Hudaybi’s gentle call to preaching is still an effort toward the same goal—the restoration of Sharia’s absolute authority. From this standpoint, al-Hudaybi should be seen as an “intra-discursive reformer,” not an ideological critic.

4.4. Conservative Rationality in al-Hudaybi’s Thought

What stands out most in Du‘at la Qudat is a kind of conservative religious rationality. Al-Hudaybi speaks of reason, yet his notion of reason is one subordinated to text and tradition. He in no way defends the independence of reason but views it merely as an instrument for understanding the Sharia. Thus, when he says that Muslims should reform society through ethics and preaching, his notion of ethics is not humanistic or universal, but defined within the boundaries of jurisprudence and scriptural text.

In other words, morality in al-Hudaybi’s thought is not the product of rational reflection but the outcome of obedience to divine command. Consequently, there is no room for the critique of tradition, historical change, or the rethinking of religious rulings. Here, the Critique of Political Islamism acquires a deeper meaning: even when Islamism appears in the form of ethics and preaching, it still lacks critical rationality and remains bound to the past.

4.5. The Paradox of Preaching: Tolerance in Language, Exclusivity in Meaning

Al-Hudaybi strives to present a tolerant face of Islam, yet tolerance in his view does not mean the acceptance of diversity. He speaks of patience and forbearance, but the goal of this patience is “the return of others to the truth of Islam,” not coexistence with difference. Thus, his preaching ultimately remains exclusivist: a call to an absolute and singular truth comprehensible only through Sharia.

Therefore, even in the absence of physical violence, semantic and epistemic violence persists. Modern society, with all its complexities and pluralities, remains in al-Hudaybi’s logic a deviant society in need of guidance. This perspective reveals the same anti-modern mindset of Islamism—a mentality that, instead of engaging in dialogue with the world, passes judgment upon it, albeit this time through the language of preaching rather than takfir.

4.6. “Preaching” as the Soft Politics of Religious Power

It can be said that in Du‘at la Qudat, al-Hudaybi transfers the concept of da‘wa (preaching) from the sphere of religious propagation to the domain of soft political power. Instead of open war with the modern state, he speaks of a form of cultural jihad—slow infiltration of society through morality, education, and teaching. The goal of this strategy is to change the structures of power from within, not to accept the secular order. From this viewpoint, da‘wa is the softer face of the same political project of Islamism.

This soft method was later reflected in the Muslim Brotherhood’s cultural policies in subsequent decades—from schools and charitable organizations to media activities—all aimed at constructing an “Islamic society from below.” Outwardly, this project seems peaceful, but at its core, it rests upon the denial of modernity and cultural pluralism. Thus, the Critique of Political Islamism in al-Hudaybi’s thought is not merely a critique of violence but a critique of spiritual and epistemic exclusivism.

4.7. Conclusion: Al-Hudaybi, the Gentle Face of the Same Hard Discourse

In conclusion, Du‘at la Qudat demonstrates that Islamism can preserve the same authoritarian logic even in a soft and ethical language. By abandoning takfir, al-Hudaybi saved Islamism from a legitimacy crisis but did not free it from the logic of restorationism. His rationality remains intra-textual, his ethics obedience-based, and his politics a call for the sovereignty of Sharia.

Thus, he should be regarded not as a religious reformer but as a manager of the ideological crisis of Political Islamism. In his thought, the return to the past remains the path to salvation—only expressed in a more polite language.

5. Theoretical Conclusion — Islamism Between Moderation and Return

5.1. Summary of the Analytical Trajectory

What emerges from the historical and analytical examination is that Political Islamism, regardless of its form or tone, is a discourse born from the identity crisis in the modern Islamic world. This discourse considers itself a religious response to the challenges of modernity, yet in reality, it is a response from within tradition, not from a historical and critical standpoint. From Hassan al-Banna to al-Hudaybi and Sayyid Qutb, from the call to preaching to the call to jihad, all operate within a shared logic: the reconstruction of society based on Sharia and the negation of reason and history as sources of authority.

Consequently, the critique of Political Islamism cannot be limited to a critique of extremist or violent behaviors. Rather, it must address the internal logic of this discourse—a logic that seeks liberation through a return to the past and perceives modernity not as a field for dialogue but as a realm of deviation.

5.2. Al-Hudaybi as the Symbol of Soft Islamism

In Hassan al-Hudaybi, Islamism transitions from a hard to a soft stage. If Sayyid Qutb represents revolutionary and takfiri Islamism, al-Hudaybi represents institutional and software-like Islamism—a discourse that, instead of rebellion, envisions gradual influence in society through ethics, education, and preaching. Yet this transformation, rather than signifying an epistemic shift, represents a change in method, not content.

By abandoning violence, al-Hudaybi made Islamism more sustainable, but simultaneously shielded it from critique. He was able to bring Islamism from the radical margins back into the social center, without challenging its ideological foundation—that is, the absolute sovereignty of Sharia and the negation of modern reason. Thus, soft Islamism is the same hard project in a new guise.

5.3. The Inherent Incompatibility of Islamism with Modernity

Political Islamism, in all its forms, is inherently at odds with modernity. This is because modernity rests on principles that Islamism does not accept:

• Autonomy of reason: the capacity for independent judgment against textual authority.
• Secularization of power: the separation of religious institutions from the state.
• Cultural pluralism: the acceptance of multiple truths and ways of life.

Even in al-Hudaybi’s interpretation, Islamism remains alien to all three principles. Reason serves Sharia, not as an independent arbiter; politics is the arena for the implementation of religion, not human law; and diversity is something to be unified rather than accepted as natural. Hence, the Islamism project—whether in the form of jihad or preaching—ultimately reproduces a kind of spiritual authoritarianism.

Within the framework of Political Islamism critique, this inherent incompatibility teaches that Islamism cannot be reconciled with modernity, but must be understood within its historical horizon: as an identity-based response to the modern crisis, not a solution for living in modernity.

5.4. Intra-Discursive Rationality and the Deadlock of Internal Reform

Al-Hudaybi is a prime example of intra-discursive reformism—an attempt to moderate Islamism from within, without leaving its framework. Such reform may reduce violence in the short term but produces a deadlock in the long term, as internal critique becomes impossible.

The rationality that al-Hudaybi advocates is interpretive, not interrogative. Within this framework, any reform ultimately reproduces tradition. Therefore, a genuine critique of Islamism is not possible from within but from outside: from the standpoint of historical and philosophical reason, which asks how religion can exist in the modern era without overshadowing politics and law.

5.5. Al-Hudaybi and the Question of Ethics in Religious Politics

One of the most important contributions of analyzing al-Hudaybi’s thought is clarifying the role of ethics in religious politics. He seeks to moralize politics, but since this ethics is grounded in Sharia, it itself becomes a tool of power. In al-Hudaybi’s logic, preaching and ethics are instruments to guide society toward an Islamic state, not independent and self-sufficient values. Thus, ethics serves ideological politics.

In effect, religious politics in al-Hudaybi’s interpretation is “power in the guise of ethics”—power that, instead of overt coercion, operates through persuasion, preaching, and cultural order. It is here that the critique of Political Islamism reaches a deeper level: the critique of spiritual power that restricts freedom in the name of ethics.

5.6. Final Conclusion: Islamism as a Discourse of Return in the Modern Era

In light of this analysis, it can be concluded that Islamism is, by nature, a discourse of return: a discourse that, instead of living in the present, seeks to reconstruct a sacred past. Al-Hudaybi, while attempting to present a reasonable and ethical face of this discourse, cannot escape its logic of restorationism.

Islamism, in any form—from Qutb to al-Hudaybi—aims to establish a society where Sharia governs everything. This objective is incompatible with modernity, which emphasizes the autonomy of the individual and history. Therefore, Islamism is not a project for the future but a form of political nostalgia: the desire to return to a past that never existed historically.

Thus, the critique of Political Islamism is not merely a critique of extremism or violence, but a critique of this very nostalgia—a critique of a discourse unable to comprehend time, and therefore perpetually living in the past.

5.7. Closing Remarks

Hassan al-Hudaybi can be seen as the symbol of “moderation within a deadlock.” He sought to save Islamism from violence, but not from ideology. His effort was ethical, yet in the service of reconstructing religious power. Ultimately, he presented an image of disciplined, orderly, and sustainable Islamism—but still trapped within the same restorationist and anti-modern logic.

Accordingly, the future path of critiquing religious thought in the Islamic world lies not in the refinement of Islamism, but in transcending it: returning to a rationality that understands religion as a personal, spiritual, and historical experience, not a political blueprint for remaking the world.