Introduction: The Place of Jalal Al-e Ahmad in Contemporary Iranian Political Thought
The political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad represents one of the most challenging and influential strands of intellectual discourse in modern Iranian thought. Al-e Ahmad was neither a political philosopher in the classical sense nor a theorist of power and sovereignty, yet he was undeniably among the most influential politico-cultural thinkers of twentieth-century Iran. He emerged at a time when Iranian society was entangled in a crisis of identity—torn between tradition and modernity—and facing the failure of Westernizing modernization projects. In this atmosphere, Al-e Ahmad, through his concepts of “Westoxication” (Gharbzadegi) and “Return to the Self”, launched a fundamental critique of Western civilization and of the cultural and intellectual dependency of Iranian intellectuals. Although this cultural critique appeared, on the surface, as a call for intellectual independence and the reconstruction of Iranian identity, it gradually evolved into an intellectual foundation that legitimized religious discourse and ultimately the establishment of a theocratic government in Iran.
The political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad was built upon a fundamental duality: on the one hand, a deep aversion to Westoxication as the cultural poison of modernity; and on the other, a yearning to recover the authenticity of an Iranian–Islamic identity. He believed that the Iranian intellectual, through blind imitation of the West, had become alienated from the people, religion, and tradition. Therefore, the Return to the Self was not merely a choice but a historical necessity for saving Iran from its cultural crisis. Yet the crucial question remains: to which Self did this return lead? To a dynamic and critical cultural identity, or to the reassertion of traditional and religious authority in the guise of political ideology?
To understand Al-e Ahmad’s place within Iranian political thought, one must situate him within the historical context of the 1940s to the 1960s—a period of rapid political and social transformation: the fall of Reza Shah, the rise of nationalist and leftist movements, the 1953 coup, and the emergence of a Western-dependent modern state. In such circumstances, many Iranian intellectuals—including Al-e Ahmad—disillusioned by the failures of state-led modernization and by the collapse of Marxist ideals, turned toward a new quest for “Iranian-ness” and “independence.” Al-e Ahmad, with his impassioned prose and literary style, translated the cultural crisis of his society into political language. His book Westoxication was not merely a critique of Western civilization, but also a manifesto against the intellectual servility of Iranian modernists. This quality allowed his ideas—unlike those of many of his contemporaries—to resonate both among the masses and within political elites.
From a critical standpoint, however, one must distinguish between the critique of the West and the rejection of modernity. Although Al-e Ahmad ostensibly defended cultural independence, he failed to draw a clear boundary between the critique of dependency and the rejection of modern achievements such as rationality, science, liberty, and democracy. Consequently, his discourse later became a vehicle for legitimizing the return to religion and tradition as remedies for Iran’s identity crisis. Religious intellectuals after him—from Ali Shariati to the revolutionary thinkers of the 1970s—merged Al-e Ahmad’s concepts with political theology, forging from them an ideology of Return to the Self that ultimately served as a blueprint for a religious revolution in Iran. Thus, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, whether consciously or not, became the intellectual bridge linking secular intellectualism with clerical authority.
Analytically, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad rests on three principal components:
- A critique of Western civilization and its manifestations in Iran;
- A valorization of tradition and religion as sources of cultural authenticity; and
- The search for an indigenous model of intellectual and political independence.
Though these three components appear mutually reinforcing, they contain profound internal contradictions that had lasting historical consequences. In Al-e Ahmad’s works—especially Westoxication—the critique of the West shifted from an analysis of global power structures to a moral and cultural judgment between “West” and “East.” As a result, the West became a symbol of corruption and rootlessness, while the Self came to represent purity and authenticity—a dichotomy that later, in the revolutionary discourse of the 1970s, took on a fully ideological form.
Today, a critical reexamination of the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad is significant not only historically but also for understanding the current condition of Iranian intellectual life. Many of today’s intellectual dilemmas—such as the persistent tension between religion and modernity or the enduring distrust of modern rational institutions—can be traced back to the same Return to the Self discourse. By raising questions of authenticity and Iranian identity, Al-e Ahmad inspired generations toward cultural reflection and resistance. Yet in the absence of a critique of political power and religious authority, this call ultimately served to reinforce a new form of intellectual domination. Therefore, his political thought can be seen as both inspirational and problematic: inspirational for articulating the crisis of modernity in Iran, and problematic for its inability to offer a democratic and rational alternative.
This article adopts a critical and analytical approach to demonstrate how the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, evolving from the critique of Westoxication and the quest for cultural identity, ultimately contributed to legitimizing the discourse of religious government in Iran. To this end, it first examines the historical and social context in which his ideas emerged, then analyzes the core components of Westoxication and Return to the Self, and finally critiques the political and intellectual consequences of this discourse in subsequent decades. The ultimate goal is a critical return to Al-e Ahmad—not to reiterate his ideas, but to rethink the relationship between culture, religion, and politics in contemporary Iran.
The Historical and Social Context of the Formation of the Political Thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad
To properly understand the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, one must situate him within the historical, social, and cultural transformations of early twentieth-century Iran—a period in which Iranian society found itself caught between three contending forces: tradition, modernity, and dependency. From the Constitutional Revolution to the 1960s, Iran was the stage for conflict between authoritarian modernization projects, justice-seeking movements, and a profound crisis of national identity. Emerging from a religious middle-class background and having personally experienced the failure of modern ideologies, Al-e Ahmad became a fierce critic of Westernization and state-imposed modernization. His political thought reflected the broader reaction of Iranian intellectuals to the failure of imposed modernity and to cultural dependency.
In the 1940s, following the fall of Reza Shah and the emergence of a relatively open political atmosphere, various ideological currents appeared in Iran’s intellectual scene—from the Marxists of the Tudeh Party to Mossadegh’s nationalists and the religious reformists. Jalal Al-e Ahmad initially entered politics through the left, joining the Tudeh Party, but soon broke away. The reason for his departure from the left was his disillusionment with their ideological mimicry and cultural rootlessness. He realized that the Iranian left, despite its rhetoric of independence and justice, was in practice dependent on Western intellectual models. This experience pushed Al-e Ahmad toward what may be called a form of indigenous critical intellectualism, making the question of cultural independence the central axis of his political thought. Indeed, his departure from the Tudeh Party can be seen as the starting point for the formation of the concept of Westoxication—a notion that later became the theoretical cornerstone of his critique of Westernism.
The political events of the 1950s also played a decisive role in shaping the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad. The nationalization of the oil industry under Dr. Mossadegh represented a moment when the hope for independence and indigenous modernity was rekindled among Iranian intellectuals. Yet the 1953 coup d’état turned that hope into despair. This historical defeat, for many intellectuals—including Al-e Ahmad—was interpreted as proof of Iran’s structural dependency on the West. In his writings, particularly in Westoxication (1962), he repeatedly refers to this sense of cultural defeat. In one passage, he writes: “We are Westoxicated—that is, uprooted and sitting in alien soil.” This sentence encapsulates his entire worldview: a critique of dependency, a lament for rootlessness, and a call for the Return to the Self.
Alongside political upheavals, social and cultural changes also deeply influenced the evolution of Al-e Ahmad’s political thought. The expansion of urbanization, the growth of modern education, and the spread of Western culture through the media created a profound rift between the traditional generation and the new intelligentsia. Al-e Ahmad saw this as a state of cultural rootlessness. In his view, Iranian society, by superficially imitating the West, had not only failed to achieve development but had also lost its identity. Therefore, in contrast to intellectuals such as Sadegh Hedayat, who despised tradition, Al-e Ahmad rose to defend Iran’s cultural and religious heritage and sought to build a bridge between intellectualism and tradition. This approach later had a direct impact on the emergence of religious intellectualism in Iran.
On a global scale, the intellectual climate of the 1950s and 1960s (the 1330s and 1340s in the Iranian calendar) was marked by anti-colonial movements, postcolonial discourses, and critiques of Western modernity. Thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus were writing against Western cultural domination. Al-e Ahmad, by engaging with their works, began to see himself within a broader global context of anti-Western critique. However, his response to the identity crisis differed from that of other postcolonial thinkers: whereas they sought solutions in secularism or in redefining modernity, Al-e Ahmad looked instead to religion and Iranian tradition. Consequently, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad emerged as a synthesis of a critique of Western modernity and a nostalgia for religious tradition—a synthesis that, while appearing authentic and sincere, carried within it a deep and unresolved contradiction.
From a sociological perspective, Al-e Ahmad must be seen as a product of Iran’s transition from tradition to modernity. He was neither able to completely detach himself from tradition nor to fully assimilate into modernity. This liminal position made his voice the conscience of a generation caught between “religion” and “reason,” “West” and “East,” “progress” and “authenticity.” Al-e Ahmad thus became the spokesperson for the crisis of Iranian intellectualism—a crisis that began with the Constitutional Revolution and continues to this day. For this reason, his political thought remains the subject of ongoing debate and reinterpretation, for it is rooted in the same deep duality that continues to shape the Iranian intellectual landscape.
In sum, the historical and social context that gave rise to the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad was one defined by the failure of modern projects and a profound cultural identity crisis in Iran. Through his critical stance toward the West and toward dependent intellectuals, he sought to reconstruct cultural authenticity from within tradition. Yet the very historical conditions that produced his critique later caused his thought to be absorbed into a discourse that moved from criticizing dependency to rejecting modernity and freedom. This is the central contradiction that will become even more evident in the following sections, particularly in the analysis of the concepts of Westoxication and Return to the Self.
The Critique of Westernization in the Political Thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad
The concept of “Westoxication” (Gharbzadegi) forms the central core of the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad. The term was first presented systematically in his book Westoxication (1962) and quickly became one of the most influential concepts in the intellectual discourse of modern Iran. Through this notion, Al-e Ahmad did not merely critique Western civilization but examined the mental and cultural condition of Iranian society—a condition he described as “blind imitation of the West and severance from one’s native roots.” In his view, modern Iran had turned into a Westoxicated patient—outwardly radiant yet inwardly hollow and devoid of identity. This diagnosis stemmed both from his personal experience and from the broader cultural and political crisis of his era.
From Al-e Ahmad’s perspective, Westoxication was a kind of cultural contamination that had spread into Iran through imported modernization, formal education, and Western consumerism. He wrote: “Westoxication means that we have been hollowed out from within, like a grain eaten away by a worm.” This metaphor expresses a form of cultural illness—one that cannot be cured by scientific progress or modern politics because its roots lie in a loss of authenticity. Instead of analyzing the economic or political structures of dependency, Al-e Ahmad emphasized its cultural and moral dimensions. He believed that as long as Iranians defined themselves through Western culture, any attempt at development would be doomed to fail. Thus, the remedy was not economic or political reform, but a “Return to the Self”—a return that, in his view, was both cultural and political in nature.
However, the critique of the West in the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, despite its apparent simplicity, carries a deep inner contradiction. On the one hand, he was himself a product of modern intellectual education, well-versed in Western philosophy, literature, and politics; on the other, he regarded the West as the source of decadence and dependency. This duality points to a crisis of modernity within Al-e Ahmad’s own consciousness. With an existentialist sensibility, he conceived of the West not merely as an external geography but as an internal psychological and cultural condition—a form of alienation that had taken hold of the Iranian intellectual’s mind. Thus, the critique of Westernization in his works is less an analysis of political or economic structures and more a critique of identity and cultural self-alienation. Yet this focus on the cultural self came at the cost of neglecting social and political institutions.
At the level of discourse, Al-e Ahmad constructs in Westoxication a binary opposition between the West and the Self. The West embodies industry, science, rationality, and domination, while the Self—identified with Iranian-Islamic tradition—symbolizes faith, morality, and authenticity. This dichotomy, rather than serving as a historical analysis of Iran’s condition, gradually becomes a moral and ideological framework. Within this structure, the West ceases to be merely a civilization or historical formation and becomes a cultural enemy to be resisted. Such a vision paved the way for the emergence of anti-modern and religious ideological discourses. In other words, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad begins as a cultural critique but ultimately moves toward the boundaries of ideological politics.
Historically, this kind of anti-Western critique was a natural reaction to the failure of the modernizing projects of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah. Authoritarian modernization in Iran, while creating new infrastructures, intensified feelings of alienation and humiliation at the cultural and political levels. Al-e Ahmad gave expression to this experience through his literary and metaphorical language, transforming it into a cultural manifesto infused with religious and justice-seeking emotions. He accused Westernized intellectuals of serving foreign interests rather than their own people. This anti-elitist tone allowed his ideas to resonate deeply with traditional and religious segments of society.
Yet from a critical perspective, one must ask: Did Al-e Ahmad’s critique of the West provide a pathway toward an indigenous and modern renewal? The answer is no. Rather than distinguishing between modernity as rationality and the West as domination, he collapsed both into a single concept of Westoxication. The consequence was the rejection of modern achievements such as freedom, science, and individualism. In this framework, the West came to signify not only domination but also critical thought and modern reason—both of which were to be avoided. Thus, his cultural critique inadvertently led to the denial of reason and modernity. This tendency was later continued in the thought of Ali Shariati and in the discourse of the Islamic Revolution, where Westoxication came to mean cultural treason and irreligion.
Philosophically, too, Al-e Ahmad’s conception of Westoxication lacks theoretical depth and coherence. Unlike Ahmad Fardid, who linked Westoxication to Martin Heidegger’s critique of the existential crisis of modern man, Al-e Ahmad was more a social writer than a philosopher. Hence, for him, Westoxication was not a metaphysical critique of modernity but a moral protest against injustice, imitation, and dependency. As a result, his concept took on an emotional and ideological weight rather than an analytical one. Instead of opening new horizons for Iranian critical reason, it called for a return to the past.
Despite these critiques, one cannot overlook Al-e Ahmad’s historical significance. He was the first Iranian intellectual to translate the issue of cultural independence into popular language and to transform cultural critique into a tool of political resistance. His Westoxication, published in the early 1960s, served as a wake-up call for a generation that felt its identity threatened by Western civilization and a dependent government. In this sense, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad embodies a kind of cultural anger—an anger that, while genuine and heartfelt, fell into the trap of ideology in the absence of structural analysis. Consequently, his discourse paved the way for one of the most significant intellectual shifts in twentieth-century Iran: the fusion of anti-Western critique with the legitimization of religious discourse.
In conclusion, the critique of Westernization in the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad must be understood as twofold: on the one hand, an effort to revive cultural independence and authenticity; and on the other, a trajectory that inadvertently led to the rejection of modernity and freedom. This duality has shaped not only the intellectual destiny of Al-e Ahmad himself but also the broader fate of Iranian intellectualism up to the present day.
Return to the Self: From Cultural Critique to Ideological Discourse
One of the most fundamental concepts in the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad is the idea of “return to the self” (bazgasht be khishtan), a notion that, along with “Westoxication” (gharbzadegi), forms the dual structure of his thinking. Al-e Ahmad believed that Iranian society could only free itself from the crisis of dependency and cultural rootlessness by returning to its own historical and spiritual identity. This “self,” in his view, was not merely a historical past but a cultural–religious essence that had shaped the spirit of Iranian society for centuries. He argued that Western modernity, by infiltrating the moral and intellectual structures of Iranian life, had distorted this essence. Thus, the return to the self was conceived as a kind of cultural and moral resurrection aimed at recovering a lost authenticity.
However, this seemingly cultural idea gradually evolved into an ideological foundation for political legitimacy. In discursive terms, the “return to the self” came to mean a return to tradition and religion; from this interpretation emerged a religious–revolutionary discourse that eventually culminated in the 1979 Revolution. In effect, by articulating the idea of returning to the self, Al-e Ahmad inadvertently facilitated a new alliance between intellectuals and the clergy—a synthesis that combined cultural critique of modernity with the presentation of religion as its alternative. This alliance laid the theoretical groundwork for one of the most significant political transformations of the twentieth century in Iran: the transformation of religion from a domain of morality and personal faith into a political ideology.
In his various works, especially On the Service and Treason of Intellectuals, Al-e Ahmad repeatedly emphasizes that the Iranian intellectual, if separated from the people and their traditions, inevitably becomes a servant of foreign powers. In his view, the only path to salvation for the intellectual is to reconnect with the masses and return to their language and values. These “people,” however, are not a social class in the modern sense but rather the traditional and religious populace whose faith has not yet been contaminated by modernity. Thus, the “return to the self” in the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad effectively becomes a return to religious faith. Within this framework, religion is presented as the source of national unity, cultural resistance, and authentic identity. Al-e Ahmad writes: “The clergy are the last refuge of this nation’s independence.” Although this statement had primarily a cultural meaning at the time, it later acquired a political dimension and came to legitimize religious authority.
From a critical perspective, the idea of returning to the self in Al-e Ahmad’s works operates on two levels: first, a cultural level aimed at criticizing the alienation of intellectuals; and second, an ideological level that promotes a collective religious identity. On the first level, Al-e Ahmad seeks to draw intellectuals down from the ivory tower of Westernization and remind them that indigenous culture also possesses the potential for renewal and modernization. On the second level, however, he inadvertently defines the “self” as an absolute, unchangeable religious tradition. This shift from culture to ideology causes the discourse of returning to the self to reproduce traditional authority rather than reconstruct cultural vitality.
In essence, in his search for identity, Al-e Ahmad turns not toward creating a new self but toward reconstructing the past. This is the same paradox that many later thinkers—most notably Ali Shariati—would replicate in their own intellectual trajectories. Shariati adopted the concept of returning to the self from Al-e Ahmad and fused it with a revolutionary interpretation of Islam, thereby transforming it into an “Islamic ideology” to fight against both Western domination and domestic despotism. From this perspective, Al-e Ahmad can be considered the cultural forerunner of the Islamic Revolution’s discourse, even if he never explicitly endorsed the establishment of a theocratic government. His thought provided the intellectual grounds for an unprecedented synthesis between “intellectualism” and “clericalism” in modern Iranian history.
From the viewpoint of the sociology of knowledge, the idea of returning to the self in the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad was a reaction to the failure of two projects: Reza Shah’s modernization program and Mossadegh’s secular nationalist movement. In both cases, the Iranian intelligentsia failed to establish a genuine connection with society. Al-e Ahmad sought to heal this rupture but lacked the theoretical tools to critique modernity from within; thus, he sought refuge in religious tradition. In the absence of critical philosophy and modern political theory, religion became the only available source of meaning and unity. In other words, Al-e Ahmad rejected the West but could not fully belong to modernity; therefore, he turned to a “self” that was less a living identity than a nostalgic projection of a lost past.
It is also important to note the hidden political dimension of this idea. “Return to the self,” though presented as a cultural invitation, implicitly contained an anti-colonial and anti-modern political stance. Al-e Ahmad viewed every form of intellectual and economic dependence on the West as a sign of betrayal and decay. Consequently, returning to the self came to signify independence from the West and, ultimately, rejection of the entire modern institutional and intellectual system. This outlook later manifested in the revolutionary discourse of the 1970s as a denial of the modern state, secularism, and even democracy. In this sense, by restoring “authenticity” to religious tradition, Al-e Ahmad inadvertently paved the way for the ideological legitimization of religious rule.
Nevertheless, Al-e Ahmad’s intentions should not be conflated with the historical consequences of his thought. He sought freedom and authenticity, not religious authoritarianism. Yet, lacking the theoretical means to distinguish between “culture” and “ideology,” his ideas were later reinterpreted within the field of politics in unintended ways. From a contemporary perspective, the notion of returning to the self can hold constructive and critical meaning—provided that returning to tradition entails rethinking it, not merely repeating it. Al-e Ahmad left this path unfinished: he sounded the alarm, but he did not chart a clear route to liberation.
In conclusion, the idea of “return to the self” in the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad must be understood as ambivalent: on the one hand, it represents a sincere effort to revive cultural independence and resist Western domination; on the other, it laid the groundwork for transforming tradition into ideology and strengthening the religious discourse of power. This duality is both the source of Al-e Ahmad’s intellectual strength and the root of his historical limitation—a voice that rose amid the crisis of tradition and modernity but could not transcend its boundaries.
Al-e Ahmad and the Legitimacy of Religious Government: The Unintended Continuation of a Discourse
Any analysis of the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad would be incomplete without considering its historical impact on the intellectual and political transformations that followed the 1960s. Although Al-e Ahmad was neither a political theorist in the classical sense nor an advocate of religious rule, his writings and positions—especially in his later works—indirectly provided the intellectual and cultural groundwork for legitimizing religious governance. In other words, Al-e Ahmad himself sought a return to faith, not the establishment of a theocracy; yet the structure of his discourse was such that, in the following decade, it was reinterpreted by religious and revolutionary forces as a theoretical foundation for political Islam.
From Critique of Intellectuals to Praise of the Clergy
In On the Service and Treason of Intellectuals, Al-e Ahmad offers a fundamental critique of the Iranian intelligentsia. He portrays the Westernized intellectual as a “broker of foreign civilization,” alienated from the people and serving systems of domination. In contrast, he presents the clergy as the only social force that remained independent of both the state and the West. In his view, the clerical class preserved its bond with the people and inherited Iran’s moral and cultural traditions. Although Al-e Ahmad expressed this opposition in cultural terms, it effectively produced a shift in the source of legitimacy—from the secular intellectual to the religious authority.
This epistemic shift had a profound influence on the intellectual climate before the Revolution. During the 1970s, a significant number of religious intellectuals—from Ali Shariati to Morteza Motahhari—thought within a framework first articulated by Al-e Ahmad: critique of Westoxication, return to the self, and the valorization of religion as a redemptive force. Shariati himself acknowledged that Al-e Ahmad was the first intellectual to make him aware of religion’s potential as a vehicle of social resistance. Thus, a deep connection was formed between Al-e Ahmad’s cultural critique and Shariati’s political theory—a connection that ultimately culminated in the emergence of the revolutionary–religious discourse of the 1970s.
Religion as the Guardian of National Identity
In the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, religion is not merely a system of belief but the very foundation of Iranian national identity. He repeatedly emphasizes that Islam has been the primary factor ensuring Iran’s cultural and social continuity after successive historical invasions. This perspective appears to defend cultural authenticity, but in practice, it fuses “nationhood” and “religion.” Consequently, Al-e Ahmad unintentionally proposes a model of cultural unity achievable only within a religious framework. In the turbulent aftermath of the Pahlavi regime’s collapse, this idea rapidly became a basis for legitimizing religious rule: if religion is the guarantor of national identity and independence, then a religious government can be seen as its natural embodiment.
In other words, what began in the 1960s as a cultural theory of independence from the West evolved in the 1970s and 1980s into the political ideology of revolutionary Islam. Al-e Ahmad described the clergy as the last refuge of independence, and the Islamic Revolution elevated that very institution as the locus of power. Thus, his cultural critique inadvertently turned into a source of religious legitimation.
From Westoxication to the Religious State
A direct conceptual link can be drawn between Al-e Ahmad’s Westoxication and the notion of “global arrogance” (estekbar-e jahani) in the discourse of the Islamic Republic. Both rest on a fundamental dichotomy between the spiritual East and the materialist West. Within this framework, resistance to the West is understood not only as a political struggle for independence but as a moral and religious duty. This logic naturally perpetuates a binary and closed worldview—one in which the West is always the source of corruption and decay, and the religious East, the locus of salvation.
The same dual structure that shaped the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, initially intended to preserve cultural identity, later served the political logic of velayat (religious guardianship). In the ideology of the Islamic Republic, the “self” that Al-e Ahmad invoked became the “Islamic ummah,” and Westoxication was recast as “cultural invasion.” Hence, Al-e Ahmad’s conceptual system, though born from cultural intent, became the linguistic apparatus for reproducing ideological power.
The Fundamental Contradiction: Critique of Power or Its Reproduction?
From a critical standpoint, Al-e Ahmad stands between two poles: on one side, he is a critic of Western domination and the political dependency of the Pahlavi regime; on the other, he legitimizes the religious institution as the authentic force of resistance. These two tendencies ultimately collide. He denounces power but seeks liberation through traditional authority. In this sense, Al-e Ahmad, though committed to freedom and independence, lacked the theoretical means to distinguish between religious faith and religious power. As a result, his discourse, once absorbed into the political sphere, was reinterpreted in ways that justified the legitimacy of religious authority.
This very contradiction defined the fate of many Iranian intellectuals: they sought independence by rejecting the West and dependent modernity but abandoned the modern tools of critical thought in the process. The outcome was the replacement of one form of power with another—one that justified itself in the name of religion and authenticity.
Conclusion: The Unintended Continuation of a Discourse
In summary, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad can be viewed as a bridge between the critical intellectual movements of the 1950s and the ideological discourse of the Islamic Revolution. He was the first to elevate the problem of Westoxication from an economic or political concern to a cultural and moral one, while presenting the return to the self as the path to liberation. Yet, by seeking that “self” within religious tradition, he paved the way for the ideological reinterpretation of faith. This trajectory—from Al-e Ahmad to Shariati, and from Shariati to the Revolution—constitutes an intellectual and historical process that ultimately culminated in the rise of religious government.
Nevertheless, Al-e Ahmad should not be seen as a prophet of religious ideology but rather as the awakened conscience of a generation caught between tradition and modernity, dependence and authenticity. He diagnosed the illness but sought its cure in a return to the past. If we are to learn from his legacy today, we must continue his unfinished path: to link the critique of Westoxication with the critique of religious power, and to understand the return to the self not as a repetition of tradition, but as the creative reimagining of identity within the modern world.
Conclusion and Final Assessment: The Intellectual Legacy of Jalal Al-e Ahmad in Contemporary Iranian Political Thought
An examination of the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad reveals that he was not merely a social writer or a critical intellectual, but one of the most influential figures in shaping the political consciousness of modern Iran. Al-e Ahmad was the voice of a generation caught in the midst of an identity crisis, alienation, and dependence on the West—searching for meaning and authenticity. By introducing concepts such as Westoxication and Return to the Self, he created a cultural-political discourse that continues to resonate within Iran’s intellectual landscape to this day. Yet this discourse, while awakening and critical, also became restrictive and ideological.
Al-e Ahmad: An Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity
Jalal Al-e Ahmad was among those intellectuals who experienced a deep ambivalence toward modernity. On the one hand, he was a child of modernity—educated, a translator, and familiar with Western philosophy and literature; on the other hand, he resisted Western intellectual and cultural influence. This inner conflict defined his intellectual identity. Thus, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad stands as both a critique of Western-style modernization and an expression of nostalgia for tradition. He did not reject modernity for its science or rationality, but for its alienation and cultural exploitation. In his view, Iranian modernity was a soulless imitation—derivative and dependent—and the only path to salvation lay in returning to one’s roots.
This “return” initially had a cultural meaning—rediscovering the self in relation to the Other—but gradually acquired religious and political dimensions. Disillusioned with Westernized intellectuals, Al-e Ahmad turned toward the clergy as an independent and populist social force. Consequently, he forged a link between culture and faith, between authenticity and religion. Although his intention was cultural, this connection indirectly contributed to the legitimization of religious authority.
From Cultural Awakening to Ideological Legitimization
Al-e Ahmad’s legacy can be viewed as twofold. On one side, he was the first modern thinker to articulate Iran’s cultural crisis in clear and accessible language. His book Westoxication served as a manifesto of awakening—a call to awareness and cultural independence. With intellectual honesty and literary force, he transformed complex concepts such as “cultural alienation” into public concerns. Yet, because his critique of modernity did not distinguish between critiquing modernity and rejecting it, his thought provided fertile ground for the rise of anti-modern ideologies. What began as a cultural critique later turned into an ideological “jihad” against the West.
In this process, religion was elevated from the level of individual spirituality to that of collective ideology; and the discourse of Al-e Ahmad, without his intention, became a source of legitimacy for religious power. Thus, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, in a paradoxical way, is both a critique of power and a precursor to a new form of power.
Enduring Influence on Iranian Intellectualism
The influence of Al-e Ahmad cannot be confined to the Islamic Revolution. Many later intellectuals from diverse schools of thought were affected by him. Even staunch critics of religious discourse—such as Abdolkarim Soroush and Dariush Shayegan—have acknowledged that their intellectual journeys began with the questions Al-e Ahmad raised. Indeed, he articulated a problem that remains unresolved: the relationship between Iran and the West, tradition and modernity, faith and modern reason.
In this sense, Al-e Ahmad was less a thinker of answers than a thinker of questions—and this is precisely his significance. He compelled Iranian society to reflect on its roots and its future. For this reason, the political thought of Jalal Al-e Ahmad continues to serve as a living source for debates on identity, culture, and politics in contemporary Iran.
Al-e Ahmad in Today’s Horizon
To engage with Al-e Ahmad’s legacy in the twenty-first century, we should see him not as a prophet calling for a return to the past, but as a warning voice against alienation. His critique of Westoxication can today be reinterpreted as a critique of “consumerism,” “information saturation,” and “technological dependency.” However, to transcend his limitations, we must move beyond ideology and toward a critical reconstruction of tradition. Return to the Self—if understood as the creative reimagining of identity—can remain inspiring; but if interpreted as mere repetition of tradition and rejection of modernity, it leads only to cultural isolation and authoritarianism.
Ultimately, Al-e Ahmad should be regarded as a thinker who mirrored the crisis of Iranian intellectual life. He emerged from within modernity, sought refuge in tradition, and remained suspended between the two. His voice still echoes because he articulated a question that remains alive: How can one live in the modern world without losing cultural and moral authenticity? His answer was incomplete, but his question continues to lie at the heart of Iranian political and intellectual thought.
